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CHAPTER ONE 
ISLAMIC EDUCATION: TRADITION, PRACTICES, AND CULTIVATION OF THE 
SOUL 
 
As a teacher in an Islamic school in North America, I recall how often I would 
hear fellow teachers and parents ask the question “Are we an Islamic school or a Muslim 
school?” This question was often raised when encountering a situation such as the 
behavior of students or the lackluster practice of some dimension of the faith by a fellow 
teacher, administrator, or board member. In this case, the term “Islamic” signified an 
idealized conception of the faith and its practice. This was juxtaposed with the term 
“Muslim” which signified the present communal embodiment of the faith; invariably not 
the idealized conception. Whenever I pressed further as to what was intended by the term 
“Islamic,” a multitude of responses with only agreement on the broad general creedal 
doctrines and practices would be presented.  
The questions over the use of “Islamic” and “Muslim” represent a lack of 
consensus amongst educators over the signification of the term. It presents one of the 
major challenges when developing an Islamic philosophy of education due to the very 
term “Islamic” being employed and conceived of in often contradictory, vague, and a 
multitude of ways. Without a conception of the object that the term “Islamic” signifies 
that goes beyond the general, broad themes that the expression “Islamic” captures, the 
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term does not serve as a viable, coherent analytical category of enquiry. The question 
arises as to why, then, do Muslims and non-Muslims use the term to begin with? In using 
the term, does it serve their purposes that they intend? Is there something that separates 
Islamic education from other conceptions of education that makes using the terms 
“Islamic” necessary? If so, what is or are those qualities that make Islamic education 
unique requiring it to be used and thereby rendering it a viable analytical category of 
enquiry? This study aspires to address this situation by suggesting an approach to engage 
the analytic category of ‘Islamic’ and addressing these questions by studying the thought 
of the Shāfiʿī jurist, judge, and educationist of the Mamluk period, Badr al-Dīn Ibn 
Jamāʿah (d. 733/1333) and his Tadhkirat al-sāmiʿ wa-l-mutakallim fī ādāb l-ʿālim wa-l-
mutaʿāllim, a seminal work capturing mature and representative educational thought in 
the Islamic world. Through his work, this study will suggest answers to the questions 
posed above in the hope of moving the conversation forward amongst Muslim educators 
in the North America. It aims to achieve this by providing a framework and approach in 
the idea of the Islamic tradition to answer these and future questions that Muslim 
educators will encounter.  
In Michael S. Merry’s assessment of Islamic schools, he describes Islamic schools 
in Western societies as currently facing a crises in (a) the “disjuncture between Islamic 
educational ideals (as expressed by Muslim philosophers of education), the aspirations of 
school administrators, and the manner in which Islamic school operate” and (b) the 
struggle of Islamic schools “to define what is distinctive about an Islamic education” 
(Merry 2007, 47). This disjuncture and lack of clarity about what is distinctive about 
Islamic education is manifests in the current state of Islamic studies curricula and in the 
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mission statements of Islamic educational institutions in North America. In recent years, 
there have been efforts to develop a comprehensive Islamic Studies curriculum for 
Islamic school in North America. Yet they are not being widely implemented while 
teachers and administrators remain unsatisfied. Regarding the state of the curriculum, 
Merry observes that, “no comprehensive set of curricular materials for Islamic school 
presently exists” (Merry 2007, 39). Craig Joseph and Barnaby Riedel further observe that 
“one of the primary difficulties of religious instruction, however, is the lack of 
systematized, consensual religious curriculum. Indeed, after more than a decade of 
operation, Universal School still finds itself without an Islamic curriculum” (Joseph and 
Riedel 2008, 164). This state of Islamic studies curriculum is a resultant condition of the 
lack of clarity of amongst Muslim educators in North America on the signification of the 
term “Islamic”.  
When studying the mission statements of Islamic schools in North America one 
does observe a degree of uniformity amongst them. For example, one school describes 
their mission as having students “understand tawhid, develop a strong moral character, 
develop a strong sense of responsibility, interact with the community and global issues 
with an Islamic frame of mind, and recognize Islam as the only viable solution to life’ 
problems and challenges.” Another school seeks to “cultivate an Islamic spirit in each 
student” in addition to high academic achievement while another aims to “help Muslim 
children excel in learning and compete with their counterparts in passing the Standards of 
Learning as mandated by the Department of Education. Lastly, a New England school 
“guides the children to lead decent contemporary lives, enrich their families, serve their 
community, tolerate differences, think critically, promote collaboration and respect 
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others. School activities help the children develop individual talent, self-esteem and 
leadership characteristics and offer an outlet for demonstrating creativity” (Merry 2007, 
59). One notices that the mention of Islam and Muslim either is at the level of identity, as 
in Muslim children, or are very general and not elaborated as to what specific aspect of 
the term is being referred to, as in the Islamic frame of mind. The rest of the items such 
as self-esteem, talent, tolerance, and thinking critically are, as Merry observes, 
“unsurprisingly Western in origin” (Merry 2007, 60) and are not conceived nor expressed 
in a manner that is distinctively Islamic or grounded in the Islamic tradition.  
I identify two approaches adopted scholars and others engaged in tackling the 
question of the signification of the term “Islamic” in Islamic education or Islamic 
schools: a universalist account and a particularist account. The universalist account, in the 
face of the multiplicity encountered regarding conceptions of the term “Islamic”, seeks an 
essence or a unifying element that is common to these various conceptions. The 
particularist account embraces the various conceptions of “Islamic” and is not necessarily 
concerned with what binds all of them together. This is due to adherents of this approach 
holding that every instance of the term “Islamic” is constructed and determined by the 
context in which it was formed, thus rendering each conception as distinct from another 
with nothing that will bring the two together under the analytical category “Islamic”. 
Barnaby Riedel’s study of character education at an Islamic school in North America 
reveals a common approach to Islamic education conceived in terms of developing 
Muslim American character. Ethical character, in this conception, is universalized to be 
as inclusive as possible to avoid engaging the internal legal, theological, and spiritual 
diversity amongst Muslims. This represents what I termed a universalist approach to 
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Islamic education that seeks to locate a common ground to all educational activity that is 
termed “Islamic”. This universalist approach to Islamic education teaches students “how 
to be good people, good Muslims, where the concept of “good” is believed to be both 
universal and self-evident” (Riedel 2009, 117). Here the purpose of Islamic education is, 
to “be good role models, be good practicing Muslims where you follow basic values 
about maintaining your family, taking care of each other, contributing to the community, 
helping the community to grow, be an asset to society and making sure that Islam is there 
helping to do that” (Ibid, 118). There is little here that is substantial on the term good that 
provides justification to use the appendage “Islamic”. Conceived in a universalist 
manner, the signification of “Islam” in Islamic education in this universalist approach has 
ended up with the universal values being conflated with “American” or “Western” values 
in the minds of educators and administrators in Islamic schools. Riedel quotes the 
principal at the Islamic school stating, “They’re just very basic simple values that tie into 
the core moral and ethical standards that every human being should have” (Ibid, 124).” 
The universalist approach, although allowing Islamic schools to avoid having to engage 
the diversity present in Islam, also renders the signifier “Islamic” in Islamic education not 
referring to any object or category that is distinct and identifiable. An additional major 
drawback of this approach is that seems not to engage the historical dimensions of 
Muslim education. Thus “Islamic,” in this approach, ends up being an analytic term with 
no meaning.  It is no surprise then that many educators in Islamic schools “describe their 
school as very much like a typical public school, only with Islamic elementary added on” 
and even use the same textbooks as other secular public schools (Merry 2007, 61).  
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Acknowledging that attempting to define Islamic education “is a contested 
enterprise,” Nadeem Memon presents another approach to the term “Islamic” which 
maintains that “there cannot be a single conception of the ‘Islamic’ without limiting the 
complexity and diversity among Muslims” (Memon 2009, 182). Farid Panjwani is a 
representative of the second approach, holding that the due to the term’s obviousness, its 
meaning is taken for granted and conception of the term “Islam” that underpins 
educational discourse needs to be examined. He recommends an approach that 
emphasises human agency when answering this question which then brings about a shift 
from focusing on Islam to focusing on Muslims. He states, “An appreciation of the role 
of human agency could lead to the recognition that while Islam may have ideals, they 
were continuously formed and reformed in the interaction between the revelatory text and 
the concrete realities of Muslims” (Panjwani 2004, 26). This approach ushers in historical 
dimensions into the question of Islamic or Muslim education. What is appreciated about 
this approach is the acknowledging of the historical and sociological dimensions that 
shape how we answer what is Islamic or Muslim education. Yet this approach leaves us 
without any tools to generate any answers that will find acceptance among the Muslim 
community. On what basis should we adopt a particular conception of what constitutes 
Islamic education? What Panjwani’s approach provides us with is an appreciation for the 
multiplicity of answers to the question of Islamic education, yet it is lacking the 
necessary epistemological tools and any framework of authoritative standards by which 
one can assess which approach which allow Islamic schools to meet the goal of in being a 
viable alternative to secular educational programs and institutions. Thus one instantiation 
of the term “Islamic” is on equal footing as another instantiation. This approach suffers 
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from not being able to explain debates amongst Muslims regarding what doctrines, 
practices are Islamic, and what is not.1 Nor does it account for the various nuances on 
how the term “Islamic” is used in scholarly discourse where a conception would be in 
logical contradiction with other conceptions.2 Under this approach, “Islamic education” 
results in being a meaningless signifier leaving the discourse with no object of study to 
which the analytic category “Islamic” signifies that can contain these diverse conceptions 
of “Islamic”.  
Memon does not favor Panjwani’s suggestion of Muslim education due to it not 
taking into consideration “the sanad (chain of transmission) through which the tradition 
of Islam remains intact today” (Memon 2009, 182) and that it leads to a relativistic 
approach to addressing educational aims and objectives.3 For Memon, the approach to 
answering the question of what is distinct about Islamic education ultimately rests in 
identifying what is common to all loci of Islamic education in the Muslim world, both 
present and historically. What is common in the loci of education is the “sacred presence” 
which constitutes the principles of the Islamic tradition and thereby constitutes the 
distinct quality of Islamic education regardless of any particular form. This universalist 
                                                               
1 Talal Asad (2009) elaborates on this point stating that this approach “will not do, if only because there are 
everywhere Muslims who say that what other people take to be Islam is not really Islam at all. This paradox 
cannot be resolved simply by saying that the claim as to what is Islam will be admitted by the 
anthropologist o only where it applies to the informant's own beliefs and practices, because it is generally 
impossible to define beliefs and practices in terms of an isolated subject. A Muslim's beliefs about the 
beliefs and practices of others are his own beliefs. And like all such beliefs, they animate and are sustained 
by his social relations with others.” 
2 See Marmura (1983) for his discussion on the term “Islamic” regarding Islamic philosophy. Here he 
distinguishes between using the term “Islamic” in two senses: as referring to belonging to the culture and 
civilization of Islam where even Christian philosophers are included, and as referring to adherents of the 
Islamic religion where the philosophers have reconciled their philosophy with the Qur’an.  
3 A sanad, or an isnād, a term usually associated with hadith studies, here refers to pedigree of teachers that 
extends to an author of a text or back to the Prophet Muhammad. It demonstrates that the student has 
studied with qualified teachers of a particular science and imparts that authority to the student who will go 
on to be included in the isnād.  
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account of Islamic education suffers from a lack of any substantial content that is 
distinctly Islamic about this sacred presence. The notion of a sacred presence is shared 
amongst many adherents of different faiths yet the question remains as to what is distinct 
about this conception of a sacred presence that renders the term “Islamic” as a viable 
analytical category of enquiry. 
The current situation of Islamic schools in North America should be viewed in the 
broader context of educational institutions in Muslim countries around the globe as well 
as in light of the secularization trajectory of educational institutions in the United States. 
Secularization is more of a process than an event. Scholars have identified various 
sources that push an educational institution that was once religious towards 
secularization. Additionally, there are marks of secularization that indicate that an 
institution in at some stage of the secularization process. William Ringerberg’s work is 
particularly useful on this topic. One of the marks of secularization is that the institution’s 
goals are less theological and more sociological in nature which is expressed in language 
that is equivocal and non-confessional. This is coupled with less emphasis on its church 
affiliation and interdenominational identification. (Ringerberg 2006) 
This mark of secularization can be observed in the mission statements of 
educational institutions affiliated with Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. In a 1995 study 
of 52 Jesuit university mission statements, there was “no reference to the formation of 
Catholics” along with “no reference to the explicit transmission of the Catholic faith and 
a specific place for theology is mentioned only in ten of the documents” (Arthur 2006, 
36). In general, theological grounding for any distinctiveness of the educational programs 
is lost while some mission statements do not even mention the Catholic Church. 
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Protestant institutions mission statements focused on values while a number of them did 
emphasize the explicit Christian distinctiveness of their educational program. For 
example, Northwestern College’s educational program exists so their students learn how 
to live in the world as Christians. (Arthur 2006) 
When it comes to Muslim institutions globally, one finds that “most governments 
in Muslim states have adopted the Western model of the university with the belief that in 
so doing Muslim societies would make progress. The study of religion, i.e. Islam, was 
largely left to the mosques, private houses and the madrassas” (Arthur 2006, 58). Thus 
what one has is an institution whose ethos may be Islamic but “the curriculum and 
methods remain entirely secular in orientation” (Arthur 2006, 59). In response to this 
phenomenon, many Islamic universities were created to ensure that this secularizing trend 
is avoided and in their mission statements Islam takes center place. The International 
Islamic University in Islamabad aims “to reconstruct human thought in all its forms on 
the foundations of Islam” and “to develop Islamic character and personality among the 
students.” Similarly, the International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur intends to 
“integrate Islamic revealed knowledge and values in all academic disciplines and 
educational activities” (Arthur 2006, 60). Finally, the Aga Khan University “emphasises 
intellectual freedom, autonomy, distinction in scholarship and even pluralism” based in 
Islam. While it is to be noted that what is intended by Islam is not elaborated nor is the 
approach to reconstructing knowledge on the foundations of Islam stated, the more 
important point is the emphasis on the sociological dimensions of the institutions’ goals 
which is a salient mark of secularization. The trends we see in Islamic schools in North 
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America regarding the nebulous conceptions of Islam are part of a larger challenge that 
all religious Islamic educational institutions have been facing.  
With the universalist and particularist approaches not being able to resolve 
signification of “Islamic” in Islamic education, the question that arises from this impasse 
is: what approach can we adopt to account for the signification of the term “Islamic” in 
Islamic education that will allow us then to develop an identity of Islamic educational 
institutions that will not end up on the secularization trajectory? This approach must 
account for the multiple conceptions of “Islamic” amongst Muslim educators yet, in order 
to serve institutional identities, it must also provide standards that allow one to determine 
what is and is not the signified by the category “Islamic”. Additionally, the approach 
should capture elements that constitute the term “Islamic” and render it a viable analytic 
category of enquiry. 
Additionally, David Bakhurst notes that any educational theory and practice can 
“scarcely avoid commitment, explicit or implicit, to a conception of the self and its 
relation to the world when adopting views of knowledge, learning, and understanding, 
when…confronting questions of difference and cultural identity in contemporary 
educational institutions” (Backhurst, 2011, 53). When composing or studying any 
educational institution’s mission statement, curriculum, identity, or theory of knowledge, 
a self is assumed in the backdrop of which educational enquiries are carried out. This 
rather obvious point deserves to be highlighted because in deliberating over issues in 
educational thought, it often happens that all parties mistakenly assume they share the 
same conception of the human self. In turn, it often leads to subsidiary educational issues 
being misconceived or being assigned a primacy that is unwarranted. This occurs usually 
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because of the use of common terms such as virtues, dispositions, scholastic skills, 
critical thinking, and other terms found in mission statements and curriculum. The 
presence of common terms gives the impression that the conception of the self is also 
shared. In recognizing that a commitment to a conception of the self underlies all 
educational deliberations, it is hoped that this will serve to adjust our thinking and 
approach in contemporary educational enquiries.  
One further point about Bakhurst’s observation on the fundamental role of the self 
in educational philosophy needs to be clarified. To identify that a conception of the self is 
assumed in the act of education is one thing, yet understanding education to be the act of 
self-cultivation seems to be a different matter.  
To this end, I will make use of the idea of an ‘Islamic tradition’ as an analytic 
category of enquiry as well as reconceiving the notion of education as education of the 
self or cultivation of the soul as approaches that will allow us to move beyond the current 
impasse the discourse on Islamic education finds itself in. When looking at the mission 
statements of various educational institutions, the focus of the statements seems to be on 
the cultivation of specific social capacities a graduate of the institution will possess. 
Looking beyond the specific capacities such as toleration, critical thinking, and being 
able to interact with the community, I identify that what is actually occurring here is the 
type of self the institution seeks to cultivate in its students. By reconceiving education as 
self cultivation, I aim to locate institutional identity primarily in the self that it seeks to 
cultivate. Institutional identity is not to be located primarily in the curriculum, a theology 
class, the institution’s architecture, a set of texts, or some strategy for communal 
engagement. By conceiving of education as the self cultivation, we now view that the 
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primary aim of every educational institution is to cultivate a particular conception of the 
self in its students which underlies the specific capacities of critical thinking or being able 
to engage the community. Thus, educational institutional identity should be examined 
with the understanding of education as self cultivation. By locating identity in the 
conception of the self, one is able to compare the Islamic tradition’s conception of the 
self with other conceptions in order to assess whether an educational institution is Islamic 
or not. One of the earliest conception of education as self cultivation, where the self is 
identified as the soul, is found in Alcibiades I by Plato which we will be examining in this 
chapter. 
In our enquiry of the conception of the self, as mentioned before, we will be 
employing the analytic category of the Islamic tradition to avoid the challenges posed by 
the universalist and particularist approaches currently employed by those addressing the 
question of the distinctive nature of Islamic education. The term tradition is frequently 
juxtaposed with modernity where the latter connotes progress and future directed 
thinking that is entails a break from the past. I will be employing tradition as a form of 
rational enquiry as developed by the Thomistic philosopher Alasdair Macintyre in After 
Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? which transcends common notions of a 
tradition that arise when used in relation to modernity. Central to MacIntyre’s conception 
of a tradition is the idea of a practice. MacIntyre’s conception of practices has embedded 
in it the notion of goods that are internal and external to practices which the practice aims 
to achieve. Education is to be conceived of as a practice which has goods that any 
practice aims to achieve, a telos. I claim that in providing an Islamic philosophy of 
education, which should also address what is signified by the term “Islamic”, one needs 
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to enquire as to what are the internal goods education seeks to secure as conceived of in 
the Islamic tradition. This is accomplished by conceiving of teaching and learning as a 
practice with internal and external goods. These goods directly arise from the telos of the 
human being as developed in the Islamic tradition and are arranged in a relational manner 
to each other and in a manner that is also hierarchical thus culminating in the highest 
good of Islamic education – which is the cultivation of the soul that possesses adab. It is 
in the highest good of Islamic education where identity of any educational activity 
resides. Thus, when seeking the identity of an educational institution, we are presuming a 
conception of Islamic education to which we are really enquiring about the internal 
goods of Islamic education. 
The remaining sections of this chapter will be devoted to developing MacIntyre’s 
notion of a tradition, and conceiving of education – the act of instructing and learning – 
as the practice of cultivating the soul as developed in Alcibiades I by Plato. The concept 
the MacIntyrean notion of a tradition of inquiry with Asad’s understanding of Islam as a 
discursive tradition will be employed to develop the concept of an Islamic tradition as an 
analytical category of enquiry. From there we will argue that the Islamic education is the 
practice where the cultivation of the soul that possesses adab is its highest good.  
 
MacIntyre and the Concept of a Tradition 
 Arguably one of the major philosophers of our time, Alasdair MacIntyre 
summarizes his intellectual biography as a philosopher stating,  
[M]y life as an academic philosopher falls into three parts. The twenty-two years  
from 1949, when I became a graduate student of philosopher at Manchester 
University, until 1971 were a period, as it now appears retrospectively, of 
heterogeneous, badly organized, sometimes fragmented and often frustrating and 
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messy enquiries, from which nonetheless in the end I learned a lot. From 1971, 
shortly after I emigrated to the United States, until 1977 was an interim period of 
sometimes painfully self-critical reflection, strengthened by coming to critical 
terms with such very different perspectives on moral philosophy as those afforded 
by Davidson in one way and by Gadamer in quite another. From 1977 onwards I 
have been engaged in a single project to which After Virtue, Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry are central, a  
Project described by one of my colleagues as that of writing An Interminably 
Long History of Ethics (MacIntyre 1998, 268-269). 
 
MacIntyre sets the foundations of his understanding of tradition and its role in 
ethics in After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? He continues to build upon 
these foundations in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry and Dependent Rational 
Animals, published in 1999, thus forming a quartet that represents the major features of 
his thought. In outlining MacIntyre’s conception of a tradition for our purpose, we will 
focus mainly on After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre’s life 
experience in the interim period grants us special insight as to the problem that his 
concept of a tradition serves as a solution for – the “very different perspectives on moral 
philosophy.” This is similar to the current state of discourse on Islamic education with 
rival conceptions of what constitutes Islamic education leading to curricular problems 
and those conceptions not being actualized in school settings. 
MacIntyre develops his conception of a tradition by entering through what he 
terms practices, which is the central part of any tradition. A practice is, “any coherent and 
complex form of socially established human activity through which goods internal to that 
for of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence 
which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended” (MacIntyre 1984, 187). We will start out analysis 
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of this conception of a practice by focusing on the role of goods in a practice. For 
MacIntyre, a practice is never to be confused for a set of technical skills. MacIntyre 
elaborates that bricklaying is a skill whereas architecture is a practice; throwing a football 
well is a technical skill whereas the game of football is a practice. Every practice has 
embedded in it goods and being a particular activity of human beings assumes the 
presence of a will and intention on part of the agent towards these goods. It is the goods 
embedded in a practice that a person engaged in the practice intends to acquire. Goods 
partly form and constitute the telos of a practice. Yet there are goods that are internal to a 
practice and goods that are external.  
In clarifying the notions of goods in relation to a practice, MacIntyre takes up the 
example of a child who wants to play the game of chess, which he considers to be a 
practice. The child does not want to learn how to play the game yet does have a strong 
desire for candy with no money to purchase it. The child is told that if he will play once a 
week, he will get fifty cents and if he wins, he will get fifty cents more. Upon hearing 
this, the child is now motivated to play the game and aims to win as well. MacIntyre 
observes that “so long as it is the candy alone which provides the child with a good 
reason for playing chess, the child has no reason not to cheat and every reason to cheat, 
provided he or she can do so successfully” (MacIntyre 1984, 188). His point in this 
observation is that the game of chess has goods such as the development of certain 
analytical skills, sharpening ones strategic thinking, and in this case, candy. The certain 
analytical skills are particular to the game of chess and can only be acquired by playing 
chess. The money for candy can be acquired by winning a game of chess or by some 
other means having nothing to do with the game of chess. If a child decides to cheat in 
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the game, he or she will only acquire the good of candy and not acquire the goods that are 
internal to the game of chess. Internal goods belong to a certain practice and can only be 
acquired through that practice. External goods, on the other hand, can be acquired 
through the practice or by means other than that particular practice. Every practice has 
internal and external goods. Someone may undertake a practice and may not intend to 
acquire its internal goods at the initial stages of a practice. At a later stage, upon realizing 
the practice’s internal goods, they will aim to acquire them. According to MacIntyre 
goods may internal for two reasons, first because “we can only specify them in terms of 
chess or some other game of that specific kind and by means of examples from such 
games,” and second “because they can only be identified and recognized by the 
experience of participating in the practice in question. Those who lack the relevant 
experience are incompetent thereby as judges of internal goods” (ibid., 188-189).  
In addition to a practice having goods that are specific to that practice and can 
only be identified by those participating in the practice, a MacIntyrean practice is 
constituted by standards of excellence and rules that are directed towards the acquiring of 
its internal goods. These standards of excellence and the goods internal to the practice 
constitute an authority that one entering into a practice must acknowledge and to which 
one must subject one’s own attitudes and preferences. One of the important consequences 
of this aspect of a practice is that subjectivist judgements are excluded from the realm of 
a practice as entering into a practice inaugurates a person into a community of 
practitioners with a relationship with each other. There is then a unifying aspect to a 
practice. MacIntyre notes that these standards of excellence are susceptible for revision. 
Yet the one entering the practice must accept the standards as the best standards so far. 
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Practices have embedded in them a conception of authoritative standards of excellence 
and goods that form what Talal Asad identifies as authoritative discourses in discursive 
traditions on which more will be elaborated later.  
A final aspect of the MacIntyrean practice that remains to be explored is that a 
practice can be carried out in successful or unsuccessful manner as determined by its 
standards of excellence and internal goods. To conduct a practice in an excellent manner 
means that it is done in accordance with its standard of excellence and to achieve the 
goods that are internal to the practice. In order for this to occur, MacIntyre identifies 
three virtues that are necessary of any practice. They are the virtues of justice, courage 
and honesty. In the example of the child playing chess, if he or she were to win by 
cheating, only the external good of fifty cents would be achieved, yet the internal goods 
of chess would remain unachieved. Thus in this case the practice of the game of chess 
would not be carried out successfully due to the absence of the virtue of honesty. The 
virtue of justice in a practice requires “that we treat others in respect of merit or desert 
according to uniform and impersonal standards” (ibid., 192) embedded in the practice. 
MacIntyre provides the example of a professor grading two students’ papers fairly 
according to the standards of the practice while grading another student’s paper based on 
her blue eyes. The relationship of the professor with the female student is different than 
his relationship to the other two students.  The virtue of courage entails “the care and 
concern for individuals, communities and causes which is so crucial to so much in 
practices” (ibid., 192) in order for practices to be carried out with excellence.  
 Before moving on to how a practice is configured within a tradition, it is 
important to highlight one of the most distinctive features of a MacIntyrean practice 
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namely a practice’s historical dimension. The historical dimension of a particular practice 
appears when looking at the relationship between a practice and its goods or ends. A 
MacIntyrean practice such as painting or physics not intrinsically possess any specific 
goals or ends, rather its goods or ends “are transmitted by the history of the activity” 
(ibid., 194). The question arises as to how the goods of a practice are determined and 
transmitted. It was observed before that when one enters into a practice, one enters into a 
relationship with other members of that practice – the community of practitioners. Yet it 
is not only current practitioners that one has a relationship with, “but also with those who 
have preceded us in the practice particularly those whose achievements extended the 
reach of the practice to its present point. It is thus the achievement, and a fortiori the 
authority, of a tradition which I then confront and from which I have to learn” (ibid., 
194). When entering into a practice, one enters into a community of practitioners that 
constitute authoritative figures, historical and current, of the practice. It is these authority 
figures’ enquiries that contribute to determining and transmitting the standards of 
excellence and ends of a practice. When one enters into a practice, one learns from the 
authorities the standards of excellence and ends of that practice.  
Yet those authority figure’s roles relate to more than the standards of excellence 
of a practice. MacIntyre explains,  
 The authority of a master within a craft4 is both more and other than a matter of  
 exemplifying the best standards so far. It is also and most importantly a matter of 
 knowing how to go further and especially how to direct others towards going 
further, using what can be learned from the tradition afforded by the past to move  
towards the telos of fully perfected work. It is in thus knowing how to link past 
and future that those with authority are able to draw upon tradition, to interpret 
and reinterpret it so that its directedness towards the telos of that particular craft 
becomes apparent in new and characteristically unexpected ways. And it is by the 
                                                               
4 MacIntyre, in his later works such as Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry where he further develops 
his concept of a tradition, uses the notion of a craft as being equated with intellectual inquiry.  
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ability to teach others how to learn this type of knowing how that the power of the 
master within the community of a craft is legitimated as rational authority 
(MacIntyre 1990, 65-66).  
 
The authorities of a practice play an important role towards new initiates of the practice. 
New initiates learn from them, not only the standards of the practice, but also the 
trajectory of the practice’s development and continuation. The development of the 
practice involves engaging its history and moving the practice towards it telos.  
 In After Virtue, MacIntyre’s conception of a tradition is in the context of the 
disquieting suggestion that all we have lost a unifying framework in which our moral 
discourse takes place. Instead, all we have are fragments from past discourses that are 
now lost resulting in a lack of coherence of contemporary moral discourse. In response to 
this condition, MacIntyre develops the tradition of virtues in which a core concept of 
virtues that unifies this tradition. His conception of tradition and practices in this context 
serve as the basis of his developments in his later works. In an important passage 
describing the three stages in the logical development of the core conception of a virtue 
MacIntyre states, 
 The first stage requires a background account of what I shall call a practice, the  
second account of what I have already characterized as the narrative order of a 
single human life and the third an account of a good deal fuller than I have given 
up to now of what constitutes a moral tradition. Each later stage presupposes the 
earlier, but not vice versa. Each earlier stage is both modified by and reinterpreted 
in the light of, but also provides an essential constituent of each later stage 
(MacIntyre 1984, 186-187). 
 
We have already explored the first stage; that of a practice. Practices are not all 
essentially good; rather a MacIntyrean practice may result or be put to evil uses. A 
practice, “under certain conditions be a source of evil: the desire to excel and to win can 
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corrupt, a man may be so engrossed by his painting that he neglects his family, what was 
initially an honorable resort to war can issue in savage cruelty” ( ibid., 200). Thus 
practices, its standards and goods, are subject to moral scrutiny which situates practices 
in a larger moral context. The larger context of a practice arises because the question the 
goods of practices and their authoritative basis: where do the good of practices derive 
their authority? One possible source of authority is to be found in individual choice. 
When a person is confronted with multiple rival conceptions of goods, it is the individual 
qua individual who has to make that choice of which conception is to be adopted. This 
choice, however, is being made in the absence of a criterion outside of the individual that 
can be invoked which does not solve the problem of arbitrariness.   
 Another possibility is to consider a practice and its goods in the greater context of 
“of an overriding conception of the telos of a whole human life, conceived as a unity” 
(ibid., 202). MacIntyre asks us to consider the virtue of justice. The Aristotelian 
conception of justice is the giving of each person his or her due desert in which being 
worthy of the desert is contingent upon contributing to the achievement of goods which 
constitute the foundations of a community. “But the goods internal to practices, including 
the goods internal to the practice of making and sustaining forms of community, need to 
be ordered and evaluated in some way if we are to assess relative desert. Thus any 
substantive application of an Aristotelian concept of justice requires an understanding of 
goods and of the goods that goes beyond the multiplicity of goods which inform practices 
[my italics]” (ibid., 202). In other words, the internal goods of a practice are situated in 
the larger context of other goods that are informed by a unified conception of the telos of 
the good life. It is the telos that serves as the constellation of goods which inform the 
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goods internal to practices by setting them in a hierarchy with the other goods. This 
constellation of goods serve also serves as the context in which an individual makes his 
or her choice when confronted with multiple rival conceptions of goods solving the 
problem of arbitrariness.  
 At this point, with the understanding of practices and how they are embedded in a 
larger context of a unitary conception of the telos of human life, we are able to attend to 
MacIntyre’s concept of a tradition as a tradition of enquiry. Nowhere does MacIntyre 
provide a complete definition of a tradition. Rather, he builds the concept of a tradition in 
his works and he develops various dimensions of a tradition throughout. We will be 
bringing those various dimensions as they relate to our purpose here of developing that 
category of an Islamic tradition as MacIntyre initially builds the concept of a moral 
tradition moving on to an intellectual tradition of enquiry; thus not all of his discussion 
bear on our task here. In After Virtue, in answering the question as to what constitutes a 
tradition, MacIntyre starts by noting that we should avoid using a Burkean notion of 
tradition where it is juxtaposed to reason and conflict where tradition is conceived only in 
the singular and associated with conservatism. If reasoning takes place in the larger 
constellation of a telos of human life, tradition cannot be the contrary of reason. In fact, 
for MacIntyre, “all reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional mode of 
thought, transcending though criticism and invention the limitations of what had hitherto 
been reasoned in that tradition; this is as true of modern physics as of medieval logic.” 
(ibid., 222). One of the major areas of what is reasoned in a tradition “are the goods the 
pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose” (ibid., 222). This 
argument over goods includes the goods of human life and the internal goods of 
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practices. MacIntyre provides the examples of a university and a hospital as institutions 
that bear a tradition of practices where its practitioners will be engaged in a continuous 
argument as to what a university is and what are the goods of medicine. Arguments of the 
goods are constituted by a historical dimension and an engagement with authoritative 
masters, both past and current, of a practice and the employment of reason. This leads to 
a conception of a tradition as, “an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and 
an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition” (ibid., 222).  
MacIntyre’s emphasis on the historical dimension of a tradition and its relation to 
practices is appreciated in that the history of a practice, with its standards of excellence 
and authority, is “embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer 
history of the tradition through which the practice in its present form was conveyed to us 
[my italics]” (ibid., 222). In other words, practices are constituent elements of traditions. 
The goods of practices and their histories can only be understood against the backdrop 
the tradition. Thus in attempting to understand a practice, we must take into account its 
history, but also view it in light of the history of the tradition that bears that practice and 
embodies. Thus far we see that a MacIntyrean conception of a tradition is bearer of 
practices of enquiry embedded with standards of excellence, internal goods, and 
authorities where reasoning takes place in the framework of the goods of a practice as 
arranged within the goods and telos of the tradition in the practice belongs. 
What remains to be explored are the substantive elements of a tradition of enquiry 
such as tradition-constituted rationality, truth, first principles, the enquiry process, 
authority, and how a tradition develops and changes. A central topos in MacIntyre’s 
works is the existence of rival claims and conceptions of the virtues such as justice, 
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patience, conceptions of the good life, and moral questions that are irresolvable. In Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? (hereafter WJ?WR?) the Enlightenment’s solution is the 
focus of MacIntyre’s development of the substantive elements of a tradition, the 
foundations of which he developed in After Virtue. It was a major aim of the 
Enlightenment project, as a solution to the irresolvable rival conceptions, to create a 
public realm where the rival conceptions would be debated. They would be debated with 
“standards and methods of rational justification by which alternative courses of action in 
every sphere of life could be adjudged just or unjust, rational or irrational, enlightened or 
unenlightened” (MacIntyre 1990, 6). The standards of rationality were understood as a 
measure by which all rival conceptions would be measured assuming that there was a 
rationality that was universal thereby transcending all local reasons. This notion of reason 
is a major constituent of the public realm which the Enlightenment project sought to 
create and any other form of reasoning that did not meet these standards was excluded 
from the public realm. Enlightenment thinkers understood this notion of reason as that 
would be acceptable to any rational person and would thereby serve as the only standard 
of reason that could be invoked in the public realm. Rationality was thus reconceived in 
this manner to serve as a solution to which all rival claims would be measured against.  
This project was, in MacIntyre’s estimation, not successful as there was a lack of 
agreement as to what this notion of reason looked like. In essence, this became another 
issue which rival conceptions existed where no resolution was achieved. The lack of a 
common understanding of reasoning in the public realm created two general responses 
from citizens: taking recourse to academic philosophy or resorting to communities of 
shared beliefs which involves circularity (in the case of academic philosophy) or 
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arbitrariness (in the case of the communities of shared beliefs). MacIntyre argues that the 
Enlightenment has made us blind to alternative conception of rationality by excluding 
them from view. What it made us blind to are rationalities that are tradition embedded. 
He states, “What the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to and what we now 
need to recover is, so I shall argue, a conception of rational enquiry as embodied in a 
tradition, a conception according to which the standards of rational justification 
themselves emerge from and are part of a history in which they are vindicated by the way 
in which they transcend the limitations of and provide remedies for the defects of their 
predecessors within the history of that same tradition” (MacIntyre 1990, 7). What is 
being proposed here is the idea that all rational thought takes place within the context of a 
tradition; rationality is tradition embedded. This is the alternative that was out of the sight 
of Enlightenment thinkers for whom tradition was the “antithesis of rational enquiry”. In 
not allowing for this alternative, their approach was to discard tradition and all prior 
forms and conceptions of authority which was to be replaced by a universal transcendent 
notion of reason and it was in this notion of reason where all authority would now be 
located for deciding on all rival claims in the public realm.  
One can naturally conclude that the concept of a tradition embedded rationality 
results in a type of relativism.5 This provides an opportunity to explore further 
MacIntyre’s conception of rationality and the process of rational enquiry. Regarding the 
laws of logic MacIntyre holds that, “the observance of the laws of logic is only a 
                                                               
5 Indeed this charge has been made against MacIntyre by more than a few critics. In the prologue to the 3rd 
edition of After Virtue he rejects relativism and maintains that those who conclude that his conception of a 
tradition leads to relativism are mistaken. I refer the reader to the prologue and to the relevant areas of 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? where he develops correctives to the understandings of his concept of 
tradition embedded rationalities that are relativistic and are deemed as mistaken understandings. My goal 
here is to develop his notion of tradition embedded rationality and its other substantive elements.  
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necessary and not a sufficient condition for rationality, whether theoretical or practical” 
(MacIntyre 1990, 4). Rationality is not to be conflated with being logical though there is 
a relationship between them. The laws of logic, such as the law of non-contradiction, the 
law of identity, and the law of the excluded middle, are to serve as the foundations for 
rationality. Enlightenment thinkers’ project of a public reason was in fact a conception of 
a conflation of their conception of rationality with the logic and it was the distinctness of 
rationality which is always embodied in a tradition, and logic which transcends traditions 
and the relationship between them which they did not consider. According to this 
conception, the term rational “is not a predicate to be applied to individuals qua 
individuals, but only to individuals qua participants in particular social orders embodying 
particular conceptions of rationality” (MacIntyre 1987, 4). The social orders MacIntyre 
has in mind here are practices which serve as the resources for habits of action and 
judgment for the community of practitioners. 
Reasoning embodied in a tradition, or tradition-constituted enquiry, takes the form 
of a syllogism where “the individual will argue from an initial premise of the form: Such-
and-such a type of action is good, or productive of good, for someone practising this 
particular craft at this particular level in such-and-such circumstances; and from a 
secondary premise of the form: Here and now are circumstances of just such a type. The 
conclusion will be an action falling under the action-description furnished by the major 
premise” (MacIntyre 1987, 5). The definition of what is good in the first premise is 
furnished by the standards and telos of that particular practice and tradition. The telos 
practice along with its goods and standards thus serve as the presuppositions of action 
and enquiry function as the first principles of a practice or a tradition. It is in this context 
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MacIntyre holds that “[i]t is characteristic of traditions of enquiry that they claim truth 
for their central theses and soundness for the central arguments. Were it otherwise, they 
would find it difficult either to characterize the aim and object of their enquiries or to 
give reasons for their conclusions” (MacIntyre 2007, xii).  
 Thus far, tradition-constituted rationality, its relationship to logic, notions of truth, 
and reasoning have been explored. Next, the stages of the enquiry process and how a 
tradition develops and is reformulated will be outlined. This will provide us with the 
components of a tradition which will serve as loci and artifacts by which we can identify, 
retrieve, and develop the practice of education in the Islamic tradition in order to identify 
its highest good. Community is an essential part of practices and a tradition. The process 
of tradition embodied enquiry consists of three stages and begins with a community 
which consists of elements which it has conferred authority upon. These elements consist 
of “certain texts and certain voices” such as “[b]ards, priests, prophets, kings, and, on 
occasion, fools and jesters” (MacIntyre 1988, 354). These elements, in the first stage, are 
accepted and deferred to without being subject to questioning by members of the 
community. The enquiry process moves into the second stage when the community is 
presented with alternative interpretations of these texts and voices. Additionally, the new 
situations and occurrences raise questions that “may reveal within established practices 
and beliefs a lack of resources for offering or for justifying answers to these new 
questions” (ibid., 355). It is at the third stage where the community responds to these new 
circumstances when a reformulation of beliefs and practices, along with the 
reinterpretation of texts resulting in the production of new texts. There is one category of 
people, texts and utterances that are exempt from this process of reinterpretation in 
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MacIntyre’s scheme: those people or texts with whose authority in the community is due 
to its relationship to the divine or sacred. It would seem that this exemption is derived 
from the quality of infallibility which divine authority is usually conceived of possessing. 
Nonetheless, the utterances of authority that is sacred or due to their relationship to the 
divine are subject to reinterpretation yet their authority is exempt. Thus, in every tradition 
“some core of the shared belief, constitutive of allegiance to the tradition, has to survive 
every rupture” (ibid., 356). A tradition is not merely about uncritically received doctrines 
in the past as we can see here. Rather, a tradition connects what is received from the past 
with the present via continuous community engagement and, in being a form of enquiry, 
the community directs towards the future development of that tradition.  
 The concept of a tradition provides us with tools to conceive the Islamic tradition 
as an analytical category by which to pursue our enquiry of the highest good of Islamic 
education. A tradition, as we have seen, is constituted by a telos of human life and its 
good where the human life with a narrative unity. Tradition additionally provides a 
constellation of goods which serve as the larger context in which the goods of practices 
are arranged hierarchically. The goods of practices are thus subordinate to the goods and 
telos of a tradition. A tradition additionally affords us the authoritative figures, texts, and 
modes of reasoning specific to it that generates, what Talal Asad’s calls, an authoritative 
discourse.6 What composes an authoritative discourse are the beliefs, doctrines, 
                                                               
6 For Asad, the term authority or authoritative is not being used in the sense of a hierarchy of power where 
there is exists a differentiation between the powerful and those without power. Rather, the term authority 
refers to “the internal structure of a relationship that brings into play a multiplicity of material components” 
(Asad 2006, 212). Here authority is what underlies various artifacts one encounters within a tradition. Here 
Asad is building on Hannah Arendt’s insights on the nature of authority where she distinguishes between 
authority and authoritarianism. The later requires coercive force whereas the former does not depend on it. 
Thus, an authoritative discourse serves as an “inner binding” of sorts that brings coherency to various 
components in the Islamic tradition.   
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cosmologies, practices, habits, dispositions, interpretations of texts, and standards of 
practices which conceived in a manner that is distinctive to a tradition and define a 
religious tradition; in our case the Islamic tradition. These conceptions are shared 
amongst the members of a tradition and core elements of this authoritative discourse are 
not subject to preconception and remain authoritative throughout a tradition’s history. 
This authoritative discourse along with its core elements constitutes what is Islamic in the 
Islamic tradition. By extension, it will also constitute what is distinct in our term Islamic 
education as one of many practices in the Islamic tradition. 
 
Education as a Practice 
We are now in a position to say that the term “Islamic” signifies any practice that 
presupposes the constitutive elements of the Islamic tradition, which are its distinctive 
conception of a narrative unity of the telos and goods of a human life and authoritative 
discourse. By extension then, Islamic education signifies a practice that has internal and 
external goods, and standards of excellence developed over time by authoritative voices 
in that community of practitioners. Conceiving education as a practice in the Islamic 
tradition, we will be in a position to enquire what constitutes the highest good of this 
practice as conceived in the Islamic tradition.7 MacIntyre’s notion of a tradition allows us 
                                                               
7 Interestingly enough, MacIntyre himself claims that teaching is not a practice. For MacIntyre, teaching is 
“a set of skills and habits put to the service of a variety of practices. The teacher should think of her or 
himself as a mathematician, a reader of poetry, an historian or whatever, engaged in communicating craft 
and knowledge to apprentices” (MacIntyre 2004, 5). MacIntyre’s conception of teaching is that all teaching 
can only take place in the context of a particular practice or craft. It is not that the teacher need be an actual 
practitioner; rather at minimum, a conception of the practice is required. Thus, there is no such thing as the 
act of teaching or being a teacher that is separated from a particular practice even at a conceptual level. I 
argue that while much of teaching is manifested in the training of initiates into a practice, MacIntyre’s 
conception of education, which entails the act of teaching and learning, is simply too narrow to restrict it 
solely to the teaching of crafts. To be sure, if education is conceived solely as the initiation into a practice 
or craft, then perhaps teaching cannot be conceived as a separate practice outside the context of a craft. I 
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to identify the constitutive elements of what makes a practice Islamic. In other words, 
every instantiation of the practice of education that possesses these constitutive elements 
will be considered Islamic. This allows us to avoid the drawbacks the universalist 
approach brings with it where the term Islamic did not signify anything of substance that 
identified what is distinctive of Islamic education. Additionally, the historical dimensions 
the concept of a tradition, particularly the concept of a practice, along with the 
authoritative discourse that allows us to engage with and account for multiple rival 
understandings of Islamic education, which the universalist approach did not provide. 
The authoritative discourse embedded in traditions and practices provide the standards 
and frameworks, which the particularist approach did not afford, needed to assess and 
navigate through the multiple conceptions of Islamic education.  
I arguing that by conceiving education as practice of self-cultivation, Islamic 
education has the cultivating of a soul that possesses adab as its highest good. By 
conceiving education as a practice, I will explore its authoritative discourse by 
identifying in the practice’s history the authoritative masters of the practice of education 
                                                               
will argue that if education in the Islamic tradition, conceived as the cultivation of the soul that possesses 
adab, does constitute a MacIntyrean practice with its own internal and external goods. For all crafts and 
practices, which includes the practice of teaching and learning, adab is an essential component that all 
initiates are expected to cultivate for the practice to carried out. Thus when MacIntyre states that “The life 
of a teacher is therefore not a specific kind of life. The life of a teacher of mathematics, whose goods are 
the goods of mathematics is one thing; a life of a teacher of music whose goods are the goods of music is 
another” (MacIntyre 2004, 8), he reaffirms that teaching is not an activity that is separate from the practice 
itself and its only goal is to acquire the goods specific to that craft. This restricted conception of teaching 
consists of a set of skills put to the service of a practice. The practice of education as conceived in the 
Islamic tradition is inclusive of the goods of individual crafts yet extends beyond those goods. The highest 
good of this inclusive view of education is the cultivation of adab in the soul. No doubt, this can be 
acquired through the means of a particular practice, but it is not necessarily the case as a practiced may be 
carried out without adab on the part of a practitioner. This requires the master of the practice to attend to 
more than the mere goods of a practice. He or she would also be required to inculcate adab in the initiate. 
This inclusive view resembles John Dewey’s concept of educative teaching that is distinct from what he 
terms mere training. Training focuses on the outward dimensions of a student whereas educative teaching 
focuses on the mental dimensions and inner dispositions of a student.  
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and the key principles and texts, to which the practitioners of the Islamic tradition of 
education have conferred authority. Although the texts of the Qurʾān and the collected 
statements of Prophet Muḥammad (ḥadīth) constitute the fundamental elements of 
Islamic tradition’s authoritative discourse, they will be engaged via the practices of 
Qurʾānic exegesis (ʿilm al-tafsīr) and ḥadīth commentary, which have their specific 
modes of rationality and authorities. The practice of education in the Islamic tradition 
embeds an authoritative discourse that, in addition to the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, is also 
constituted by certain authoritative texts which Sebastian Günther has termed the ādāb 
al-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿllim literature. This educational literature belongs to a larger genre of 
adab manuals that virtually every practice in the Islamic tradition has generated. Thus, 
we find adab manuals for judges, musicians, jurists, physicians, administrative secretaries 
and governors. These manuals differed in content than other resources available for the 
practitioners of these crafts in that these manuals are dedicated to a particular way the 
practice should be conducted not to any substantive and detailed knowledge of the 
practice. When a practice is carried out the way outlined in adab manuals, the practice 
can be said to be conducted with adab. These ādāb (plural of adab) constitute a praxis 
the practitioner undertakes by which the soul will possess adab. It is in this light where 
adab signifies “the disciplining of the souls” and “every praiseworthy praxis by [the 
employment of] which a virtue is generated” (al-Munāwī 1990, 44). Manuals of adab are 
manuals of praxis that the practitioner of a craft is required to undergo in order to 
cultivate a soul that possesses adab for that particular craft. By employing acts of adab, 
the practitioner will develop a malaka or habitus of adab, which, according to Muslim 
scholars of education, is a state of the soul where the practitioner’s soul possesses adab.  
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Education, being a practice, has its own genre of adab manuals that have been 
written for the teacher and the student. To construct the adab possessing soul, the major 
works of this genre will be studied. To that end, this enquiry will focus primarily on the 
work Tadhkirat al-sāmiʿ wa-l-mutakallim fī ādāb-i-l-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿāllim of Badr al-
Dīn Ibn Jamāʿah (d. 733/1333) who can be considered as an ‘authoritative master’ of the 
practice of education in the Islamic tradition. This work is one of the most influential 
works on educational thought in the Islamic tradition, being composed in an era of high 
activity in the field of education and at a time when institutionally, the state of education 
was mature. His work, therefore, serves as a mature and comprehensive representation of 
educational thought in the Islamic tradition. Studying this work will allow us to construct 
the self that the practice of education in the Islamic tradition aims to cultivate. This self 
can only be understood within the larger context of the human person and its telos in the 
Islamic tradition. Therefore, this study will first develop the conception of human person 
as a body-soul composite in the Islamic tradition, which informs the goods of the practice 
of education in the tradition. Thus far, we have developed what education as a 
MacIntyrean practice entails. What remains to be developed is conceiving education as 
the cultivation of the soul.  
 
Education as Self-Cultivation 
  One of the earliest presentations of education as self-cultivation is by Plato in his 
Alcibiades I.8 Alcibiades son of Clinias was sought out by many people of his day due to 
                                                               
8 There has been relatively recent controversy around the attribution of Alcibiades to Plato. Being accepted 
since ancient times as one of Plato’s works, it was only in the early nineteenth century where we doubt 
about its authenticity. According to Nicholas Denyer, this doubt was initiated by Friedrich Schleiermacher 
whose position was so influential that it led Alcibiades from “being the one dialogue read by anyone who 
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his physical beauty and talents. Having ambitions to start his political career, many 
sought his company, yet he sought the company of only one admirer of his, namely 
Socrates. At this point of his life, most of Alcibiades’ admirers have left him except for 
Socrates. Socrates’ love for Alcibiades was for who he truly was, while “the other were 
only lovers of what you had. While your possessions are passing their prime, you are just 
beginning to bloom” he tells the young Alcibiades (131e – 132a).  This Platonic dialogue 
centers on Socrates attempting to persuade Alcibiades to cultivate his self prior to 
entering into political life for despite Alcibiades, being from a noble family, having 
received one of the finest educations in his times, Socrates observed that his education 
was not complete. In this section we will examine what does Socrates intend by self-
cultivation and what method(s) does he propose for this to take place.  
 The dialogue starts with Socrates demonstrating that Alcibiades has a need for a 
teacher. The approach Socrates takes is first to convince Alcibiades that he is need of 
further developing. All of Alcibiades’ previous admirers, who held themselves in high 
esteem, left because, as Socrates tell Alcibiades, “you were even more arrogant” than his 
admirers. Socrates continues, “You say you don’t need anybody for anything, since your 
own qualities, from your body right up to your soul, are so great there’s nothing you 
lack” (104a). So how does Socrates deal with a person who is convinced that he has 
everything he needs? He presents to Alcibiades a hypothetical situation. “Supposing one 
of the gods asked you, “Alcibiades, would you rather live with what you now have, or 
would you rather die on the spot if you weren’t permitted to acquire anything greater?” 
                                                               
had read any Plato at all” to being “passed out of the canon, and almost completely out of sight” (Denyer 
2001, 15). For a detailed analysis of the claims against the authenticity of Alcibiades being composed by 
Plato along with responses to each claim, see Denyer (2001, 14-20). 
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(105a). Socrates answers the question for Alcibiades stating that he would rather die on 
the spot. By doing so, he convinces Alcibiades that there is still more that he can acquire 
and develop regarding his abilities.  
 Socrates insists that he is the only person who can assist Alcibiades in acquiring 
the political power he is aiming to acquire. Commenting on this, Darryl M. De Marzio 
highlights that, “There is a relationship between political power and pedagogy. A 
political leader needs the help of a teacher in order to acquire power. Presumably, a 
political leader requires a certain kind of teacher like Socrates. ‘Neither guardian, nor 
kinsman, nor anyone’ can help Alcibiades realize his ambitions – not even his own 
guardian, the great Pericles” (De Marzio 2006, 114). This is the first aim of Socrates 
when dialoguing with Alcibiades – to convince him of the need for an education before 
entering into politics and that this education requires a teacher. Of all the politicians in 
the city, it is only Pericles who is not in the state of ignorance. Socrates eventually has 
Alcibiades acknowledge that Pericles did not, “acquire his expertise all by himself; he 
kept the company with many experts like Pythoclides and Anaxagoras” (118c). 
Alcibiades even agrees that an expert also has the ability to make someone else an expert. 
Socrates achieved this by having Alcibiades have doubt over things he was once certain 
of such as the nature of justice. This doubt was created by a series of questions regarding 
the source of Alcibiades’ knowledge of justice. Alcibiades did not learn about justice 
from a teacher nor did he acquire this knowledge by himself. Instead, he learned it “from 
people in general” (110e).  
 Up until this point, the exact nature of education Socrates has in mind remains 
unexplored. To arrive at the exact nature of education, Socrates presents Alcibiades with 
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two options: staying in his present state or “practice some self-cultivation” (119a). Still 
not completely convinced, Alcibiades is ready to rely simply on his natural abilities of his 
soul without any cultivation to bring his soul to perfection. Socrates takes up the task of 
arguing that Alcibiades cannot merely rely on his natural abilities if he wants to succeed 
in politics. Rather he needs to attend to his soul in order to be successful in the realm of 
politics. Alcibiades will not be competing against those who are on his level politically, 
rather Socrates points out that his real enemy will be those Spartan generals and Persian 
kings who are from the most respectable households that provide their children with royal 
tutors to train children in the four virtues of wisdom, justice, moderation and courage 
(121e). Alcibiades did not have such tutors, rather his tutor was, as Socrates describes, 
“so old as was perfectly useless” (122b). After continuing the task of finally convincing 
Alcibiades on the necessity of education and this education is the practice of self-
cultivation, Socrates ends his argument exhorting Alcibiades to “trust in me and in the 
Delphic inscription, ‘Know thyself’” (124a). Nicholas Denyer glosses that “[t]he maxim 
was said to have started Socrates on is philosophical career (Arist. Phil. fr. i). He thought 
that the limits which we most need to know are our intellectual limits (117b2-13n); he 
accordingly glossed the maxim as enjoining us not to think that we know things of which 
we are in fact ignorant” (Plato 2001, 191). Socrates invokes this maxim multiple times 
throughout his dialogue with Alcibiades. In this context, he invokes it with the purpose to 
establish Alcibiades’ his ignorance of many matters to move onto the substantive 
elements the educational program Socrates has in mind for him. 
 Concerned that self-cultivation is not correctly understood, Socrates asks whether 
or not one is self-cultivation is taking place when a person cultivates what they have. The 
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question of enquiry here is what does ‘self’ in self-cultivation exactly signify? He wants 
to make sure that clarity on the term ‘self’ is first established in order to avoid cultivating 
something other than the self. Socrates is seeking clarification on this point.  He starts his 
enquiry by asking when does someone cultivate or care for his feet? The main point 
Socrates makes here is that each object has a skill to cultivate that very object as well as a 
separate skill to cultivate what belongs to the object. One could be cultivating something 
that belongs to the self as opposed to the actual self. Thus, he introduces the distinction 
between taking care of shoes as opposed to taking care of one foot where shoes belong to 
the feet but are not the feet themselves. Each has their own set of skills that allow one to 
care of the object. Shoemaking is the set of skills that makes shoes better whereas 
athletics is the set of skills that allows one to care for the feet. What we understand so far 
is that embedded in the concept of self-cultivation, or caring for the self, is by properly 
caring for something one is actually making it better. Additionally, from this line of 
reasoning, Socrates concludes that “cultivating yourself and cultivating what belongs to 
you require different skills” (128d9-10).  
 The concept of the human person in education as self-cultivation is essential. For 
it is the concept of the human person that allows us to identify what the term ‘self’ in 
self-cultivation signifies. Socrates introduces this when he asks Alcibiades “how might 
the itself itself be discovered?” (129b). What he is looking for here is the Socratic 
definition of the self, that every instance of self-cultivation can be identified. Arguing 
from the premise that a person is different from the things that he uses, Socrates argues 
that a person uses his body and therefore the self must refer to something other than the 
body. What uses the body is a person’s soul. Socrates argues that “[since] man is neither 
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his body, nor his body and soul together, what remains, I think, is either that he’s nothing, 
or else, if he is something, he nothing other than his soul” (130c1-3). At this point 
Socrates reintroduces the Delphi maxim “Know thyself” not in to establish Alcibiades’ 
limits of knowledge, rather to uncover what the term ‘self’ signifies. He states “the 
command that we should know ourselves means that we should know our souls” (129e 6-
7). Man possessing his body means that the body belongs to something else other than the 
body. That something else is the soul, which possesses things and does not belong to 
anything else. So the Socratic conception of the human person is not a soul-body 
composite. The human person, itself, is the soul. 
 The Socratic conception of education as self-cultivation is the cultivation of the 
soul. Attending to a person’s body or wealth would not constitute as self-cultivation, it is 
only caring of the soul, where caring for the soul entails knowing the soul according to 
the Delphic maxim, which constitutes self-cultivation. How does one know the soul? 
According to Socrates, this has its own skill set that differs from the set of skills required 
in caring for the body or others objects that belong to the soul. In explaining what the 
Delphic maxim means, Socrates focuses on the sense of sight. He asks “If the inscription 
took our eyes to be men and advised them, ‘See thyself.’ How would we understand such 
advice? Shouldn’t the eye be looking at something in which it could see itself?” (132d5-
8). To know oneself one must be able to see oneself and to be able to see oneself one 
must find an object “that allows us to see both it and ourselves when we look at it” 
(132d10-11). The object Socrates identifies is a mirror. One can look at the mirror and 
ourselves in a mirror. This is the case where the object of the maxim is an eye instead of a 
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man. In the case of a man, meaning a soul, the person must look at the soul in order to 
know oneself.  
 What is Socrates’s method for looking at the soul? An important passage the will 
help us understand Socrates’s method is when he discusses the looking of one man into 
another man’s eye (133a-b).  Here the analogy to a mirror appears because when one 
looks into another man’s eyes, he can observe his own face. The Greek word for pupil 
refers to a doll or miniature figure and for this it is called the pupil of the eye. The 
looking into the eyes of another man and self-knowledge has, as Denyer notes, two points 
of significance: “First, the analogy with an eye that sees itself will make self-knowledge 
particularly attractive to one with Alcibiades’ concern for the impression that he makes 
upon others (cf. 124a5-6n.). Second, the analogy will mean that self-knowledge is gained, 
not by any inward-looking self-absorption, but by casting the mind outward, to appreciate 
what others know about oneself” (Plato 2001, 233). Self-knowledge requires another 
person, a teacher who knows the person to the extent that he serves as a mirror by which 
one can look at his soul. This is in line with Socrates’s earlier claims that self-cultivation 
requires a teacher. What knowing entails here on the part of the teacher is knowledge of 
the person’s soul. Here Socrates tells Alcibiades that he was his only true lover as 
Alcibiades’s other lovers “were only lovers of what you had” (131e) whereas Socrates 
loved Alcibiades for who he is because he possessed knowledge of his soul. Thus, 
Socrates can serve as the true mirror for Alcibiades to know himself.  
 Looking at a soul entails look at certain regions of the soul. Socrates tells 
Alcibiades that if he wants knowledge of his soul, he “must look at a soul, and especially 
at that region in which what makes a soul good, wisdom, occurs, and at anything else 
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which is similar to it” (133b). It is this part of the soul where “knowing and 
understanding take place” (133c1) that most resembles the divine. A person wanting to 
have self-knowledge would have to look at this region of his soul. Thus taking care of the 
self entails taking care of the region of the soul where knowledge and understanding 
occurs. The role of the teacher in the process of self-knowledge is to conduct 
philosophical conversations. It is through words that souls converse with each other 
where the words are not addressed to a person’s body, rather “by addressing his words to 
Alcibiades, in other words to his soul” (130e). It is by this process where Socrates was 
able to demonstrate to Alcibiades his own skills and limitations. He was also able to 
provide him the self-knowledge of areas where Alcibiades was ignorant. So education as 
self-cultivation is understood as cultivation of the soul. In order to care and cultivate the 
soul one must know one’s soul that requires a teacher who serves as a mirror by which to 
see one’s soul. It is by philosophical conversations where one soul addresses the other 
that knowledge of one’s soul is obtained.  
 Thus far, we have seen that education as self-cultivation in the Socratic sense 
requires a teacher, a concept of the human person and its telos and the good life, and 
skills required for self-cultivation. It is this last part, the skills required for self-
cultivation, to which we now turn our attention. Socrates speaks of skills in regards to 
cultivating a thing where cultivation entails making that thing better. Making something 
better entails the ideal conception of that thing which the skills are employed to care for 
that thing – to bring it to its ideal. We have some notion of what these skills are in 
looking at the method to know look at a soul that Socrates employs. This method, as we 
have seen, was the specific type of dialogue Socrates took Alcibiades through by 
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someone, Socrates in this case, who knows Alcibiades’s soul. The result of this dialogue 
was Alcibiades knowing his own skills that he possessed and his limitations. Pierre Hadot 
writes about the Socratic dialogue being a practice of spiritual exercise. I understand the 
term spiritual here as referring an activity where the soul, or the self, is the object. “In the 
‘Socratic’ dialogue,” he states, “the question truly at stake is not what is being talked 
about, but who is doing the talking” (Hadot 1995, 89). The importance of who is doing 
the talking highlights the purpose and method of the dialogue. Socrates’s goal in his 
dialogues was to his interlocutor “to pay attention to and take care of themselves” (ibid.). 
The dialogue is an example of a spiritual exercise where “the interlocutors are invited to 
participate in such an inner spiritual exercise as examination of conscience and attention 
to oneself; in other words, they are urged to comply with the famous dictum, “Know 
thyself” (ibid., 90). Hadot identifies two aspects that constitute the dialectical exercise as 
a spiritual exercise. The first aspect is that the aim of the dialogue is for change to take 
place on the part of the interlocutor. The interlocutor must possess a real desire to know 
the truth. The second aspect is that because “it is an exercise of pure thought, subject to 
the demands of the Logos, turns the soul away from the sensible world” (ibid., 93).  
 In Hadot’s analysis of spiritual exercises, or askēsis, there are multiple other 
examples he studies. The art of living, along with learning to die, and learning how to 
read are all examples of spiritual exercises as they all entail “a return to the self” (Hadot 
1995, 103). Hadot employs the Greek term askēsis to refer to spiritual exercises which 
the ancient philosophers, in his view, took it to refer not to any type of asceticism 
involving the abstinence of sexual acts, but to “inner activities of the thought and the 
will” ibid., 128). In Hadot’s understanding, ascetic practices as conceived of in 
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Christianity do not have to do directly with thought exercises. Thus the method for self-
cultivation in the Socratic sense can be captured by the term askēsis in its ancient 
philosophical understanding which refers to a practice with the objective of self 
formation. In Michel Foucault’s study of askēsis, he observes a number of characteristics 
of askēsis that shed light on the purpose of these exercises. In ancient philosophy, the 
purpose of askēsis is to form the self and to cultivate it, not self-renunciation. The 
purpose of an askēsis is to provide the soul with something it currently does not possess. 
Lastly, the most fundamental aspect of askēsis is that it is not concerned with aligning the 
soul to the ordinances of the law. Rather, it is to align the soul with the truth which 
Foucault calls the subjectivation of true discourse. (Foucault 2005, 332-33). The care of 
the self is the care of soul, the most essential element of the human person. It’s aim is to 
induce change on the part of the person. The nature of this change is to perfect the human 
person by acquiring what it did not possess in order to acquire the truth.  
  
Conclusion 
 Determining the identity of an educational institution rests on understanding the 
conception of education embodied in the institution and the tradition that informs its 
practice. In this light, I propose to identify what is distinctive of Islamic education by 
enquiring into its highest good at which it aims. Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of a 
tradition while conceiving of education as a practice with internal and external goods 
along with its authoritative discourse provides us with the necessary framework for this 
enquiry. In exploring the authoritative discourse of Islamic education, we will identify the 
internal and external goods of the practice of education as conceived of in the Islamic 
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tradition. This enquiry will be carried out using the ādāb al-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿllim 
literature developed in the Islamic tradition of education, which partly consists of adab 
manuals designed for the teacher and student alike. This approach accounts for the 
multiplicity of voices in addition to engaging the historical dimensions of the Islamic 
tradition.  
 Conceiving education as self-cultivation requires us to develop the human person, 
which includes its telos in the Islamic tradition. This serves as the constellation of goods 
in which the highest good of Islamic education is embedded. Additionally, self-
cultivation requires an askēsis or exercises, which are aimed at the self for the purposes 
of self-formation.  Cultivating adab, it will be argued, is the highest good of education in 
the Islamic tradition. Adab is a quality of the soul and is considered a habitus (malaka) by 
Muslim scholars of education. To acquire adab as a habitus requires certain exercises that 
constitute adab, an askēsis of sorts. This askēsis exists in adab manuals, which the 
student and teacher are expected to put into practice and eventually embody. Each craft, 
in the Islamic tradition, has its manuals of adab. When a craft is practiced in a certain 
manner, it will be practiced with adab. This is what makes any craft, including education, 
distinctively Islamic.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
ADAB AS HABITUS (MALAKAH) 
Introduction  
 This chapter serves to provide a definition of the term adab as understood by 
theologians, philosophers, and writers on education in the Islamic tradition. It will 
provide a framework for understanding the adab manuals that have been written 
generating what Sebastian Günther termed the adab al-ʿālim wa l-mutaʿāllim literature. 
(Günther 2005) This literature will be explored in the next chapter seeking to identify the 
self that is to be cultivated in the student and teacher as the good of education in the 
Islamic tradition.  
 The central argument of this chapter is that contemporary educational discourse 
on adab by Muslim educationalists’, such as Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (1991) and 
Yusuf Waghed (2011), while being rich and explore various dimensions of adab, does 
not address adab as a habitus or malaka. Not addressing adab as a habitus has led to 
challenges in the correct conceiving of adab in an educational context. i.e. as the highest 
good of the practice of education. This has resulted in difficulties regarding the 
cultivating of adab in educational institutions, thereby rendering the discourse having 
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little practical impact in Islamic educational projects. To that end, I will first explore 
Muhammad Naquib al-Attas’s conception of adab as his work informs much of the 
discourse on adab used today in Muslim educational discourse. In arguing adab as a 
habitus, I will develop the semantic field of adab by surveying the major Arabic lexicons 
and statements of Arabic lexicographers, providing for us adab’s primary and secondary 
significations and its usage in pre-Islamic times. Early Islamic usages and developments 
will then be explored by looking at the Qur’ān, Ḥadīth, and statements of major figures 
of the early Muslim community on adab. It will be shown that the primary lexical 
signification of adab is a calling, more specifically a calling to a banquet or a feast. 
Attending a banquet requires elegant behavior and comportment on part of the guest. 
From this signification and usage, adab in the early Islamic era takes on the secondary 
significations of training, discipline, habits, custom while retaining the meaning of 
displaying fine character traits.  
 Through the study of dictionaries of technical vocabulary of sciences in the 
Islamic tradition, adab is treated from its philosophical and psychological dimensions. 
Adab is now being seen as a function of the soul where the soul undertakes spiritual 
exercises with the aim to acquire virtuous character traits. Major writers of the technical 
dictionaries such as Abu al-Baqa al-Kafawī and Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī have placed adab as a 
habitus (malakah) one of the ten categories of predication that Muslim philosophers and 
theologians have incorporated from Aristotle’s works. Understanding adab as a habitus 
allows us to appreciate Ibn Jamāʿah’s adab manual in relation to others writers on adab 
in the context of education. Specficially, Ibn Jamāʿah’s manual serves as a manual of 
practices that the student and teacher undertake in order to develop the habitus of adab. 
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Additionally, the anatomy of his manual reflects the relational aspect of the self 
possessing adab. The manual’s structure reflects that adab is always demonstrated in 
relation to another being or object in the created order. It is these dimensions that Ibn 
Jamāʿah’s work captures and contemporary writers have not explored.  
 
A Contemporary Conception of Adab  
Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (b. 1931) is a major contemporary contributor 
to the field of Muslim philosophy of education. He has written numerous works in the 
fields of Islamic metaphysics, philosophy, education, and theology in English and 
Malay.9 The process of Islamization of knowledge has been the central focus of al-Attas’ 
writings and efforts throughout his life. Islamization is, “the liberation of man from first 
the magical, mythological, animistic, national-cultural, tradition opposed to Islam, and 
then from secular control over his reason and his language” (al-Attas 1993, 44). His 
efforts have resulted in the founding in Malaysia of the International Institute of Islamic 
Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) in 1987 which is setup to achieve his project of 
Islamization of knowledge thus reflecting a true Islamic university as al-Attas has 
outlined in his works. Al-Attas’s writings on adab inform most contemporary 
engagements of adab in the writings of educational thinkers.10 It is for this reason that I 
will develop al-Attas’s understanding of adab to which I will argue that adab should be 
                                                               
9 For a full list of publications, see Mohd. Nor Wan Daud. 1998. The educational philosophy and practice 
of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas: an exposition of the original concept of Islamization. Kuala Lumpur: 
International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, pgs. 10-15. 
 
10 See for example Noaparast, Khosrow Bagheri. 2012. "Al-Attas Revisited on the Islamic Understanding 
of Education". Journal of Shīʿa Islamic Studies. 5(2): 149-172 and Waghid, Yusef. Conceptions of Islamic 
Education. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2011. 
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correctly viewed as a habitus. This is not meant to replace al-Attas’s conception of adab, 
rather I see adab as a habitus as filling in unexplored dimensions of adab.  
 Although al-Attas has addressed the issue of education in many of his works, his 
central work on Muslim philosophy of education is The Concept of Education in Islam: A 
Framework for an Islamic Philosophy of Education written in 1980. Of all the writers on 
adab that I have been able to identify, it is with al-Attas where a philosophical discussion 
on the essence of adab is given. Yet it is noteworthy that despite al-Attas’ philosophical 
treatment of adab even he does not treat with adab as a habitus in his writings.  
al-Attas, building on the pre-Islamic and early Islamic descriptions and lexical 
definitions of adab, states,  
“Adab is recognition and acknowledgement of the reality that knowledge and 
being are ordered hierarchically according to their various grades and degrees of 
rank, and of one’s proper place in relation to that reality and to one’s physical, 
intellectual and spiritual capacities and potentials” (al-Attas 1999, 27).  
 
This rich definition of adab is constituted by a heavy emphasis on cognitive dimensions. 
Adab is constituted by a recognition and an acknowledgement on the part of the person. 
Recognition and acknowledgement are acts of the soul, thereby identifying adab as an 
activity of the soul. al-Attas distinguishes between recognition and acknowledgement. 
Stemming from the verse in the Qur ͗ān, “And there is none of us except that he has a 
station (maqām) that is well-known” [37: 164], reality is constituted of a multitude of 
various beings each possessing position, station, and rank. The station each being 
possesses constitutes an order by which all beings have a relationship to each other. For 
al-Attas, meaning entails “the recognition of the place of anything in a system” and 
meaning is achieved when “the relation of a things has with other things becomes 
clarified and understood” (Ibid., 15). Having adab, at its fundamental level, involves a 
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certain type of recognition, which, here refers to “the recognition of the proper places of 
things in the order of creation, such that it leads to the recognition of the proper place of 
God in the order of being and existence” (Ibid., 19).  
 However, recognition of the hierarchical order of reality and the relationship of 
beings in creation is not enough to constitute adab. Here, al-Attas introduces the 
distinction between recognition and acknowledgement that is central to adab in his view 
saying “recognition alone of the proper places of things and of God does not necessarily 
imply concomitant action on the part of man to behave in accordance with the suitable 
requirements of what is recognized” (al-Attas 1999, 19). Action that is based on this 
recognition is the focus in this discussion, not mere recognition nor mere action not based 
on this recognition. The order and relationship of beings, in other words, entail that a 
person carries out action in a specific manner that reflects the position and relationship of 
beings in the order of creation. Recognition does not necessarily lead to that action. In 
order to pass the divide between recognition and action, acknowledgment is required on 
the part of the person. al-Attas elaborates what he intends by acknowledgement stating 
that it “consists in man making himself suitable to the requirements of the right or proper 
places of things or affairs. The requirements of the proper places of things and affairs 
entail action on the part of man, and this action is denoted by the term ʿamal” (Ibid., 19). 
All beings in the order of creation, by virtue of their position and rank, possess certain 
rights. It seems to me that recognition involves the knowledge of the rank of all beings in 
the order of creation while acknowledgment involves the knowledge of the rights of these 
beings that their rank entails. It is these rights, once acknowledge, that informs a person 
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who possesses adab on the proper course of action that aligned with the hierarchical 
order of creation. 
  In closing his discussion on adab, al-Attas brings in another formulation of adab 
that brings together the two concepts of justice and wisdom. He states that adab “is the 
spectacle (mashhad) of justice as it is reflected by wisdom” (al-Attas 1999, 23). Justice 
and wisdom figure into adab in the following manner: justice (ʿadl) is the constituted by 
the recognition and acknowledgement of the proper places of things in the order of 
creation along with a person and society acting in a manner that is aligned and dictated by 
this order. Justice, then, is the “harmonious condition of things being in their right or 
proper places” (ibid., 20). This harmonious condition is created at two levels: at the 
individual level by a person acting along the dictates of the rights entailed by a thing’s 
position and at the societal level by all individuals acting along the same dictates. Justice 
and adab are thus linked when a person acts with adab, thereby achieving justice in 
himself, and when a society acts with adab, achieving justice at the group level. Wisdom 
is defined as “the knowledge given by God, by which the recipient is able to effect 
correct judgements as to the proper places of things” (Ibid., 20). Thus, when a person 
possesses adab, he has the knowledge of the proper places of things and their rights. 
When a judgment is made that is aligned with this knowledge, this is termed wisdom, 
where action based on this knowledge is acting with justice.  
 Al-Attas’s philosophical conception of adab is a major development in the 
practice of education in the Islamic tradition. His development of adab provides a 
synthesis of the lexical, philosophical, and theological streams of the Islamic tradition in 
the educational context. Additionally, he provides a more solid foundation to this major 
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Islamic theme allowing Muslim educators to retrieve adab to address educational issues 
they encounter. Yet if we examine al-Attas’s discourse on adab, we see that he has a 
strong emphasis on the cognitive dimensions of adab by grounding it in a type of 
recognition and acknowledgement on part of the person. While this is dimension is 
correct, I argue that what is missing here in the conception of adab is the understanding 
that practitioners of education saw adab as a habitus. Identifying adab as a habitus, in 
addition to adding to the discourse on adab, allows us to align educational practice in 
institutions with the ideal of adab. The notion of a habitus opens the door for exploring 
actual ways of cultivating adab in individuals which has generated a rich genre of 
literature called the adab al-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿāllim literature by Günther which will be 
explored in the later chapters. The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to 
developing the notion of adab as a habitus establishing this as an essential dimension of 
the practice of education in the Islamic tradition. 
 
The Semantic Field of Adab  
 For a term so central to Muslim philosophy of education, it is surprising that the 
term adab or any of its derivatives does not occur a single time in the Qur’ān – the 
foundational text of Islam. This fact, however, need not worry us once it is understood 
that what constitutes the Islamic Tradition in terms of texts extends beyond the Qur’ān. 
Ḥadīth, which are sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, along with the sayings of Muslim 
scholars and sages play an essential if not an equal role in forming the repository of 
teachings that serve as authoritative sources for in the Islamic tradition. Additionally, and 
for our purposes here, the Arabic language, specifically the etymology and semantic field 
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of words and poetry, play a vital role in assisting us to understand how the term adab has 
been conceived of and its influence on Muslim educational thought.  
 In his studies on the worldview of the Qur’ān, Toshihiko Izutsu lays out his 
methodology by examining the semantics of what he calls Qur’ānic key terms. The 
semantic weltanschauung is not a mere exercise in etymology. Rather, by studying the 
relational meanings of words, we can access the spirit of that culture and obtain “a most 
faithful reflection of the general tendency, psychology and otherwise, of the people who 
use the word as part of their vocabulary” (Izutsu 2002, 17). Thus we will adopt this 
approach to study the term adab and the related terms of ‘ilm and tarbiyah. In analyzing 
the semantics of these terms we hope to reach a full understanding of how education was 
conceived by Muslims. This process will entail us to bring “together, compare and put in 
relation all the terms that resemble, oppose, and correspond with each other” (Izutsu 2002, 
36) to achieve our goal.  
 An etymological analysis of the term adab will provide us with a basic structure 
of the early uses of the term, from where we can initiate our analysis and then trace 
development of the application of the term through different time periods of the Islamic 
tradition. We will examine entries on adab by Arabic lexicographers, most notably 
Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī’s (1732–1791) Tāj̲  al-ʿArūs, his commentary on the dictionary Qamus 
al-Muhīt by al-Fīrūzābādī (1329–1415). Other major Arabic lexicographers’ works will 
be utilized as well throughout our analysis as well as the writings of  
 All Arabic words can be reduced to either trilateral or quadrilateral root letters. 
Trilateral roots are most common. The root letters for adab are hamza – dal – ba’. Taking 
the root letters as a starting point in our analysis, Ibn al-Fāris (d.395/1004) states in his 
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entry on the roots hamza – dal – ba’, “The letters hamza, dal and ba’ [denote] one 
meaning from which [many nouns] are derived and refer back to. [The term] al-‘adb, 
therefore, [refers to you] assembling people to [attend] your feast” (Ibn al-Fāris 2001, 
50). The term adab primarily signifies a calling or an invitation. Ibn al-Athīr (1149-
1210), Ibn Manzụ̄r (1233-1331) and al-Zabīdī all confirm the etymology of the term as 
signifying a calling or an invitation.  An alternative etymology has been presented by the 
German Arabist K. Vollers (1857 - 1909) in his Volkssprache und Schriftsprache im alten 
Arabien and later taken up by C.A. Nallino (1872-1938) in his Tārīkh al-Ādāb al-
ʻArabīyah. “There is no doubt,” says Nallino, “that the term al-adab, according to the 
ancient Arabs, referred to customary practice (sunnah)” (Nallino 1970, 24). Particularly, 
it referred to the customary practice of one’s ancestors and was thereby constituted a 
necessary practice for people of later generations to observe. In Tārīkh al-Ādāb, Nallino 
then states that while reading the works of Vollers, he arrived at the conclusion that al-
adab was derived from the dal – hamza – ba’, which means “habit or adhering to 
[something]. And this is not far from the meaning of customary practice (sunnah) and al-
adab” (Ibid., 29). When deriving a word’s etymology, Arabic etymologists would refer to 
the singular form of the word and then identify a word’s root letters. From there, the 
general meaning will then be analyzed and formulated. Nallino instead starts his analysis 
with the plural of al-adab: ādāb. The pattern he gives us is: ādāb to dal – hamza – ba’ as 
opposed to going from dal – hamza – ba’ to ādāb. So the transformation of the word is as 
follows: the plural of dal – hamza – ba’ is adāb and the middle long vowel transfers to 
the first letter which leads to ādāb.  
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 There are some weaknesses in Nallino’s theory that writers have pointed out. One 
is, which Nallino himself acknowledges, that the plural ādāb, which Nallino uses, has not 
been documented by any Arabic lexicographer as being used by ancient or pre-Islamic 
Arabs (Ibid., 29). Additionally, Arabic lexicographers have documented a plural for d’b 
which is du’ub and not ādāb. S. A. Bonebakker comments on Nallino’s claim that adab is 
synonymous with customary practice stating, “Early sources do not yield unambiguous 
evidence in support of this theory. Not only is it rarely possible to date or authenticate the 
earliest source-material, poetry, with absolute certainty (even in authentic, datable pieces 
individual words may have been changed at a later period to suit contemporary taste), 
but, in early texts, adab and its derivatives seldom appear in contexts where their 
meaning can be accurately determined” (Bonebakker 1990, 17). Bonebakker produces the 
following lines of poetry from Sahm b. Hanzalah: 
People do not withhold from me what I want, but I do not give them what they  
want; 
what good adab this is! 
 
In this case, it is possible that adab could be referring to customs, “but the poet is 
probably commenting ironically on his own bad manners” (ibid., 17). Seeing the material 
that Nallino produces for his argument, Bonebakker concludes that “adab should be 
interpreted according to its immediate social or intellectual terms of reference” (ibid., 
25). 
 When examining various derived words from adab and how they were used, the 
immediate connection the words have to its primary signification of being an invitation to 
a feast becomes obvious. The actual feast or meal is referred to as maʾdubah, or 
maʾdabah, a derived noun which denotes “a prepared feast which people are invited to” 
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(al-Zabīdī 1965, 12-13). Specific applications of the noun have been noted to refer to a 
wedding feast. The word al-ādib refers to the person inviting people to the feast. The 
following verses of Ṭarfah ibn al-ʿAbd, a pre-Islamic poet, are produced by both Ibn al-
Fāris and al-Zabīdī that support this usage of the word:  
 We are in our winter residence calling everyone,  
You will not find an inviter (al-ādib) amongst us who discriminates  
(Ibn al-Fāris 2001, 50; al-Zabīdī 1965, 14). 
 
Arabic lexicographers discussions of the term adab explore it’s other significations which 
build off its primary signification. Adab, as used by Arabs, also means partaking of food 
in a beautiful and proper manner. A feast is a sign of generosity and nobility from the 
host and guests must recognize and display proper decorum when partaking in the feast. 
The term adab did have an ethical dimension embedded in its usage. In pre-Islamic and 
Islamic Arabic, primarily, it was a social ethic of how one was expected to conduct 
themselves in various public settings. As we will see, after the advent of Islam, this social 
dimension continues but takes on psychological and spiritual dimensions as well.  
 Having looked at adab’s primary signification in the pre-Islamic period, we will 
now focus our attention on the early Islamic period and study the usage of the term and 
note the developments in its usage. We will focus on early source material: the Qur’ān, 
statements made by the Prophet Muhammad and statements of individuals he interacted 
with from that time period. As mentioned previously, the term adab does not occur at all 
in the Qur’ān. Where it does come up in discussion is in material dealing with the 
exegesis of the Qur’ān. When Qur’ānic exegetes discuss the verse “Believers, guard 
yourselves and your families against a Fire fuelled by people and stones” [66:6] the 
comments of the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) are 
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usually quoted by exegetes. Commenting on the verse ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib states that the 
verse means to, “instill adab in them and teach them” (Ibn Kathīr 2001, 4:258). An 
important observation to make here is that learning (taʿlīm) and the instilling of adab are 
two separate activities are seen in this statement. Based on the comments of early 
Qur’ānic exegetes, teaching here refers to the teaching of God’s commandments and 
prohibitions while the instilling of adab refers to the disciplining of one’s family to 
perform acts that are good and to refrain from acts that are evil.  
 In their discussions on adab, most Arabic lexicographers reference the Prophet 
Muhammad’s saying, “This Qur’ān is the feast of God (ma ͗dubatullāhi) on Earth. Learn 
from His feast!” (al-Bayhaqī 2003, 3:334). This statement has held a rather important 
position in educational writings in the Islamic tradition. One frequently encounters this 
statement in various ethical treatises that deal with the recitation of the Qur’ān and the 
proper internal and external qualities to possess. In this statement, we see that just as a 
person acquires and demonstrates proper conduct and decorum at a feast, one treats the 
Qur’ān in the same manner: the Qur’ān is a place of acquiring and demonstrating proper 
conduct and decorum. Additionally, there is the statement of the Companion, Abdullah 
ibn Masʿūd, “Every host (mu’addib) loves that his feast be well attended. The feast of 
God is the Qur’ān; do not desert His feast.” On the comparison of the Qur’ān to the feast, 
al-Zabīdī comments, “He compared the Qur’ān to a feast, which contains what is good 
and beneficial for them, prepared for mankind by God to which He then invited them to 
[partake in].” (al-Zabīdī 1965) Thus underlying the theme of acquiring high ethical 
qualities and moral principles to live by from the Qur’ān.  
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 In a lengthy ḥadīth where there was some tension between the Prophet 
Muhammad and his wives, the Companion ʿUmar b. al-Khattab stated, “We men of 
Quraysh would have ascendancy over our womenfolk. When we came [and resided] with 
the Ansar, [we found] that they were a community whose womenfolk had ascendancy 
over their men. Our womenfolk began to adopt the adab of the womenfolk of the Ansar” 
(al-Bukhārī  #2468, 597, 2002). Commentators have glossed that adab refers to their 
mode of conduct with their husbands and their general comportment around the house. 
The womenfolk of the Quraysh had a particular way of being with their husbands when 
in Makkah that was particular to them and differed from that of womenfolk of the Ansar 
in Madinah. When they migrated to Madinah, they left their adab and adopted the adab 
of the womenfolk of the Ansar. This is an instance where adab is being applied to acts 
other than acts of religious worship. This way of being was referred to as adab in the 
words of ‘Umar b. al-Khattab.  
 Another ḥadīth states, “There is nothing superior a father can bestow to his son 
than good adab.” Here we see that adab is being used as habits in general, but also there 
is a moral and religious dimension added in the last ḥadīth mentioned. This is evidenced 
by the fact that the jurist al-Bahyaqī (d. 458/1066) has included this ḥadīth in the chapter 
on the obligation to teach others what is needed in order for a prayer to be valid in his 
legal work, al-Sunan al-Kubrā. Adab, in this context, is being applied to the correct 
performance of religious obligations.  
 The idea of disciplining is also noted in the term adab from other ḥadīth. “Any 
man who possesses a female slave,” the Prophet Muhammad said, “then teaches her well 
and instills adab in her and does so well, then frees her and marries her will have two 
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rewards [with God].” According to commentators, the instilling of adab here refers to the 
instilling in the females slave virtuous character traits. The difference between teaching 
and adab is also brought out in this ḥadīth where teaching refers to the teaching of 
religious knowledge and could also apply to vocational and other types of knowledge. 
What is interesting is that the second form (addaba) of the verb adab is used in this 
ḥadīth. al-Zabīdī mentions that the second form shifts the meaning from a person 
exhibiting adab to a person putting another person through various exercises and 
activities that will result in the acquiring of adab by the person. The verb addaba, whose 
infinitive noun is ta’dīb, has the meaning of training, bringing up or educating someone 
else. The agent is not performing an act of adab, but is involved in the act of instilling 
adab in another person. An additional meaning of ta’dīb that is very common is 
punishing or physically disciplining someone due to their bad adab because punishing the 
person will result in them avoiding bad adab and thereby acquiring good adab.  Based on 
the ḥadīth, ta’dīb taken as educating is not to be understood in the sense of providing 
information or content. It is something other than learning. It is in this line we have 
another ḥadīth where the Prophet Muhammad, speaking of himself, stated, “My Lord has 
instilled me with adab and how excellent is His ta’dīb of me.” We have seen thus far that 
the term ta’dīb has been applied to human beings, but the ḥadīth literature provides 
evidence that the term has also been applied to animals where adab is being used in the 
strict sense of training an animal to acquire certain skills. A ḥadīth discussing three 
activities that are not considered to be folly one of which is “a man instilling adab in his 
horse” (Abū Dawūd #2505 2010, 3:282-283). It will be argued in later chapters that adab 
as applied to human beings is fundamentally different when it is applied to animals. The 
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difference is due to an intellectual and cognitive aspect that exists in human beings that 
does not in animals. Thus adab, when applied to human beings, is not to be reduced to 
the mere training of a human being in certain skills.  
Adab in Technical Dictionaries 
 It is from these various contexts in which the term adab is used where Arabic 
lexicographers, Muslim theologians and Muslim philosophers of education have 
generated various definitions of the term adab. All of these definitions share the various 
significations of the term outlined above. We will now look at how the term adab has 
been defined in the classical period of the Islamic tradition. In addition to dictionaries, we 
will be looking at the taʿrīfāt genre of dictionaries in the Islamic tradition. This genre of 
literature is composed of manuals on the technical definitions of terms used in all 
sciences in the Islamic tradition. From the early period of the Islamic tradition, numerous 
texts on technical terminology have been produced by Muslim scholars of various fields. 
The nature of these texts is different than lexicons. These texts while elaborating the 
lexical meaning of words at times, focus on how words are used in various disciplines of 
knowledge such as law, prophetic traditions, Sufism, theology (kalām), philosophy 
(falsafā) and other sciences. I call these understandings of these words technical 
nomenclature of the Islamic sciences as they have a relationship to the lexical meaning 
and usage of the word, yet have developed their own meanings within different sciences 
of the Islamic tradition. All of the definitions examined will be by major figures in each 
of the disciplines of the Islamic tradition.  
 al-Fayyumī (d. 766/1364) stated, “addabtuhu: means I taught him the [means of] 
disciplining the soul and of attaining noble character traits.” al-Jurjanī (d. 816/1413) 
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simply states that “al-adab is a term referring to knowledge by virtue of which a person 
can avoid all types of errors.” ʿAbd al-Raʾūf al-Munāwī (d. 1031/1621) says that it is, 
“the disciplining of the soul and [the acquiring of] fine character traits. It also refers to 
any sort of praiseworthy training by which a person is disciplined to acquire a virtue from 
amongst the virtues.”  Abu al-Baqa al-Kafawī al-Hanafī (d. 1094/1683), author of al-
Kullīyyat, has an almost identical definition as al-Munāwī does. In Dustūr al-‘Ulamā’, 
al-Aḥmadnagarī (d.1273/1856) states that, “the one who possesses adab (mu’addib) 
combines the [teachings of the] Prophetic Sacred Law and good character traits.” He 
expands on this stating, “adab is of two types: adab pertaining to one’s self (adab al-
nafs) and adab pertaining to a lesson (adab al-dars). The first type [refers to] preventing 
the outer and inner members of the body from all types of mistakes. The second [type] is 
an expression [signifying] the knowledge of what should be avoided in all types of 
rhetorical modes used in the art of disputation” (al-Aḥmadnagarī 1911, 1:62). While 
retaining the early Islamic significations and usages of adab, one notices a major shift in 
the way the term is now being understood. Adab is now seen as a function of the soul, 
thus a psychological dimension is now being explored. Additionally, it is given a 
religious and ethical grounding in being equated with the teachings of the Prophet 
Muhammad and good character traits. 
 Perhaps the most detailed entry on adab is by the 12th century Indian author 
Muhạmmad Aʿlā ibn ʿAlī al-Tahānawī in his dictionary on technical nomenclature of all 
the sciences in the Islamic tradition, Kashshāf Istilaḥāt al-Funūn. al-Tahānawī’s entry 
captures most of what his predecessors have had to say about the term adab. He begins 
his entry stating that the term in Persian denotes knowledge, intelligence and sagacity 
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(thaqafa), being mindful of [what should be observed in conduct], proper and acceptable 
conduct, and observing the proper bounds in all things. (al-Tahānawī 1996, 1:127) It also 
refers to the science amongst the sciences of the Arabic language that deals with 
eloquence and rhetoric. In a similar line, Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1352) states that, “the 
science of adab (ʿilm al-adab) is the science of rectifying speech, the correct usage of 
speech, embellishment of words, and protection from mistakes [in speech] and missteps. 
It is a subset of adab.”11 After mentioning the writers we have seen previously, al-
Tahānawī treats how the term adab is used in legal writings. The jurists (fuqahā’) use the 
term adab to refer to that which is considered preferable and recommended (mandub) for 
a person to perform. In legal writings, the term is juxtaposed to what is obligatory (wajib) 
by the Sacred Law (sharīʿah). 
 al-Tahānawī then moves on to discuss the difference noted previously between 
learning (taʿlīm) and ta’dīb. This distinction has been observed in statements of the 
Prophet Muhammad and in the statements of later writers as well. A statement by 
Abdullah ibn Mubārak (d. 181/797) expressed a similar understanding of the difference 
between adab and learning where he said, “We are more in need of a small amount of 
adab than a great amount of knowledge” (al-Tahānawī 1996, 2:380). A famous statement 
of al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) is often quoted regarding adab and spiritual works which 
includes learning, “Know that a small amount of adab is superior to a great amount of 
spiritual works. This [misunderstanding] is what destroyed Iblis and his many spiritual 
works went waste due to his lack of adab. We ask Allah safety from this in this world 
and the next. A righteous man once said to his son, “My son! Make your spiritual works 
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salt and your adab wheat. Meaning that you should seek adab more than you seek 
spiritual works.” 
 al-Tahānawī differentiates between learning (taʿlīm) and taʾdīb stating that the 
former refers to learning religious teaching and doctrines whereas the later relates to the 
idea of a person embodying what it truly means to be a human (muru’ah). Another way 
of stating it is that learning relates to the Sacred Law and ta’dīb relates to custom or, he 
continues, learning is the sphere of religion (dīnī) where ta’dīb is the sphere of the social 
(dunyawī). (al-Tahānawī 1996, 1:128) The idea of murūʾah is of central importance and 
exploring it will help us better understand the concept of adab. The root letters of 
murūʾah are mīm-rā’-‘ain and its primary signification according to Arabic 
lexicographers is being complete and wholesome.  The noun murūʾah has been explained 
as referring to the completeness of a person and being a complete male. This is not 
referring to the physical aspect of being a complete male, rather it refers to the ethical and 
moral aspects of functioning like a true man in society. This applies equally to a woman 
as well as the terms mar’, which refers to a man, and mar’ah, which refers to a woman, 
are both derived from the same root letters. al-Fayyumī states, “murūʾah are qualities of 
the soul that lead a person who enacts them to noble character traits and elegant habits” 
(al-Fayyumī 1996, 294). The term murūʾah thus connects noble character with a person 
embodying what it means to be fully human as the two ideas of being whole and a man or 
a woman are contained in the word mar’. In linking adab with murūʾah, al-Tahānawī 
highlights the fact that learning of religious teachings (ta’līm) is a different activity than 
acquiring adab. In some ways it is difficult to see what the difference is between adab 
and muru’ah as they both refer to the same ideal of how a person conducts oneself. The 
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difference is seen when one looks at the etymological origin of the two words. In 
murūʾah one finds the idea that possessing these qualities is what makes a person a 
complete and perfect human; the ideal human being is achieved. In fact, this idea is so 
embedded in this word that al-Kafawī (d. 1094/1683) simply defines murūʾah as 
humanness (al-insāniyyah). He does mention that it has been defined as the ideal of 
manhood, but he precedes this definition with “it has been said (qīla)” which denotes, in 
Islamic scholarly writings, that this is not the preferred definition of the word (al-Kafawī 
1998, 874). In the term adab, the idea of humanness is not present etymologically 
speaking although in its primary signification it does refer to an activity solely performed 
by human beings. Even in its usage, as we have seen above, adab has been applied to 
humans and animals albeit with a qualified meaning of the word. By relating the two 
words, one can see that it is in the acquiring of adab a person achieves the ideal of what it 
means to be a human being. 
 
Adab as Habitus (malakah) 
 Thus far we have seen various ways how scholars of the Islamic Tradition have 
discoursed on adab. From its primary signification lexically being a calling to a feast that 
requires a certain mode of conduct on the part of the participant, adab was extended 
beyond the setting of hospitality to other settings. In the early Islamic era, the adab takes 
on the meaning of training, disciplining and general custom and way of conduct as when 
applied to the women of the Quraysh and Ansar by the Companion ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab. 
Any attempt to define adab has not been seen in the early period. This could be due to the 
fact that it was a word that was common and understood by everyone and therefore did 
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not need to be explicitly defined. It is with later writers have attempted to provide 
approximate definitions of adab. In the treatment of adab in Arabic lexicons, one 
encounters that Muslim scholars have usually given examples of when adab is being 
demonstrated when trying to explain the term. This is seen in the general statements of 
adab where it is equated with the display of good character, the avoiding of bad character 
traits and blameworthy behaviors, or the taking of food in a refined manner.  
 
The question still remains as to what is the true nature of adab that brings about 
these manifestations that adab is identified with. What are the psychological and 
philosophical understandings of adab?  In this section we aim at exploring this question 
by looking at the taʿrīfat literature as they go beyond the lexical meanings of words and 
provide for us how words and terms are developed and understood by scholars of the 
Islamic tradition. It is important to note that the definitions of terms in specific sciences 
are for the most part grounded in the lexical definitions of the terms. They lexical 
definitions govern the technical definitions influencing the technical meaning’s 
development. In the dictionaries of technical terminology one sees that adab is now being 
seen as a state of the soul, a disciplining of the soul, and that it requires a process on the 
part of the person to undertake in order to obtain the state of possessing adab. 
Additionally, the ethical dimensions have been included by the mentioning of noble 
character traits (makārim al-akhlaq) when defining adab.  
 As we have seen, one of the earliest major authors of dictionaries of technical 
vocabulary, al-Jurjanī, defines adab as “a term referring to knowledge by virtue of which 
a person can avoid all types of errors.” al-Kafawī defines adab as “every praiseworthy 
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training by which a person acquires a one of the virtues.” Munawī has exactly the same 
definition. One can see that in these works, adab is no longer being defined by 
manifestations of adab. Rather, it is now knowledge that one must acquire that, once 
acquired, will result in a person possessing adab.  
 Perhaps the most important addition to the understanding of adab is seen in al-
Tahānawī’s entry on adab. To my knowledge, it is the earliest work I have been able to 
find that discusses this dimension of adab. al-Tahānawī starts his entry by listing what 
prior authors have mentioned on adab. After doing so, al-Tahānawī quotes the 9th century 
Mu’tazilite and scholar of the Arabic language, Abu Zaid al-Ansari’s definition of adab 
as, “a habitus (malakah) that protects the person in whom adab inheres from that 
[committing those acts] which disgraces one.” Then after discussing how adab is used 
according to the jurists, al-Tahānawī states, “[Of all these definitions], it is better to refer 
to [adab] as a habitus (malakah) because it is a quality that is firmly established in the 
soul.” From seeing adab as an activity of a person’s soul, the discussion on what adab is 
further extended to being seen as a malakah, what I have translated here as a habitus. 
More will be discussed on the term malakah to understand what this development of the 
discussion of the term adab fully entails.  
 About six centuries later, in the 18th century, we see adab as a habitus continue 
with al-Zabīdī in his Tāj̲  al-ʿarūs. In listing several definitions in his entry on the root 
letters ‘ – d – b al-Zabīdī states,  
“al-Adab (whose middle letter) is vowelled...The primary signification of adab 
is a calling (duʿa). Our Shaykh said quoting from what his shaykhs have reported 
that, ‘al-adab [is a term referring to] a habitus (malakah) that protects the 
individual in whom adab inheres from that [committing those acts] which 
disgraces one.’ And in al-Miṣbaḥ it states, ‘it (adab) is the learning of what 
disciplines the soul and [the acquiring of] virtuous traits of character.’ Abu Zaid 
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al-Anṣarī states, ‘Adab applies to every praiseworthy spiritual exercise by which a 
person can acquire one of the virtues.’ A similar statement occurs in al-Tahdhīb. 
And in al-Tawshīh it states, ‘[Adab] is the employment of speech or acts that are 
considered praiseworthy, or it is adopting or abiding by those things that are 
deemed good, or it (adab) is venerating those [socially] above you and dealing 
gently with those [socially] below you.’ Khafajī transmitted in al-‘Inayah from al-
Jawālīqī in Sharh adab al-katib, ‘Lexically, adab is good character and the 
performance of noble acts.’ It being applied to sciences of the Arabic language is 
muwallad12; originating after the early period of Islam. Ibn al-Sayyid al-
Baṭalyausī said, ‘adab is the adab of the soul and adab of the lesson.’ al-adab is 
beauty (al-ẓarf) and refinement in the taking of food. And this statement is 
inclusive of most of what has already been mentioned. For this reason the author 
restricted himself to this” (al-Zabīdī 1965, 2:12). 
 
I quote this passage in full because of the important place this text holds. al-Zabīdī is 
considered to be late in the Islamic intellectual tradition and his lexicon, Tāj al-ʿArūs, is 
considered to be one of the major achievements in the Arabic sciences and is the major 
authority in Arabic lexicography. This work being late in the Islamic tradition means that 
it is comprehensive representation of the discourse generated historically on the term 
adab. If we look at this passage, we find al-Zabīdī first defining adab in terms of its 
technical definition, meaning as a habitus (malakah). Then after surveying the various 
lexical definitions and descriptions on adab we have seen from the early period up to his 
own era, he sums up the various definitions given stating that, “Al- Adab is beauty (al-
ẓarf) and refinement in the taking of food.” Stating afterwards that this sums up the 
essence of what has been mentioned by different lexicographers on the matter. All of the 
other statements on adab as seen as attempts to describe adab by providing examples and 
                                                               
12 The term is used to denote as ‘post-classical’ certain linguistic items, such as words, 
derivations, and even proverbs. ‘Post-classical’ means: not belonging to the classical language of 
pre- and early Islamic texts.” Encyclopedia of Arabic Literature, Volume 2 edited by Julie Scott 
Meisami, Paul Starkey. 
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manifestations of adab and with different areas emphasized depending on the person 
describing the term.  
 What does it mean to say that adab is a habitus (malakah)? By analyzing the 
Arabic term malakah, we hope to locate adab as part of a greater discourse in the Islamic 
theological and philosophical tradition that assigns adab as a quality of the soul. Malakah 
is a technical term that is used when Muslim philosophers and theologians discuss the 
maqūlat al-‘ashar or the ten categories. The Categories of Aristotle had made its way 
into the Islamic Tradition along with the rest of Aristotle’s writings. Muslim philosophers 
and theologians actively and selectively engaged Aristotle’s Categories with each 
philosopher or theological school incorporating what they felt to be in agreement with the 
Islamic tradition. A maqūlah literally translates to what is said or a statement. In the area 
Islamic theology and philosophy, the concern is what is being said of subject. A maqūlah 
then is what can be predicated of a subject. Its technical signification is that it applies to 
the major categories (al-ajnas al-ʿāliyyah) or every universal term that can be predicated 
of all possible existents. (Makhlūf 1971) 
 In the Islamic tradition, standard texts that a student encounters when studying 
philosophy and theology put in verse the ten categories for students to memorize. The 
translation of the verses is: 
  Zaid [who is] tall, blue eyed, the son of Malik 
   who was in his house yesterday reclining, 
  In his hand was a sword, which he turned so it turned. 
   These then are the ten categories.  
 
Zaid is the name of a person and is the subject or the possible existent about which things 
will be predicated. Zaid refers to the substance (jawhar), the first of the ten categories. A 
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substance is that which takes up space and the substrate in which accidents (a’rāḍ) 
inhere, accidents being in need of a locus of substrate to exist. The rest of the nine 
categories are classified as accidents. Tall is an example of the second category of 
quantity (kamm). Quantity is divided into two major categories: quantities that are 
continuous (al-kamm al-muttaṣil) and quantities that are discrete (al-kamm al-munfaṣil). 
Continuous quantities are those quantities that are measurable and are composite such as 
time, depth, thickness, thinness, length, width and height. Discrete quantities are simple 
quantities such as numbers. If one were to divide the number ten into two parts one 
would get two separate discrete units of five.  
 Blue-eyed is an example of the third category of quality (kayf). Qualities are non-
divisible accidents and are of four types: sensible qualities (al-kayfiyyat al-maḥsusah), 
psychic qualities (al-kayfiyyat al-nafsaniyyah) or qualities that relate to the soul not 
merely to the mind, qualities of predisposition (al-kayfiyyat al-‘isti’dadiyyah), and 
qualities specific to quantities (al-kayfiyyat mukhtaṣṣah bil kamiyyat). Sensible qualities 
are those accidents that are perceptible to one of the five external senses. Examples of 
sensible qualities given are heat, cold, colors, sounds, odors, and tastes. Psychic qualities 
are specific only to beings that possess a soul (dhawāt al-‘anfus), excluding inanimate 
objects such as stones and plants from this category of qualities. Examples given of these 
qualities are life, sickness, power, will, and perception. Qualities of predisposition are 
qualities that allow a substance to be predisposed to resist or receive other qualities. 
Qualities specific to quantities are accidental qualities to quantities such as a number 
being odd or even, and a line being crooked or straight.  
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 The ‘son of Malik’ in the verses serves as an example of the fourth category of 
relation (al-iḍafah). This category refers to those accidents that describe an object in 
relation to another such as a person being a father to another person, a son of someone, or 
one object being larger than another object. ‘In his house yesterday reclining’ are 
examples of the categories of place (al-ʾayn), time (mata), and position (al-waḍʿ), 
whereas ‘in his hand was a sword, which he turned so it turned’ are examples of the 
categories of having or possession (milk or al-jidah), action (ʾan-yafʿalu), and affection 
(ʾan-yanfaʿilu). Where the person, in this case Zaid, possesses a sword and acts upon it 
by turning the sword, and the sword is affected by being turned by Zaid.  
 The categories allow us to understand what it means when Muslim writers 
identify adab as a malakah and why I translate it as a habitus. We have previously 
covered that there are four types of qualities that Muslim theologians and philosophers 
have identified, thereby agreeing with and accepting Aristotle’s formulation of this 
category. In al-Jawahir al-Muntaẓimat fī ʿUqūd maqūlāt. a well known text on the 
categories, Ahṃad ibn Ahṃad al-Sujāʿī expands on the psychic qualities mentioning that 
of the four, psychic qualities are those that are specific to beings that possess a soul (nafs) 
thereby excluding plants and other inanimate objects. al-Sujāʻī then states, “If [the 
psychic quality] is not established, then it is termed a condition (ḥal). However, if it is 
firmly established, they it is termed a malakah such as writing. This is so because in the 
initial stage [of the quality being acquired] it is a condition (ḥal) which, if ingrained and 
firmly, becomes a malakah” (Makhlūf 1971, 43). In the process of a person acquiring a 
psychic quality, there are two stages: the stage where it is a condition and the stage where 
it is a malakah.  
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 What are the differences between the two stages and what activity or activities on 
the part of the person are required for a psychic quality to become a malakah? When a 
person performs an act that results in the person acquiring a psychic quality such as 
activities that make up a healthy life style like eating healthy foods, exercising, and 
sleeping well, in the beginning stages the person may eat healthy for 3-4 days and 
exercise for the same amount of time and then revert back to their previous manner of 
living. The quality of being healthy was a temporary condition that a person could easily 
loose after some short duration of time, being only there for the time the person was 
performing those acts that are considered to compose a healthy lifestyle. Once the person 
stopped performing them, the quality of being healthy no longer can be predicated of the 
person and no longer existed. This stage is referred to as a condition (ḥal) where being 
healthy is not a quality that is firmly established in the person’s soul. At this stage the 
quality appears on the soul but then leaves the soul due to lack of continuous 
performance of those activities that result in the quality being formed.  
 If a person continues to perform those activities that result in a particular psychic 
quality, in our case here the quality of being healthy, then the quality will take hold on 
the soul. Once the quality takes hold and becomes firmly fixed on the soul, the psychic 
quality now enters the stage where it is a malakah. At this stage, the psychic quality will 
not leave the soul due to it being firmly established. This stage is reached by a person 
consistently performing those acts that result in the psychic quality intended to where it 
becomes a habit of the person. This habit results in the person possessing a disposition 
towards those acts. The term malakah in Arabic is etymologically derived from the root 
letters of mīm-lam-kaf which signify possession and acquiring of something. Hence it is 
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appropriate to translate malakah as a habitus where acts that result in a person being 
healthy now proceed with ease from a person who acquires the habitus (malakah) of 
health.  
 Muslim theologians point out that it is not that the psychic quality changes from 
the stage of it being a condition to the stage of the quality being a habitus. Meaning that it 
is not that the quality of being healthy is different at the stage of it being a condition from 
the quality of being healthy at the habitus stage. The difference between the two stages is 
of the accidental quality of being firmly established (tamakkun) in the soul which is 
related to the factor of time. “The difference between a condition and a habitus is not that 
of a difference between two species of the same genus,” Avicenna states, “the 
differentiating between them both is their relation to a factor that has changed. That 
factor that has changed is time. This differentiation is by virtue of an accidental quality, 
not the result of a differentia in the true nature of the object” (Makhlūf 1971, 43). Thus 
every habitus is a condition but not every condition is a habitus. 
 Once the habitus is achieved, acts that resulted in the habitus were performed with 
effort and deliberation in the stage of condition, now issue forth with ease and no 
deliberation. In an important passage on the role of deliberation and the ends of an act, 
Avicenna makes the case that when performing an act towards some end, deliberation is 
not a component. He asks us to consider the case of art, “for undoubtedly, it is for the 
sake of some end. Once it becomes a habit, however, doing it no longer requires 
deliberation, and it even becomes such that when deliberation is present, it is nigh on 
impossible to do” (Avicenna 2009, 98). When art is at the habitus stage, it issues forth 
from the person without much effort or deliberation as it is now a firmly fixed quality of 
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the person’s soul. Only at the stage of condition (hāl) is effort and deliberation required 
due to the quality not being firmly established. One observes this same distinction in al-
Ghazālī’s discussion on what character is in his Iḥyāʿ ʿŪlūm al-Dīn. al-Ghazālī defines 
character as, “a firmly established disposition (hayʾah) of the soul by virtue of which acts 
proceed [from the soul] with ease, not requiring reflection and deliberation [on part the 
person]” (al-Ghazālī 2010, 3:605). In defining a character trait as a fixed disposition of 
the soul, al-Ghazālī identifies that a person can only truly possess a character trait, good 
or bad, at the habitus stage. Prior to that, in relation to that character trait, the person is in 
the state where it is a condition and not a fixed part of the person’s disposition. al-Ghazālī 
later discusses why he has qualified his definition with it being a fixed disposition by 
providing the example of a person who only on certain occasions performs acts of 
generosity and gives money due to certain circumstances. Such a person cannot be 
described as a generous person or as possessing the quality of generosity because an act 
of generosity only proceeds from them due to external factors. Only when acts of 
generosity proceed from a person easily and without deliberation can generosity be said 
to be a firmly fixed quality of a person’s soul. To the extent, al-Ghazālī states, that, “a 
person could possess the quality of generosity and not give anything due to an 
impediment such as the lack of wealth or some other factor [that prevents the generous 
person from acting generously]. [Likewise] it may be the case that a person posses the 
quality of stinginess and gives out wealth due to motivating factors such as ostentation or 
to establish a reputation [of being generous]” (ibid., 3:606). Only when a psychic quality 
has gone through the stage of condition onto the habitus stage can it be said to be firmly 
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fixed in a person’s soul. Once the quality is firmly fixed (rāsikhah) and very difficult for 
a person to lose can that psychic quality be predicated of the person.  
When a person is said to possess adab it is to be understood as a habitus 
(malakah) which is a firmly established psychic quality of the soul. This is achieved by a 
person consistently performing acts that reflect that disposition resulting in the condition 
(ḥāl) of adab with effort and deliberation. The consistent performance of acts of adab 
result in the soul possessing adab and acquiring the disposition of adab. After which acts 
of adab proceed from the person without deliberation and effort. This understanding of a 
psychic quality going through the stage of being a condition (ḥāl) and then to the stage of 
being a habitus (malakah) is demonstrated in the statement of the Prophet Muhammad 
where he said, “O people! [Know] that knowledge is acquired through acts of learning 
(taʿallum) and deep understanding of the religion is acquired by undertaking acts that 
generate understanding of the religion (tafaqquh)” (al-Bayhaqī 1999, 1:314). In another 
statement made by the Companion of the Prophet, Abu Dardā’, we find the same 
statement made about learning with the addition of the virtue of forbearance. Abu Dardā’ 
says, “Knowledge is acquired through acts of learning (ta’allum) and forbearance is 
acquired by performing acts of forbearance (taḥallum)” (Ibid., 1:348). In these 
statements, the qualities of religious knowledge, deep understanding, and the virtue of 
forbearance all have the same way of being acquired which is the performing of those 
acts that are dictated of that quality. One notices that the verb form being used in each 
case is the form V. According to Arabic grammarians, one of the primary meanings of 
the form V verb is to put in effort (takalluf) to perform the verb in form I. So taḥallum 
means to put effort to perform acts of forbearance (ḥilm). Similarly is the case with the 
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other verbs. Muslim theologians and writers on education have cited this ḥadith as a 
proof text for the process of acquiring a psychic quality comprised of the stage of being a 
condition (ḥal) then, upon constant performance of acts that the quality dictates, the 
person enters the habitus (malakah) stage where the quality can truly be predicated of the 
person.  
 Adab being identified as a habitus (malakah) entails that a person performs acts 
that constitute adab in order for the soul to possess adab. The statements of the early 
Muslims on adab which identify it with specific acts and dispositions can now be 
understood as identifying some acts that are the fruits of a person possessing adab. They 
serve as guidelines of acts that a person can perform continuously to reach the stage 
where adab is a habitus.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONSTRUCTING THE EDUCATIONAL AUTHORITATIVE DISCOURSE: CRAFTS 
AND ADAB MANUALS 
 
 Having explored the various significations of the term adab and investigated its 
psychological dimensions, we arrived, in the last chapter, towards a philosophical 
definition of the term with al-Attas. In this chapter, we aim to construct a central 
constituent of the practice of education’s authoritative discourse, namely adab manuals. 
Exploring the authoritative discourse will allow us to situate Ibn Jamāʿah and his 
contribution to educational thought in the Islamic tradition. Manuals dedicated to adab 
have been composed for all crafts and practices in the Islamic tradition, including the 
practice of education. The focus of this chapter is to construct the authoritative discourse 
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of adab manuals through studying adab manuals in various practices aiming to identify 
the purpose these manuals served in Muslim societies. Then we will focus specifically on 
the adab manuals in the practice of education attempting to identify content and trends of 
these manuals historically.  
 What the prevalence of adab manuals indicate is that “there is a general adab 
shared widely in Muslim society that underlies the norms and activities of all other roles” 
and a “pervasiveness of theories of the person and of psychology evident in the concept 
and literatures of adab” (Metcalf, 1984, 4). The way adab is embodied and unfolds in 
each of these crafts and disciplines of knowledge indicates to us that, despite the different 
social roles, offices and crafts the adab manuals were intended for, it was expected that 
each practitioner would cultivate an adab that was common to all social roles and crafts. 
In addition to the universal nature of adab, it also had its own manifestations that were 
particular to each social role, office or craft.   
 Having established adab as the good sought after in all crafts and disciplines of 
knowledge, adab in literature dedicated to the practice of education in the Islamic 
tradition will be surveyed. This will establish that in any educational initiative, the 
highest good that is sought after in Islamic educational philosophy is adab.  
 
Teaching as a Craft (al-ṣināʿah) 
 The existence of adab manuals in the Islamic practice of education must be 
understood within a larger context of how the activity of teaching and learning is viewed 
in relation to other human activities in the Islamic tradition. The educationalist al-Rāghib 
al-Asf̣ahānī (d. 502/1108) situates human actions in relation to divine acts, or the acts of 
74 
God. He states, “Acts (afʿāl) are of two types: divine and human. Divine acts are of four 
types: origination (ibdāʿ), existentiation (takwīn), sustaining (tarbiyyah), and 
transformation (īḥālah)” (al-Rāghib 2007, 293). All of these acts are considered acts of 
creation with each act signifying a type of creation; creation referring to the act of 
bringing into existence from non-existence.  
 Origination refers to God creating an object where the act of creation is a single 
act and the object is not created from a pre-existing object nor created in a gradual 
manner. The thing is brought into existence in its complete form in a single act. 
Existentiation occurs when a thing is brought into existence in a gradual manner. al-
Rāghib provides the creating of humans, plants and animals as examples of existentiation. 
Sustaining refers to God providing creation with all types of sustenance and 
transformation refers to God changing the qualities of creation such as color, taste, and 
odor.   
 al-Rāghib next treats human actions stating that there are of three types: acts of 
the soul, or psychic acts which  al-Rāghib states are the “acts of the heart” (ibid., 294). 
The acts of the heart are not the physical acts of the body, but are the acts of thought and 
knowledge. Next are physical (badanī) acts to which walking, standing, sitting, and other 
acts of the body belong. The third types of humans acts are artisanal (ṣinaʿī) in nature and 
are acts produced by both the soul and the body. The various crafts and arts belong to this 
type of human acts. al-Rāghib’s classification of acts is predicated on his understanding 
of the makeup of a human being. A human being is composed of both a body and a soul. 
Each has acts that are specific to it and acts that are produced when the body and the soul 
act together.  
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 al-Rāghib adds another perspective on human actions by viewing them in relation 
to animals and inanimate objects. The key terms he uses when discussing the actions of 
humans, animals, and inanimate objects are al-fiʿl, al-ʿamal, and al-ṣunʿu. Each of the 
terms signify certain qualities of an action and those qualities determine which of the 
three, humans, animals, or inanimate objects, the term can be applied to. Al-fiʿl, being the 
most general of the terms, is applied to actions that, “are skillfully or unskillfully done, 
done with or without cognition, are done intentionally or unintentionally, and to the 
actions of humans, animals, and inanimate objects.” Al-ʿamal, on the other hand, “is only 
applied to animals and not to inanimate objects, and to actions that are intentional and 
done with cognition, not to actions that are unintentional and done without cognition.” 
Al-ʿamal excludes only the acts of inanimate objects. The last term al-Rāghib treats is al-
ṣunʿu which is, “only applied to humans and not other animals. And [the term] is only 
applied to [actions] that are performed with skill.” So in this classification scheme of 
movements, al-fiʿl is the most inclusive term, including the movement of animate and 
inanimate objects, and al-ʿamal brings in one level of exclusivity by being applied only 
to the movement of animate objects. The most specific class is al-ṣunʿu which only refers 
to the acts of human beings, excluding all other movements of animate objects.  
 A fiʿl, as we have just seent, is the most general in its application in that it 
includes all actions we observe in the world from all beings and is not exclusive to human 
actions. al-Jurjanī defines an animal as, “a sentient body which grows and moves 
possessing a will.” The ability to act intentionally is affirmed for all animals (al-
hayawān) but not affirmed for inanimate objects (al-jamadat). Even though plants are 
bodies which do grow they are not included the category of animals. Ahṃadnagarī states 
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in his entry on plants, “there is no difference [of opinion] that plants are not [considered 
as] animals. The only difference is regarding whether they are living. It is said that they 
are living because life is an attribute that is the basis of nourishment and growth. Others 
said no because life is an attribute that is the basis of perception and volitional 
movement” (Ahṃadnagarī 1911, 1:394). Thus the types of acts that a willing sentient 
being can perform are of a different category than inanimate beings that lack a will or 
volition that category being al-ʿamal.  
 For al-Rāghib, what makes human beings stand out in this framework is the 
ability of humans to perform acts that require skill and expertise, termed al-ṣunʿu, which 
signifies doing and act well and skillfully. The derived noun al-ṣināʿah refers to habitual 
work, trade, an art, or craft. Actions of this category assume will, knowledge, and a telos 
on part of the agent. According to al-Rāghib, actions of this category may occur without 
thought (fikr) by the agent but this is due to the agent’s expertise of the craft. Whereas an 
action of the first category performed without exhibiting thought on part of the agent is 
due to the agent’s lack of expertise.  
 Crafts (al-ṣināʿah), according to al-Rāghib are either intellectual (ʿilmī) or practical 
(ʿamalī):  
“The intellectual crafts are those which do not require any assistance such as the 
members [of the body] like the hands and feet [to accomplish]. [Examples of the 
intellectual crafts] are knowledge of divine realities (al-maʿārif al-ilāhiyyah) and 
arithmetic. Practical crafts require the assistance of the members of the body and 
are of two kinds. The first kind [of craft] comes to an end with the completion of 
the actions of the craftsman such as dancing, playing of wind instruments (al-zamr), 
and plays (muhakāh). The second kind [of craft] produces an impression that 
remains [after the completion of an action]. This [second] kind [of craft] is [also] 
of two kinds: crafts that leave an intellectual, not a tangible, impression such as the 
craft of medicine and blacksmithing (al-bayṭarah). And crafts that leave a tangible 
impression such as the craft of building and writing” (al-Rāghib 2007, 294-5).  
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When one conceives of a craft what normally comes to mind is an activity that produces 
something that is tangible, that one can observe. In other words, the goal of a craft is the 
production of an artifact resulting at the end of the activity. In al-Rāghib’s conception, a 
craft is inclusive of activities whose telos is to produce an artifact, but he extends the 
concept of a craft to the sciences as well, such as arithmetic. Medicine is classified as a 
practical craft, yet this is approaching medicine in terms of the actual practice of medicine. 
The science of medicine would be an intellectual craft.  
 Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406), in addition to being a historian and a judge, has written 
much on education and is a major thinker in the Islamic tradition on educational thought. 
In his well known al-Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldūn spends nearly a quarter of the book on 
teaching, epistemology, the development of the religious sciences and crafts.13 He argues 
that the teaching of sciences is to be considered a craft (al-ṣināʿah) because, “[obtaining] 
skill in a science, the ascertainment of it, and the complete mastery of it is only by 
[possessing] a habitus (malakah)” (Ibn Khaldūn, 2005, 2:350). A habitus is developed only 
by constant practice of a particular craft. In teaching a particular science, the habitus will 
allow the instructor to “comprehensive knowledge of the science’s foundations, principles, 
knowledge its topics and being able to derive solutions for new cases from its principles” 
(ibid). All habitus, Ibn Khaldūn states, are corporeal (jismaniyyah). What he intends by this 
is that they are sensible (maḥsūsah), able to be perceived. The habitus can be perceived on 
the body or in the mind. Because the habitus are corporeal, in order for them to be acquired, 
a teacher is required.  
                                                               
13 For a thorough study on this topic see Zaid Ahmad. 2003. The epistemology of Ibn Khaldūn. London: 
Routledge Curzon.  
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 Ibn Khaldūn further argues that teaching a science is a craft by pointing to the 
existence of different technical nomenclature that exists amongst the experts of a particular 
science which is the case with all crafts. The existence of different nomenclature within a 
particular science is evidence that the nomenclature itself is not part of the science. Ibn 
Khaldūn states, “for if they were part of the science, there would be only one [set of] 
technical terms used by them all. Do you not see in theology (ʿilm al-kalām) how, in the 
teaching of this science, the terminology of the early and later scholars differs? Similarly 
in legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), Arabic language, and law (fiqh), every science that is needed 
to be learnt you will find its terminology different when teaching the science. This all shows 
that the different technical terms are crafts utilized when teaching, while the science as 
such is one in itself” (Ibn Khaldūn 2005, 2:351). How this works is the science that is being 
taught is one and the same no matter who is learning the science or teaching it. The science 
of theology is one science, but when it comes to the activity of teaching the science of 
theology, different techniques are used. Of these techniques are terms that allow the teacher 
and the student to discourse about various issues and concepts that are particular to 
theology. Different teachers and scholars will invariably have different terminologies and 
techniques that they used when teaching theology. The activity of teaching is separate from 
the science that is being taught and it is the activity of teaching that is considered to be a 
craft.  
 We have seen with al-Rāghib that crafts are a category of actions that are specific 
to human beings that entail actions of the soul and the body. Ibn Khaldūn sees crafts in 
much the same way: as an activity that is specific only to human beings. “Humans being 
are distinguished from other animals with qualities that are specific to humans. Of these 
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qualities are the [existence] of the sciences and crafts that result from thought by which 
human beings are distinguished from all other animals” (Ibn Khaldūn 2005, 1:62). Thus 
the craft of teaching and learning is specific to human beings and not other animals and 
this craft involves the development of a habitus which, as we have encountered, is a quality 
of the soul.  
 In the framework outlined, Muslim writers on education have considered the 
activity of teaching and learning as a craft. For each craft, as we will be shown, there are 
manuals of adab that the practitioner of the craft must embody when engaging in a 
particular craft. The craft of teaching and learning also has its manuals of adab for the 
teacher and the student.  
 
Adab Manuals and Crafts 
 In the literature of almost all craft and practices in the Islamic tradition, one 
encounters manuals of adab that relate to that specific craft, social role, or act of worship. 
The presence of adab manuals is seen amongst different theological sects, Sufi orders 
(turuq), different political and religious offices, and for each age group and gender. Adab 
manuals transcend all boundaries in the Islamic tradition. One finds well known early 
adab manuals in various fields of human activity such as Adab al-Qaḍī by al-Khassaf (d. 
261/874) in the field of law, Adab al-Kātib by Ibn Qutaybah al-Dīnawarī (d. 276/889) 
which he wrote for secretaries in the Abbasid administration, Adab al-Ṭabīb by Ishāq ibn 
ʿAlī Ruhāwī (d. 319/931) in the field of medicine, Adab al- Ṣuhḅa by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-
Sulamī (d. 412/1021) in the field of Sufism, Ādāb al-Mulūk by al-Thaʿlabī (d. 427/1035) 
in the field of politics, and al-Jāmiʿ li-Akhlāq al-Rāwī wa Ādāb al-Sāmiʿ by Khatị̄b al-
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Baghdādī (d. 463/1070) in the field of hadīth. What has been mentioned so far are 
separate tracts devoted to a particular craft or a particular aspect of a craft or science. 
There are other writings and compilations that contain sections dedicated to the ādāb for 
the particular field. In hadīth compilations and legal manuals, for example, one 
encounters chapters and sections devoted to the ādāb of a particular aspect of a craft, 
science, acts of worship, or a daily act that a Muslim will perform.  
 Adab manuals were read and studied by the practitioners of each craft or science. 
These manuals served purposes different from those manuals that were in a craft that 
were designed for instruction and content. One would undergo training to be a judge by 
reading texts in positive law in one of the four legal schools, legal theory and other texts 
in other sciences. Then one would also study adab manuals written for a judge. This 
phenomenon of adab manuals existed all across the Islamic tradition and indicates, as 
Barabara Metcalf notes, that the “ideal of adab to be strikingly pervasive” (Metcalf, 
1984, 3). The ideal was not to merely be a judge, a jurist, a hadith scholar, a Sufi, a man, 
a woman, or a ruler. Rather it was to be a master of these practices while possessing 
adab. In fact, to be considered a master of a practice was only possible if the craft was 
practiced with adab. Thus it is adab serving as the ideal to be cultivated in Islamic 
educational philosophy.  
 In examining the content of the adab manuals and by looking at manuals across 
various disciplines and crafts, we hope to ascertain a good sense of what the ideal of adab 
entails and how it is reflected in the disciplines of medicine, issuing legal verdicts 
(fatāwa), and hadīth transmission. The 4thAH/9th century CE physician, Isḥāq ibn ‘Alī al-
Ruhāwī, composed an important work entitled Adab al- ṭabīb intended to reform the 
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practice of medicine in his times. He observes that practitioners of medicine his time 
have resorted to dishonest and deceptive practices resulting in them, “marring the good 
qualities of medicine and bringing down the respected standing of its practitioners” (al-
Ruhāwī  1992, 35). This situation resulted due to practitioners not acquiring knowledge of 
the foundational principles of the craft of medicine thereby not being able to pay heed to 
the directions the craft was headed. His solution was that the practice of medicine needed 
to be aligned with the ādāb required of the craft. He states, “Thus I have gathered 
together, to the extent I am able to, the ādāb which a physician must instill in himself, 
and the virtuous character traits according to which the physician must constitute his self 
with” (al-Ruhāwī  1992, 35). Once the physician acquires the proper adab and virtues, he 
will then be able to correctly practice his craft in its ideal manner. What exactly does the 
adab of the physician entail? In the passages following, al- Ruhāwī outlines the sections 
and topics of the book. This provides us a conception of what al-Ruhāwī has in mind 
when he speaks of the adab of the physician.  
 al-Ruhāwī organized Adab al- ṭabīb into twenty chapters divided over two 
sections. The first section focuses on specific ādāb and virtues that the physician must 
acquire, practices for managing and maintaining his physical body, practices that the 
physician must first do concerning himself, then those practices the physician must do 
concerning his ill patients and those who are healthy. Finally the first section treats 
instructions, injunctions, and ways of managing one’s health that the physician should 
offer to the patient, his servants, and those who oversee the patient’s health interests. In 
the second section of Adab al-ṭabīb, al-Ruhāwī focuses on necessary practices and 
regimina for patients and those who are well to observe. al-Ruhāwī sets this in the form 
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of stories and traditions, “by which all people can acquire adab, particularly the 
physicians” (al-Ruhāwī  1992, 36).  
 Studying the chapter titles also provides us with further details as to al-Ruhāwī’s 
conception of adab as it applies to the physician. The twenty chapters and their titles, as 
outlined by al-Ruhāwī himself, are: 
Chapter 1:  The responsibility (amānah) and creed (i’tiqād) the physician must 
uphold, and the ādāb that the physician should cultivate in his soul 
and character. 
Chapter 2: The measures by which the physician treats his body and limbs. 
This chapter includes many obligations and must be discussed in 
detail.  
Chapter 3:  What a physician must avoid and be aware of. 
Chapter 4: What the physician should advise the servants of the patient [to 
do]. 
Chapter 5: The ādāb the visitors of the patient and the family of the bereaved 
should observe. 
Chapter 6:  Matters the physician should pay close attention to such as simple 
and compound drugs, how to avoid using expired drug 
intentionally or unintentionally from pharmacists and other who 
are in charge of managing and safekeeping drugs. 
Chapter 7: What the physician should ask the patient and other about. 
Chapter 8: What is obligatory for the ill and healthy people to believe 
regarding the physician when ill or healthy. 
Chapter 9: The patient and the healthy person must accept what the physician 
[prescribes]. 
Chapter 10: What a patient should advise [before an illness occurs] his family 
and servants [to do at the onset of an illness]. 
Chapter 11: How a patient should interact with his visitors. 
Chapter 12: On the noble nature of the practice of medicine. 
Chapter 13: All people must hold the physician in high esteem in accordance 
with the position of the craft of medicine. However, kings and 
noble people must esteem the physician more [than the common 
people]. 
Chapter 14: On rare incidents that occurred to some physicians. Some of which  
are already known. [Knowledge of this] will encourage the 
physician to be alert as to its paths. Some are funny, intending to 
encourage the physician to test the intelligence of the one seeking 
treatment, lest the physician be held responsible 
   for any harm that results.  
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Chapter 15: The craft of medicine is not to be taught to everyone seeking to 
learn it. Rather, [it should only be taught] to those who physical 
and moral constitution are suitable [to the craft]. 
Chapter 16:  On the examination of physicians. 
Chapter 17: On the ways kings may remove the corruption that exists amongst 
physicians, and guide all people to rectifying their relationship to 
medicine and how this was accomplished in past times.  
Chapter 18: Warning people from those who falsely practice under the same of 
medicine, and the difference between them and the medical tactics.  
Chapter 19: On blameworthy habits that many people have adopted that harm 
the sick and the physician.  
Chapter 20:  On what the physician should store up and prepare for during  
periods of health for periods of illness, and from the time of youth  
for the time of old age.  
  
One immediately notices the absence of any chapter on the content of medicine 
itself. If one were to look at the contents of the famous Canon on Medicine (Ḳānūn fi’l-
ṭibb) of Ibn Sīnā (d.428/1037), one finds the text devoted to topics such as the 
temperaments, the humours, anatomy, general physiology, psychology, the causes of 
disease, semeiology, sphygmology, urinoscopy, dietetics, the need for compound drugs, 
and on the preparation of various medicines. These topics are the technical aspects of the 
craft of medicine that are absent from al-Ruhāwī’s composition on the ādāb a physician 
must abide by. This sheds light on the conception of adab in al-Ruhāwī’s mind and what 
was absent in the practice of medicine in his time that did not allow physicians to obtain 
the good of the practice of medicine. It was not the content that was lacking, rather it was 
the absence of adab that created physicians unable to recognize and obtain the goods of 
the practice of medicine. The ideal self in the craft of medicine, in addition to mastering 
the content of medicine, must also possess the required adab of medicine as well. Such a 
physician will practice medicine in a specific manner that will realize the goods that are 
internal and external to the practice of medicine. In an important passage al-Ruhāwī 
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states, “It is, therefore, necessary for a physician to acquire the ādāb and the knowledge 
that benefits him in the practice of medicine. And without doubt, one who does not 
acquire what I will mention and discuss will be embarrassed [to practice medicine] if one 
possesses a minimal amount of perception (al-ḥiss)” (al-Ruhāwī  1992, 40). 
 al-Ruhāwī starts his first section on the theological doctrines that a physician must 
uphold. What is significant here is that he terms the items he will cover in this section 
rational ādāb (al- ādāb al-‘aqliyyah) or ādāb that the intellect must possess. For al-
Ruhāwī, it is a must for a physician to have correct theological beliefs regarding God, His 
prophets, and other tenets of faith. The ādāb for the intellect are three and entails, firstly, 
upholding there is a Creator of the cosmos who is one, omnipotent, wise, gives life and 
death, and health and illness. Secondly, the physician must have firm affection and 
dedicate his entire intellect, self, and will to Allah. Thirdly, the physician must uphold 
that Allah has prophets that Allah has sent to humanity for their benefit and interests. Not 
possessing these ādāb of the intellect, on the part of the physician, will lead to a corrupt 
practice of medicine that does not achieve the goods of the craft. After a physician 
upholds correct doctrine taught from the prophets of Allah, the physician must turn to 
himself and acquire the virtues and improve one’s moral character. This entails 
worshiping Allah in a manner that is pleasing to Him, and bringing into balance the three 
faculties of the soul: faculty of the mind (al-quwwa al-nafsainyyah), the vital faculty (al-
quwwa al-hayawiniyyah), and the faculty related to lust (al-quwwa al-shahwaniyyah). 
 For al-Ruhāwī, the adāb a physician is expected to cultivate, while many are 
specific to the craft of medicine, are also expected for any Muslim to cultivate regardless 
of their craft or profession. al-Ruhāwī states that the goods of the adab are, “general and 
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apply to all people who have intelligence. And if one possesses adab, then one would 
deem the acquiring [of these ādāb] as a virtue” (al-Ruhāwī  1992, 39).This is an 
important observation on the nature of the self that possesses adab that serves as the 
highest good that education in the Islamic tradition seeks to cultivate. The ideal of adab 
serves to inform all crafts and disciplines. This ideal, however, does create different 
expectations at certain levels of a craft or a discipline of knowledge that are specific to 
them and not transferable. Thus the adab of the intellect are to be found in the adab 
expected, not only for a physician, but for a judge, a jurist, a student, a teacher, and a 
ruler as well. al-Ruhāwī draws an analogy between the adāb of the physician and the 
adāb of a judge stating that the physician acts like a judge over the soul as a judge is over 
the body and, “the qualities that are befitting for a judge are all, or mostly, befitting of a 
physician as well” (Ibid., 39). In an adab manual for delivering the Friday sermons, the 
Shafite jurist Ibn al-ʻAt ̣tạ̄r (d. 724/1324) states when discussing the adab that relate to 
oneself, “It is necessary that [the person delivering the sermon] be upholding correct 
doctrine, be of Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jama’ah, not an anthropomorphist, nor one who 
negates His attributes” (Ibn al-ʿAt ̣tạ̄r  1996, 87). This being identical to what al-Ruhāwī 
mentioned as the adab relating to physicians. al-ʻAt ̣tạ̄r later elaborates on more of the 
adāb that a person delivering a sermon needs to cultivate stating that the person needs to 
know all of the legal rulings related to delivering the Friday sermon such as what the 
conditions of the sermon are what invalidates the sermon. These particular adāb is 
specific to delivering the Friday sermon. 
 al-Ruhāwī’s work on adab is represent a systematic work whose chapters are well 
organized and build on each other. This is not the case with all adab works. There does 
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not seem to be a particular style of composing works on adab that all writers adhered to. 
The similarities between different works of adab are more in the content and purpose 
rather than in the style and order of the work. For example, al-Ruhāwī will have chapters 
each dedicated to a particular adab the physician is to cultivate. He dedicates the first 
chapter of his work to the virtues and character traits a physician must acquire. al-ʿAtṭạ̄r 
dedicates the chapter on the virtues and character traits  for one delivering the Friday 
sermon towards the end of the work. In a work on the adab for judges by an 11th century 
Hanablite jurist, Marʿī ibn Yūsuf al-Karmī (d. 1033/1623), the virtues and character traits 
required of judges is scattered throughout the work in different places. The Shafite jurist, 
al-Māwardī (d. 450/1058), dedicates chapters to the same topic in the second half of his 
Adab al-qadī. The first section is dedicated to procedural issues the judge should be 
aware of when in court. (al-Māwardī 1971)  
 Adāb that are common to all crafts and disciplines of knowledge are an important 
point of inquiry in Islamic philosophy of education. The adāb were in the mind of the 
writers when composing these tracts to be read and studied by students and practitioners 
of the craft. They provide us with the conception of the self that is to be cultivated in any 
Islamic educational initiative. We have seen that a person having upholding correct 
theological doctrines regarding God, prophets, revealed books, and other issues holds a 
central place in the self that possesses adab that is common to all educational initiatives. 
Another example of an adab that is common to all disciplines is the virtuous character 
traits (al-akhlāq al-maḥmūdah) that constitute the soul possessing adab. al-ʻAt ̣tạ̄r says, 
“It is necessary [for the person delivering the Friday sermons] to avoid the customs of 
politicians, the pleasures of the [lower] soul, demonic states, senseless moods, and 
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engaging in sophistical discussions. It is necessary to hold his soul to the fine, virtuous 
traits of character, and avoid evil and rude traits of character” (Ibn al-ʿAtṭạ̄r  1996, 170). 
al-Karmī states that judges should, “beware of forgetting Allah, Most Great. This comes 
about from – without him being aware of it – from being accustomed to having his 
judgments carried out, the love of leadership, social status, and being placed in charge 
over people, people being in awe of him, veneration his position, and similar factors” (al-
Karmī 2001, 47). He continues providing the cause of forgetting Allah saying, “This also 
comes about from destructive vices that come about due to being oblivious to the self and 
its refinement, and arising from the engagement of a judge with people who have not 
perfected themselves [by acquiring the virtues of good character] such as those who 
follow their desires and lusts” (Ibid.) In Adab al-Wazīr by al-Māwardī, an adab manual 
for governors, he outlines a number of virtues to acquire and vices a governor should rid 
oneself of such as covetousness, forbearance, being grateful, patience, not listening to 
slander, and other vices and virtues. (al-Māwardī 1929) We have already encountered 
similar passages in al-Ruhāwī’s work. All of this indicates that in the conception of the 
self that possesses adab, the acquisition of the virtues and the elimination of vices is a 
constituent element to be cultivated regardless of the specific craft or discipline of 
knowledge one is concerned with undertaking. 
 One finds a strong correlation between adab and moral character in many writings 
of adab. Although this is not the only defining aspect of adab, yet it the conception of 
adab in the Islamic tradition, the position of moral character is central. To the extent that 
adab has been defined as, “a term signifying knowledge by virtue of which all types of 
errors can be avoided. It is [a term] general in its application that includes [errors in] 
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speech, acts, and character (khuluq).” This definition allows us to understand that the 
strong relationship moral character (akhlāq) has with adab that we see all so pervasive on 
all writings on adab that it is in the context of the adab a person must have in relation to 
himself. Discussions on adab are always relational – meaning that one possesses adab 
but in addition to possessing adab one also exhibits and manifests adab in relation to 
something. Thus there are adāb to be observed in relation to a patient, to a student, to 
one’s subjects, to a teacher, to a prophet, to Allah, and to one’s own self. Thus we find al-
Māwardī stating, “There are ādāb that belong to the judgeship. These ādāb increase the 
awe judges possess, strengthen the reverence they have; awe and reverence being the 
basis of their presence. This will lead the opposing parties to deal fairly with one another 
and prevent them from denying the other’s rights. The ādāb in regards to judges…are of 
three types” (al-Māwardī 1971, 2:241-242). The first type of adab of a judge relate to 
their own selves and the character traits they possess. A judge should possess the 
qualities of abstinence (zuhd), humility, and composure (khushuʿ). Possessing these traits 
would increase the judge in his awe and reverence that are needed in the courtroom. al-
Māwardī then continues with the second type of adab of a judge and these relate to the 
adab a judge exhibits in relation to the witnesses of a case. The third type of adab relates 
to the adab a judge exhibits in relation to the opposing parties of the case he is handling. 
Thus, how adab manifests itself and what action, word or moral character traits manifest 
is determined by the relation of the object of adab to the person exhibiting adab.  
 The relational aspect of adab that we find in our writers is expressed in al-Attas’ 
definition of adab where it is an understanding that there is a hierarchy in knowledge and 
being and adab entails that one recognize and acknowledge one’s place in this hierarchy. 
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Along with this recognition and acknowledgment comes an appropriate action, speech, or 
disposition that is a true reflection on the hierarchy. It is this hierarchy that produces a 
relational self; a self is can never be conceived of in isolation of anything because the self 
does not exist in isolation.  
 
The Ādāb al-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿallim Genre of Literature  
 Thus far, we have been studying adab literature in various domains of society 
from the governor, the judge, to the physician, the ḥadīth scholar, and the person 
delivering the Friday sermon. Manuals of adab exist for each social role, craft and 
discipline of knowledge. A vast amount of literature has been generated that treats adab 
as it relates to various fields. One can get the impression that education in the Islamic 
tradition is only conceived within the context of a particular craft or social role. This is an 
important question of philosophical importance as to whether or not teaching can be 
conceived of as a craft or practice in itself and it is this craft of teaching that is applied to 
specific crafts. We will not take up this question at this time. Nonetheless, the material 
examined and the conclusions we arrive at in this study will bear direct relevance to this 
question.  
 In the Islamic tradition, one does encounter an impressive amount of literature on 
the adab of the student and the teacher. Sebastian Günther has labeled this literature as 
the ādāb al-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿallim genre of literature and it is in the 3rd - 4th /9th century 
that we find literary expression of educational thought in the Islamic tradition. (Günther 
2005) Yaḥya Ḥasan ʿAlī has identified an earlier date for the literary expression of 
educational placing it in the first half of the second century AH with a tract written by the 
90 
jurist Abu Ḥanifah (d. 150/768) to his student Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/799). (Murād 2003) 
The fact that during the initial stages of the Islamic tradition existed in an oral culture 
forces us to conclude that the ādāb most likely did exist but not primarily in written form. 
So there very likely did exist this tradition even before this time period when we see the 
generation of many texts in various disciplines of knowledge.  
 Historians of educational thought in the Islamic tradition have all mentioned that 
one of the earliest writings on education is Kitab Ādāb al-muʿallimīn by the North 
African Malikite jurist Muḥammad ibn Saḥnūn (d. 256/870). Examining its structure, 
contents and style, both Günther and Tạlas state that the work is intended for elementary 
teachers and is intended to serve as professional advice for them regarding their practice. 
(Günther 2005; Tạlas 1957) This text indicates that elementary education in North Africa 
in this time was well established. Additionally, the text provides us with an idea of what 
the curriculum was at the time. Tạlas and Günther state that from Ibn Saḥnūn’s work, one 
learns that the teacher (al-mu ͗addib) was requested to teach a curriculum that was 
compulsory for the child and another curriculum that was optional. The compulsory 
curriculum primarily focused on the Qur’an. Children were required to recite the Qur’an 
correctly, with its correct vowellings, rules for copying the Qur’an, and other aspects of 
reciting the Qur’an. The optional curriculum was composed of subjects such as 
mathematics, poetry, history of the Arabs, Arabic grammar, handwriting and the art of 
delivering the Friday sermon. (Günther 2005; Tạlas  1957)  
 Other issues discussed by Ibn Saḥnūn in his text relate to teacher responsibilities, 
treating students fairly, and what type of teacher to appoint. Günther provides us with a 
list of the chapters of the text: 
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 i. [Traditions] on the teaching of the Quran. 
 ii.  [Traditions] on the equity [to be observed in treating school] boys. 
 iii.  Chapter [of traditions] on the reprehensibility of erasing the Word of God  
the Exalted [when written on slates], and what should be done [instead] in  
this regard. 
iv.  [Traditions] on disciplining [students], and on what is permissible in this 
[regard] and what is not. 
v.  [Opinions] on the final exams for the recitation of the Quran [at 
elementary schools], and what is [to be given] to the teacher on this 
[occasion]. 
 vi.  [Opinions] on the presentation of gifts [to the teacher] on feast days. 
vii.  [Opinions] on [the occasions] when [the teacher] should give days off to  
the [school] boys. 
viii.  [Opinions] on the obligation on the teacher to stay all the time with the 
pupils [under his supervision]. 
 ix.  [Opinions] on the wage of the teacher and when it is obligatory. 
 x.  [Opinions] on renting a copy of the Quran, law books, and other such  
books  
(Günther 2005, 95-96). 
 
 Written in a very legal, administrative manner and in the form of questions posed 
and responded to, with statements from Ibn Saḥnūn on certain issues, what one notices 
here is the absence of any treatment of the adab that a teacher must observe as we saw in 
the other adab manuals of a physician or a judge. The use of adab in this text is used 
primarily in the sense of disciplining and creating habits in the student. Kitab Ādāb al-
Muʿallimīn is a very early text and later compositions in the Ādāb al-ʿālim wa-l-
mutaʿallim genre differ significantly from it in both style and content as we will see when 
analyzing Ibn Jamāʿah’s Tadhkirat al-Sāmiʿ wa al-Mutakallim fī Ādāb al-ʿālim wa-l-
Mutaʿallim. There are many factors that explain the differences in the compositions. One 
is that it is clear that Ibn Saḥnūn is writing for a particular situation regarding the state of 
elementary education in his time and location. He is addressing the needs that have arisen 
in his context by composing this tract on professional advice to teachers. Another factor 
is that one would naturally assume that one teaching the Qur’an would be a Muslim 
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holding sound creed; otherwise the person would not be qualified to teach in the first 
place.  
 Other representative writings in Ādāb al-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿallim genre that Tạlas 
lists are:  
- Abu Nasr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Fārābī (d. 339/950). Wrote extensively 
on educational thought but his writings in this area are no longer extant.  
- ‘Alī ibn Muhạmmad Qābisī (d. 403/1012). His manual on adab is entitled al-
Risālah al-Mufasṣịlah li-Ahẉāl al-Mutaʿallimīn wa-Ahḳām al-Muʿallimīn wa-al-
Mutaʿallimīn and is considered to be one of the most extensive writings in this 
genre. Quoting extensively from Ibn Saḥnūn, Qābisī discusses the merits of 
learning the Qur’an and teaching it to others. However, he treats many issues not 
covered by Ibn Saḥnūn, such as the teaching on Christians and Jews by Muslims, 
the teaching of girls, and issues related to a child’s family. Qābisī does dedicate a 
chapter on how to attain righteousness.  
- Ahṃad ibn Muhạmmad ibn Miskawayh (d. 421/1030). Considered as one of the 
falāsifah in the Islamic tradition, he composed numerous works dealing with 
educational thought. His most famous work is The Refinement of Character 
(Tahdhib al-Akhlaq).  
- The Brethren of Purity (Ikhwān al-Sạfāʼ). A group of philosophers from the 
fourth or fifth century AH, tenth or eleventh AD. They left a collection of fifty-
two treatises on various metaphysical topics, mathematics, and education.  
- Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Sīnā. One of the greatest philosophers of 
the Islamic tradition who composed numerous works on logic, metaphysics, and 
medicine. His educational work is entitled The Book of Management (Kitāb al-
Sīyāsah).  
- Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī (d. 504/1111). One of the great theologians, jurists, and 
Sufis of the Islamic tradition. al-Ghazālī is considered to be one of the great 
writers on Islamic educational thought. He was written numerous works in 
different sciences. One of his well known works is The Revival of the Religious 
Sciences (Ihỵā ͗ Ulūm al-Dīn). 
This list may give the impression that adab manuals are a thing of the past and this 
genre was at an ebb since the 12th century, yet the adab manuals have continued to be 
written since al-Ghazālī and Ibn Jamāʿah. One such work, The Adab [of Learning] and 
the Endpoint of Desire (adab al-ṭalab wa-l-muntahā-l-ʾarab), was composed by the 
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Traditionist and former Zaidī Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Shawkānī (d. 1250/1839).14 This 
work, while comprising similar topics that previous writers engaged in, stands out due to 
the writer dedicating a significant portion of his work on factors that lead to partisanship 
(al-taʿṣṣub) and the topic of being objective and fairness (al-inṣāf) when studying. The 
reason for this seems to be stemmed by the state of scholarship in al-Shawkānī’s era. 
Early in his life, he enquired as to why certain legal positions were adopted and adhered 
to by local jurists in the face of a multiplicity of opinions. al-Shawkānī was not satisfied 
with the adopting of opinions merely on the basis of custom, what was familiar, or false 
doctrine. Rather he would enquire about the evidences for each legal position and would 
spend time researching legal literature that provided evidences for the jurists’ position. al-
Shawkānī saw that it was partisanship (al-taʿṣṣub) that lead students and scholars from 
determining what the truth was on matters and not being objective when weighing the 
evidence for each issue. He states, advising the student, “When you subjected yourself, O 
student, to fairness and not being partisan to any school of law, nor [to any particular] 
scholar, rather you place all scholars on the same level in regards to the Sacred Law, all 
being subjected to it…then you have obtained the greatest benefit of knowledge and 
acquired its most unique gems” (al-Shawkānī 1998, 89). Thus, one of the most important 
qualities to cultivate is the ability to discern when bias enters into scholarship.  
al-Shawkānī also provides an analysis of how partisanship takes root in the scholarly 
class. Explaining the reason for partisanship, he states that “a student starts to study in a 
region that has adopted a particular school of law and follow a particular scholar. This 
                                                               
14 On al-Shawkānī’s life, works, and legacy, see Bernard Haykel’s Revival and Reform in Islam. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
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[condition] is a malady that has pervaded the Islamic regions and is widespread among its 
inhabitants” (ibid., 91). Studying in an environment where there is only one school of law 
creates a psychology which engenders partisanship among the class of scholars to the 
point where they treat their own school of law as the Sacred Law, dismissing all other 
voices that differ from the student’s positions as error and misguidance for no reason 
other than being different and unfamiliar. Here we see adab manuals develop and being 
used to correct corrupt practices of a craft that may exist in a certain time period. In this 
sense, adab manuals continue to change and reflect the situations in which authors find 
themselves.  
Adab manuals continue to be written in our own times serving the same ends of 
ensuring the practice of education is aligned to its internal goods. More recently, the 
ḥadīth scholar Muḥammad ʿAwwamah (b. 1940) has written a sizeable adab manual 
entitled Directive Landmarks Regarding the Craft of Learning Sacred Knowledge 
(Maʿālim al-Irshādiyyah li-Ṣināʿah Ṭālib al-ʿIlm). This work covers many of the issues 
and topics that most educational adab manuals historically have deal with. Issues and 
topics addressed in Maʿālim al-Irshādiyyah are: categories and types of knowledge, the 
merit of sacred knowledge and scholars, the ādāb a student must cultivate in himself such 
as sincerity, efficient utilization of one’s time, the ādāb a student is to cultivate in relation 
to his teacher, and the ādāb towards the material objects required for learning.  
There are two related themes that set Maʿālim al-Irshādiyyah apart from other earlier 
adab manuals. They are the theme of a student adopting a methodical approach to 
studying and the theme of direct, unmediated learning from a qualified teacher. 
ʿAwwamah’s emphasis on these two themes stems from the current state of religious 
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education and educational institutions in the Muslim world. His main concerns focus on 
shifts in scholarly authority brought in by the introduction of higher education institutions 
patterned on Western models in the Muslim world. These Western style institutions, such 
as Aligarh Muslim University (established in 1920) which grew out of the Mohammedan 
Anglo-Oriental College (established in 1877), in addition to competing with pre-existing 
educational institutions such as the madrasa, generated a new class of religious 
authorities who underwent training that was, in most respects, unfamiliar to the practice 
of education in the Islamic tradition. It is seen as a break with the norms of the practice 
and its most problematic effects in the practice was twofold: (1) students were learning 
from teachers who did not enjoy an authoritative status amongst the community of 
practitioners, and (2) the new institutions cultivated in their students an approach to 
learning that was not methodical, lacked rigor, and assumed to be part of the authoritative 
community of practitioners independent of any conferring from the existing experts of the 
practice. For example, he warns against the phenomenon of “taking the parchment as a 
teacher (al-tashayyukh bi-l-saḥīfah)” where students take on the path to learning solely 
from books produced by unqualified individuals, while not accompanying a master of the 
practice and being initiated into the community of practitioners. The breaks with the 
norms of the practice of education were expedited by the mass printing of educational 
resources and developments in technology, such as computer databases, both of which 
continued this trend which resulted in students having, in ʿAwwamah’s eyes, a skewed 
sense of expertise and what being educated truly entailed; basically a state of confusion 
regarding the internal goods of the practice. This confusion regarding the goods of the 
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practice has graduated many unqualified individuals who later assume the role of masters 
of the practice of education.15  
ʿAwwamah’s solution to address this situation is multifaceted starting with the title of 
his manual on adab. He invokes the idea of a craft (al-ṣināʿah) to religious learning 
indicating that there is an authoritative discourse that informs the standards of learning a 
novice must acknowledge. Even though the understanding of learning as a craft has been 
historically recognized, ʿAwwamah intends to bring this dimension to the forefront of his 
reader’s mind by framing the contents of his manual and forcing the reader to approach 
education as a craft. By doing so, structure will be brought back to educational discourse 
which it currently lacks.  
Building from the conception of a craft, ʿAwwamah introduces the importance of 
adopting a methodological approach to learning. The second section of the first chapter is 
dedicated to explaining the importance of a method (al-manhaj) for the student of the 
religious sciences. For ʿAwwamah, having a methodological approach is something 
natural to all endeavors in life. “Any practical or theoretical project that a person takes up 
will not and will never end up in sound results unless a person designs a plan and studies 
his project from the moment he starts” (ʿAwwamah 2013, 25). For the religious sciences 
to be studied in a methodological manner is not something unique to them. Rather all 
sciences, in order to obtain the goods it seeks, require to be studied methodically. The 
question of who determines the appropriate methodology is answered by ʿAwwamah that 
it is the masters and experts of each craft who determine the appropriate methodology for 
                                                               
15 For an overview on the change of authority in within Islam over the last 200 years, see Francis Robinson. 
(2009). Crisis of Authority: Crisis of Islam?. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Third Series), 19, pp 
339-354.  
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their respective crafts. Here ʿAwwamah provides the examples of a physician and a 
Qurʾān reciter who understand the methods that are appropriate to their crafts, thus 
demonstrating that the religious sciences are no different than any other practice or craft 
in this regard. (ʿAwwamah 2013, 27) 
New types of educational institutions and mass education, while resulting in increased 
literacy rates in Muslim countries, has also resulted in new modes of education as well.16 
ʿAwwamah notes this change and the negative impact this has had on mastering the 
religious sciences stating,  
“The religious sciences used to be acquired by learning in person (talaqqī), the  
crowding of the knees (muzāḥama bi-rukub)17, students of the sciences standing at the 
doors of scholars, by reading a number of authoritative texts in every science, and by 
putting to memory foundational short texts in each science. A student would be 
gradual in their learning joining between learning in person and learning by oneself –  
by which I mean his own private reading – all the while consulting with his teachers 
in issues that were difficult for him [to understand]. The student would, by the grace 
of God, reach the stage where he himself will be an authoritative source for the 
forthcoming generation of students. 
… 
However, we have entered into a low stage [of learning] that has led to an even more 
precarious stage. The state [of things] is as our Master the Messenger of God (God 
bless him and grant him peace) has said regarding the tribulations at the end of time, 
‘Each will make the [previous] one [seem] insignificant.’ The first dangerous stage is 
the study in Islamic universities in the College of Sacred Law (sharīʿah) without [the 
college] requiring the student to attend [lectures] continuously nor do they require, to 
admit a student, to be a student of the religious sciences before studying at the 
university level – meaning that the student has not student in Sharīʿah schools at the 
elementary and high school levels. Instead, a student would be admitted into the 
College of Sacred Law even if he is without a high school [diploma] and with no 
foundations in the religious sciences, not having studied its foundational [texts] nor 
its necessary [prerequisites]. Such a student starts to study at the university level and 
studies for four year in the College of Sacred Law. He then graduates as a professor 
and teacher of religion for generations of students. He sees himself as having become 
a scholar when he sits with laypeople speaking on God’s religion based on the 
questions posed in the gathering” (ʿAwwamah 2013, 181-182). 
                                                               
16 See Robinson (2009) p. 351. 
17 This is an idiomatic expression referring to a manner of sitting in front of a teacher where the knees of 
the student are touching the knees of the teacher in a lesson.  
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Here we see that, with the introduction of the Western model university, a new mode of 
learning was introduced. It is important to note here that ʿAwwamah is not necessarily 
identifying the low quality of graduates on the university itself. Rather his identifies the 
reconceiving of the standards of scholarship and what qualifies one to be a scholar to be 
problematic. It is in the independence from the community of the practice of education 
the universities cultivate in their students that breaks away from the standards of the 
practice. To be sure, ʿAwwamah does not jettison university education in favor of 
maintaining the status quo. Rather, in his view graduates from the university simply do 
not meet up to the standards of the practice. He states that “I do not deny some of the 
good [practices] of modern education for students of religious sciences…it is best and 
complete for a student to combine what is best in both [systems]: between the rooted,  
venerable [education system] and the fixed, modern [one]”  (Ibid., 186). He does not 
elaborate much on the benefits of the modern systems of education.    
 A final area of ʿAwwamah’s engagement that we will look at is the impact of 
technological advances on the practice of education. ʿAwwamah acknowledges benefits 
that computer software such as databases of journals and books bring. Yet he aims to 
highlight what this technology takes away from the practice of education. He classifies 
the detriments of such software into material and spiritual. The material detriments lie in 
their inaccuracy and lack of reliability. For ʿAwwamah, there are simply too many errors 
in e-journals and e-books created by unqualified individuals overseeing the production of 
such resources. These errors render them as an unreliable source. The spiritual detriments 
lie in the fact that “the religious knowledge differs from other types of knowledge in that 
it entails a cognitive [component], disciplining [of the soul], and traversing of the 
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spiritual path (sulūk)” (ʿAwwamah 2013, 185). An engineer can rely on technological 
advances because his craft deals with inanimate objects. However, in the case of the 
student of religious sciences, they are not merely engaged in the cognitive dimensions of 
their craft. Rather their craft demands from the soul to refine their souls in addition to 
developing their minds. For ʿAwwamah, a database of books will inform the student that 
prayer is an obligatory act, as well as inform the student on the legal proof texts for this. 
Yet, a database is not able to refine the sole of the student and serve as a guide on the 
spiritual in the manner that learning from a living teacher would provide. It is in 
disrupting the irreplaceable and direct, human to human connection in the learning 
process where the new educational advances are not accommodated and have created the 
situation in learning ʿAwwamah so bemoans.   
The ādāb al-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿallim genre of literature identified by Günther serves as 
the locus point for constructing the authoritative discourse of the practice of education in 
the Islamic tradition. In exploring this genre of literature, we have seen that adab manuals 
were created for all crafts in the Islamic tradition. Education, viewed as a craft, also has 
its manuals of adab. Although the content of these manuals varied throughout the 
centuries, they were all focused on content that did not relate to any substantive aspects 
of the science or practice. The manuals, instead, focused on how a person in the practice 
should cultivate adab as conceived of in the practice. Additionally, there are ādāb specific 
to the craft and what I have terms universal ādāb that are common to all crafts and practices.  
Educational manuals of adab serve to ensure, like all adab manuals, that the practice 
is carried out in a manner that is aligned to the achievement of its internal goods. To that 
end, many adab manuals contain criticisms of the way the practice is carried out by its 
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practitioners. Though the content of adab educational manuals have variable elements, 
for example the earlier manuals focus on administrative dimensions of education, later 
manuals post-Ghazālī are more systematic and exhibit the relational nature of adab. Later 
manuals are organized according to the object of adab, whether it be the person himself, 
the teacher, the lesson, or educational materials. Current adab manuals continue in this 
trajectory following the same model of purpose and composition. ʿAwwamah’s 
contribution to this genre continues this tradition of adab manuals addressing deficiencies 
in the practice of education as conceived in the Islamic tradition.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SELF IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION 
Introduction 
 In the educational context, it is important to keep in mind that a person’s identity 
or sense of self cannot be reduced to them as a student. When considering the self that 
Islamic education seeks to cultivate, one must consider the person in the educational 
context. The self in the educational context is connected to and part of the conception of 
the self in the Islamic tradition. This greater conception must be explored in order to fully 
appreciate and better understand the self that Islamic education seeks to cultivate. As we 
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saw with Socrates, the cultivation of the soul takes place within the greater context of the 
conception of the person.  
 This chapter will look at how the Islamic tradition understands the aims of human 
beings’ existence and what constitutes a human being. Additionally, two main ideas that 
ground the self that is to be cultivated in Islamic education will be explore in this chapter. 
We will explore what constitutes human happiness (saʿādah) in the Islamic tradition 
seeking to arrive at an understanding of the telos of the human species. Additionally, the 
concept of human nature, the fiṭra, will be studied before exploring the self that possesses 
adab as conceived in the educational context.  
 The fiṭra is a term that is challenging to translate. Generally, however, it refers to 
the primordial natural disposition that human beings have been created by God upon. The 
fiṭra plays and how it is understood has significant theological, legal, educational, and 
spiritual implications. It will be shown that there are various understandings of the fiṭra 
amongst Muslim scholars, yet, the fiṭra does serve a role epistemologically as well in 
terms of what types of knowledge constitute the fiṭra.    
 
The Human Person and Its Telos 
 In the Islamic tradition, one finds that Muslims conceived of the human person as 
possessing a physical and a spiritual component. The exact nature of these two 
components and their relationship with each other will be explored in order to develop an 
Islamic anthropology. In explaining what constitutes the human person, al-Rāghib al-
Isfahānī (d. 502/1108) states, “The human being (al-insān) is composed of a body (jism), 
which perceives with the eye, and a soul (nafs) which perceives with the inner sight 
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(baṣīra).” This observation is grounded not solely in empirical observation, but in the 
Qur’ān, as al-Rāghib cites two verses of the Qur’ān in support of his claim, “Your Lord 
said to the angels, ‘I will create a man from clay. When I have shaped him and breathed 
from My Spirit (ruḥ) into him, bow down before him.’” [38:71-72]  
 After acknowledging the many different ways to understand and classify where 
humans stand in relation to all of creation, the Ashʿarite theologian and philosopher, 
Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) discusses the place of humans in creation by 
considering which beings in creation possess an intellect (‘aql), wisdom (ḥikma), natural 
inclinations (ṭabīʿa), or carnal desires (shahwa). The first category is of those beings that 
possess an intellect and wisdom, but do not possess natural inclinations or carnal desires. 
In this category are angels. The second category is of those beings that do not possess an 
intellect or wisdom, but do possess natural inclinations and carnal desires. All animals, 
except for humans, fall in this category. The third category is composed of those beings 
that do not possess any of the four qualities, which plants and inanimate objects fall into. 
The fourth category is composed of those beings that possess and intellect, wisdom, 
natural inclinations and carnal desires. Human beings fall into this category (al-Rāzī 
2013, 84-85). 
 al-Rāzī reasons that when God’s effusion (fayḍ) pervaded all possibilities, God’s 
inclusive effusion necessitated that it bring all four categories of creation into existence. 
For this reason, God said that “I am putting a successor on earth” [30:30] in order to 
avoid a possible category remaining non-existent. Although this is an explanation by al-
Rāzī as to why God created human beings, it does not provide us with an understanding 
of what constitutes a person nor of what is the telos of a human life or of humanity at 
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large. This is not to say that al-Rāzī did not hold that there is a purpose or goods of a 
person’s life. But understanding where humans stand in relation to other created beings is 
an important part of understanding the telos of humanity’s creation.  
For an understanding of what constitutes a person and the telos of human life, we 
will be focusing on the writings of the 12th century theologian and philosopher al-Rāghib 
al-Isfahānī (d. 502/1108). His thoughts represent by and large perspective of the Sunni 
tradition and in our enquiry we will be referencing other representative writers as well. In 
developing a telos of human life, we will look at the concept of sa’ādah, usually 
translated as happiness, and al-Rāghib discourse on this term. In his Mufradāt Alfāz al-
Qurʻān (Dictionary of Qur’ānic Vocabulary), al-Rāghib defines the term saʿādah as, 
“Divine assistance given to human beings in order to attain that which is good, and its 
contrary is wretchedness (shaqāwah)” (al-Rāghib al-Isf̣ahānī 1992, 410.) This application 
of the terms saʿādah and shaqāwah have their bases in the Qurʻān, “As for those who 
have been given saʿādah, they will be in Paradise,” [11:108] referring to the final good of 
the human life where people end up in the hereafter, similarly we have in the Qurʻān 
describing the two possible ends of human beings stating, “some of them will be 
wretched and some happy” [11:105]. Thus the Qurʻānic understanding of ultimate human 
happiness (saʿādah) is the the attainment of paradise where a person will be eternally 
with God; happiness being achieved in the life hereafter. (Ibid., 410) 
 The term saʿādah has also been applied to worldly aspects as well. In this sense, I 
would translate the term as referring to the good of something or some activity. In al-
Rāghib’s conception, every created thing has a purpose and therefore a good for which it 
is to achieve in this world. This he deduces from the Qurʻān (20:50), “Our Lord is He 
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who gave everything its form, then gave it guidance.” al-Rāghib comments that this verse 
shows that, “In all things, God has made a perfection (kamal) that their nature drives 
them towards.” (al-Rāghib 1988) Thus, there is a perfection that is not actualized in this 
world of all created things, including human beings. This is referred to as the God given 
form in the verse. For each thing, its saʿādah or happiness/good is in actualizing and 
obtaining its perfection that is specific to it. Thus there is the term saʿādah can be applied 
to an ultimate good of a thing, which would be the thing obtaining its perfection, and the 
term can also be applied to an activity which is aligned to the ultimate good of a thing but 
which is sought for other than itself. Achieving both goods results in happiness, but that 
requires the lesser goods to be sought in order to achieve the ultimate happiness, which 
for all things is their perfection.  
 The types of goods (saʿādah) can be seen clearly in al-Rāghib’s discussion of the 
perfection of humans. His discussion starts with identifying three classes of goods 
(saʿādah) as they relate to humans. The first class relate to those goods that are external 
to a person (saʿādah kharijah), meaning that they are not related to the person’s physical 
or spiritual dimensions. These include goods such as wealth, social status, and fame. The 
second class are those goods that relate to the physical dimensions (saʿādah badanīyya) 
of a person such as one’s health, balanced personality, and physical beauty. The third 
category of goods are ones that relate to a person’s spiritual dimension (saʿādah 
nafsānīyya) and include praiseworthy habits (ādāb) and noble knowledge. al-Rāghib 
holds that it is this third category of goods that is the most superior. This is because these 
goods, once obtained, persist with a person despite the different conditions and 
circumstances a person finds himself in and they are also beneficial in obtaining the good 
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of this world and the hereafter. This is to be understood in light of another passage al-
Rāghib on goods, where he classifies goods as goods of this world or goods of the 
hereafter. Goods of the hereafter, once obtained, are continuous and never end, whereas 
goods of this world, if they are not sought for purposes of achieving perfection, the 
highest good, are “like a mirage, and are a delusion, a trial, and a punishment” (al-Rāghib 
1988, 102).  
 al-Ghazālī’s discussion on saʿādah as it relates to human beings arrives at the 
same conclusion as al-Rāghib. In the section on the rational proofs on the merits of 
knowledge, al-Ghazālī states, 
Know that what is precious and desired is of many types: that what is sought after 
for the sake of something else, that what is sought for its own sake, and that what 
is sought for its own sake and for the sake of something else as well. That which 
is sought for its own sake is more noble and superior to that what is sought for the 
sake of something else.  
  
And that which is sought for the sake of something else are darāhim and dananīr 
for they are merely stones with no intrinsic benefit. Were it not for God, Exalted 
and High, facilitating the fulfillment of needs with these two stones, they would 
be considered the same as pebbles [by people]. That which is sought for its own 
sake is happiness in the hereafter and the bliss of the beatific vision of God, the 
Exalted. [An example of] what is sought for its own sake and for the sake of 
something else is [the seeking] of a sound and healthy physique (al-Ghazālī 2010, 
1:148). 
 
Like al-Rāghib, al-Ghazālī observes that goods (saʿādah) relate to this world and the 
hereafter. Thus happiness is not a phenomenon that human beings only obtain in the 
hereafter. al-Ghazālī also identifies ultimate happiness with being with God in the 
hereafter. That is the only good that is intrinsically good, all others are extrinsically good 
and are only considered to be a good if sought after to serve in obtaining what is 
intrinsically good.  
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 Thus far, we have described happiness (saʿādah) as it relates to an individual 
person. Happiness is understood as the achievement of perfection that is specific to its 
type. al-Rāghib explains,   
The nobility of the human being lies in that God created them complete in terms 
of possessing the qualities for the purpose for which he was created. To clarify 
this, [consider] that every species that God has created in this world or has guided 
some created beings to make and produce has a particular act (fiʿl)18 that is 
specific to this species, and were it not for this [particular act], this species would 
not exist. Each species also has a purpose that is specific to it. The [particular act] 
of the camel, for example, is  to carry us and our heavy possessions to a town to 
which we would only be able to reach with great hardship. Likewise the horse is 
like wings for us to fly with, the saw and chisel are to repair our doors, beds, and 
other things with, and the door in order to protect the house with (al-Rāghib 2007, 
294). 
 
Every created being has many functions and acts yet it, in terms of its perfection (kamāl) 
there is an act that is specific to it. When looking at the acts that are specific to humans, 
we come to know that it is not that there is one act particular to each species, rather a 
species can have multiple acts that are specific to it. What is important here is that these 
acts do relate to a species perfection and thus to its happiness. al-Rāghib continues and 
describes the acts that specific to human beings. He explains,  
Acts that are specific to humans are three: (1) Cultivating and populating 
(ʿimārah)19 the earth. This is mentioned in God’s, the Exalted, statement, “and 
made you inhabit and  cultivate [the earth].” [11:61] This is achieved by acquiring 
sustenance that will suffice  for oneself and others. (2) Worshipping God. This is 
mentioned in God’s, the Exalted, statement, “I created jinn and mankind only to 
worship Me.” [51:56] This is achieved by the submitting to the Creator in His 
commands and prohibitions. (3) Being God’s successor (khilāfah). This is 
mentioned in God’s, the Exalted, words, “and make you successors to the land to 
                                                               
18 al-Rāghib defines an act (al-fiʿl) as, “a generic word that applies to an act that creates something or not, 
carried out with knowledge or no knowledge, or carried out with purpose or no purpose. It is also applied to 
the acts of humans, animals, and inanimate objects.” See Rāghib al-Isf̣ahānī (2007, 294).  
19 Franz Rosenthal comments on the word, “Imarah, from the same root as ʿumran, and practically identical 
with it.” He also notes that, “As soon as several human beings, with their God-given power of thinking, 
begin to cooperate with each other and to form some kind of social organization, ʿumran results. ʿUmran 
(translated here as "civilization") is one of the key terms in Ibn Khaldun's system. It is derived from a root 
which means "to build up, to cultivate," and is used to designate any settlement above the level of 
individual savagery.” 
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see how you act” and other verses. Being a successor entails following the 
Creator, Exalted is He, to the extent a human being can, when governing through 
operationalizing the noble qualities of the Sacred Law. These noble qualities of 
the Sacred Law are wisdom (ḥikmah), establishing justice between people, 
clemency, goodness, and virtue. The objective [of being a successor] is to arrive 
to the Garden of refuge (jannāt al-maʾwā) and [obtain] proximity to God, Mighty 
and Exalted is He (al-Rāghib 2007, 82-83). 
 
These three acts are what constitute human perfection. In working towards these ends is 
where human happiness lies. One observes, in al- Rāghib’s explanation, the 
differentiating of ultimate happiness, an intrinsic good which is sought for itself, and 
goods that are sought for the sake of the ultimate good which is proximity to God.  
 
Fiṭra – Natural Disposition 
 Central to the conception of the human self in the Islamic tradition is the concept 
of fiṭra, often translated as the primordial disposition of human beings. There is no 
systematic outline of the nature of human beings in the foundational texts of the Islamic 
tradition, the Qurʾān and hadīth. What we have is various interpretations and assumptions 
regarding the various aspects of the human person throughout the Islamic tradition. 
Camilla Adang states that the subject of fiṭra, “has received relatively little attention in 
modern scholarship” (Adang 2000, 21:391) Griffel comments along the same lines 
stating, “Fiṭra plays an important role in al-Ghazālī’s thinking and yet the subject has 
attracted only scant attention. This is not only true for al-Ghazālī but for the Islamic 
intellectual history as a whole” (Griffel 2012, 2). Consequently, we will begin our 
enquiry of fiṭra by studying the lexical dimensions of the term, similar to our study of the 
term adab, and then look at key texts in the Qur’an and hadīth literature that have served 
at the center of discussions of Muslim theologians, philosophers and exegetes on fiṭra. 
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Like Adang, I will leave the word fiṭra untranslated, “for it is by no means unequivocal” 
(Adang 2000, 21:393). During this enquiry, we will be referencing the works of Western 
scholarship on the fiṭra. 
 Lexically the word fiṭra is based on three root letters fa ͗ – ṭa ͗ – ra ͗. al-Zabīdī 
(1965, 13:325) states that these root letters primarily signify the opening of something or 
causing something to appear and become manifest. In the Qur’an, the word and its 
cognates occur about twenty times. The noun al-faṭr denotes a vertical opening or fissure 
(al-shaqq) as in the Qur’an 82:1, “When the sky is torn apart (infaṭarat), when the stars 
are scattered.” ʿAbdallāh Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 68/687–8), one of the earliest authorities on 
Qurʾānic exegesis, stated that he did not know what the verse, “Creator (fāṭir) of the 
heavens and earth” [Qurʾān 35:1] meant, the word fāṭir being unknown to him, until he 
came across two bedouins quarreling about which one of them possessed a well. One of 
the bedouins said, “I am the one who dug (faṭartuha) the well” while the other one said, 
“It is I who began (‘ibtada’tuha) it’s [digging]” (Ibn Kathīr  2005, 1:44) The meaning of 
fa’ –ṭa’ – ra’ now indicating the initiating of and beginning of an act in addition to its 
primary signification of an opening. The use of the word in this verse signifies that God 
is the sole creator and originator of the heavens and earth, without any associate in this 
act of creation. In another verse of the Qurʾān, “I worship only Him who created (faṭara) 
me, and it is He who will guide me,” [43:27], and in, “to Him who created us (faṭaranā)” 
[20:72] the use of the verb faṭara has been explained by exegetes and lexicographers to 
mean the act of creating and bringing into existence from non-existence. (al-Samīn 1995, 
3:2014) Hence, one of God’s names is al-Fātir, the Creator as in Qurʾān 35:1, “Praise be 
to God, Creator (fātir) of the heavens and earth.”  
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 An important nuance of the meaning of the verb faṭara has been brought about by 
some exegetes of the Qurʾān. The general meaning of the verb is to create, to bring out, 
and make apparent with the additional meaning of something coming forth from the 
inside of something, splitting the outside and making it apparent. The Arabs say the trees 
broke open (tafaṭṭara) with leaves and the plants broke through (faṭara) the earth. 
(Maydānī 2000, 7:23) This brings to light that what is meant by the term is not a mere 
opening of something, but rather it is the actualizing a thing’s inner core that appears and 
becomes manifest.  
 Other meanings of the root letters that have been identified are flaws, such as in 
the verse, “You will not see any flaw in what the Lord of Mercy creates. Look again! Can 
you see any flaw (fuṭūr)?”[67:3] Here humans are told to reflect on the universe and its 
composition without any cracks in it as one would find when a building made by a human 
being over the years. The openings and cracks that appear are considered a flaw and 
therefore a sign of imperfect craftsmanship.  
 The term fiṭra occurs once in the Qurʾān, in 30:30, and this verse has received the 
attention from Qurʾān commentators, philosophers, and theologians. The verse reads, 
“And set forth yourself entirely towards the religion, not inclining to anything else 
(ḥanīfan). The fiṭra of God, according to which He created (faṭara) all of mankind. There 
is no altering the creation of God. That is the true religion, but most of mankind knows 
not.” In this verse, one finds three terms being used that have received the focus of 
Qurʾān commentators: religion (dīn), ḥanīf, and fiṭra. Ḥanīf, occurring twelve times in the 
Qurʾān, is strongly associated with the Prophet Abraham who is seen as the ideal ḥanīf.20  
                                                               
20 See verses 2:135, 3:67, 3:95, 4:125, 679, 6:161, 10:105, 16:120, and 16:123. 
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The term is used alongside millat ibrāhīm, the religion of Abraham and has been used 
synonymously with the term muslim (Qurʾān, 3:67). This is so because of the pure 
sincerity and utter dedication to God that the Prophet Abraham embodied and his turning 
away from all forms of religion that violated the doctrine of God’s oneness (tawḥīd). The 
Prophet Abraham is described in the Qurʾān as being the paragon of monotheism, 
“Abraham was truly an example: devoutly obedient to God and true in faith (ḥanīfan). He 
was not an idolater.” [16:120] and the Prophet Muhammad is commanded to follow the 
Prophet Abraham, “Then We revealed to you [Muhammad], ‘Follow the religion of 
Abraham (millat ibrāhīm), a man of pure faith who was not an idolater.’” [16:123] In this 
verse, the quality that is stressed is that Abraham turned away from the idol worship of 
his people and adopted monotheism.  
 al-Rāghib al-Asfahani states that al-ḥanaf is, “an inclining towards uprightness 
and away from misguidance” (al-Rāghib 1992, 260). The main idea behind the term in 
the Qurʾān is that a ḥanīf is one who has turned away from all false beliefs and practices 
and has submitted to the true religion of God. There were a number of individuals in 
Mecca during the pre-Islamic times who were referred to as being a ḥanīf. The common 
characteristic of this group was that they did not accept the polytheism of the Meccans 
and the pagan practices.21 These people then turned away from the Meccan polytheism 
and religious practices associated with it and adopted a monotheistic understanding of 
God. The ḥanīfs also associated themselves with the religion of Abraham due to the 
emphasis on God’s oneness.  
                                                               
21 Umayya b. Abi ’l-Ṣalt being one of the more well known individuals identified as a ḥanīf. For a thorough 
analysis of the idea of a ḥanīf  and the individuals identified as being a ḥanīf , see Dr. Jawad ‘Ali’s al-
Mufasṣạl fī tārīkh al-ʻArab qabla al-Islām vol. 8 pgs. 351-399.  
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 In 30:30, the fiṭra has been conflated with religion (dīn) at the end of the verse 
where “that is the sound religion” refers to “the fiṭra of God.” This is important as it gives 
us an important avenue to investigate what is the nature of this fiṭra upon which humans 
have been created. Describing this religion as ḥanīf serves as evidence to support us to 
say that the oneness of God is an essential part of the fiṭra. This has been demonstrated 
above when looking at the qualities of Abraham highlighted in the Qurʾān; turning away 
from polytheism and idolatry, and adopting the religion of monotheism.  
 From the discussion so far on 30:30, the fiṭra has been equated with the correct 
religion and the oneness of God. And the fiṭra is also that which inherent to all humans, 
being created with by God. It would seem from the preceding discussion that all human 
beings are born believing in the correct religion, as Muslims and as monotheists. This has 
been the claim of some Muslim theologians and philosophers. Adang states that the 
5th/11th century Ẓāhirī jurist and theologian Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba held that based on 
Qurʾān 30:30 and the ḥadīth of the Prophet Muhammad, “everyone starts his life as a 
Muslim, and that it is his parents who give him his subsequent religious identity: if they 
are Muslims, they will continue to raise their child as a Muslim; if on the other hand, they 
are unbelievers, they wean it away from its inborn Islam” (Adang 2000, 392). I will be 
arguing, however, that the fiṭra is a particular way human beings are constituted. This 
constitution is such that it provides human beings with a natural propensity towards belief 
in God and His oneness, and the doctrines and practices of what is understood to be the 
true religion. Thus human beings, by virtue of the fiṭra, can be said to be homo religious 
(religious man)22 in the Islamic tradition where religion and belief in God is considered 
                                                               
22 The idea of homo religious, or religious man, has been developed by Mircea Eliade.  
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natural to the human condition and the religion of Islam, its doctrines and practices, to be 
compatible with the fiṭra. 
 In order to further explore the nature of the fiṭra that constitutes all human beings, 
its cognitive dimensions and its relationship to the detailed doctrines and practices of 
Islam, statements of the Prophet Muhammad related to the fiṭra will now be examined. A 
famous ḥadīth of the Prophet Muhammad on the fiṭra that has received, alongside the 
Qurʾān 30:30, much discussion is: “Abū Hurayra said, “The Messenger of Allah (Allah 
bless him and grant him peace) said, “Every child is born on the fiṭra. It is his parents 
who then cause him to be a Jew or a Christian or a Magian, just as an animal gives birth 
to its offspring free of any defects. Do you observe any of offspring being born with its 
ears lopped (jad’ā’)?” Then Abū Hurayra (Allah be pleased with him) would quote the 
verse, “The fiṭra of God, which He created all of mankind upon. There is no altering the 
creation of God. That is the true religion” [30:30]” (al-Bukharī #1359, 2002, 328-329). 
There are many transmissions of this ḥadīth that contain variants that are important to our 
discussion on the fiṭra. These variants will be referred to in their appropriate places.  
 In this ḥadīth, the fiṭra is mentioned without any explicit discussion as to what 
constitutes the fiṭra. What we can gather from the outset is that every human being is 
born on the fiṭra. What can be understood about the fiṭra so far is what we have 
understood from the Qurʾān 30:30; that the fiṭra is created and given by God, and is 
associated with a monotheistic understanding of God. In this ḥadīth we find that fiṭra is 
the natural state of a human being and it is due to the upbringing of a child that will make 
the child adopt a different religion. In light of this ḥadīth, a person becoming a Jew, 
Christian, or adopting any other religion is entirely due to external factors. It is the 
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parents and the upbringing they provide their child that leads a child away from the fiṭra. 
This brings up the question as to whether this change of religion entails a change in the 
fiṭra in light of Qurʾān 30:30 where it states, “there is no altering the creation of God.” 
This has been understood in at least two general ways by commentators of the Qurʾān. 
Baydāwī (d. 685/1286) comments on this part of the verse that one possible reading is 
that no one has the ability to alter or change the fiṭra. This is the nature upon which God 
created human beings and human beings do not have the capability alter this nature 
because the fiṭra is not able to altered. No matter what religion one adopts, the fiṭra will 
still be present although it has been hindered from being expressed. Another reading of 
the verse is that is to be read as a command from God to human beings. According to this 
reading, the fiṭra can be changed, but God is commanding humans not to change it by 
adopting beliefs and practices that are contrary to it (al-Baydạ̄wī 2000, 3:51). According 
to both readings of the verse and this ḥadīth, the fiṭra is either altered or impeded from 
being manifested solely due to external factors. Likewise the fiṭra it is to be maintained 
and nurtured by external factors as well.  
 That the fiṭra is the natural state of a person when they are born is understood 
from the questioning of the Prophet Muhammad in the ḥadīth. Turning the listener’s 
attention to consider the offspring of animals when they are born, the question is 
rhetorically asked if any offspring of animals, or as in one transmission of the ḥadīth 
where the Prophet said, “just as the camel gives birth to a calf that is free of defects”,23 
are born earmarked or branded. Just as the earmark of animals is something that is not 
                                                               
23 Hadith #646. Mālik ibn Anas. 1997. al-Muwatṭạʼ, riwāyat Yahỵá ibn Yahỵá al-Laythī al-Andalusī. 
Bayrūt: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī.  
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natural to them and is considered a defect, likewise is the fiṭra considered to be the 
natural state in which human beings are born.  
 In mentioning Judaism, Christianity, and Mazdaism in the ḥadīth, some 
commentators have identified the fiṭra with Islam. In other words, the ḥadīth is to be 
understood as saying that it is a child’s parents who make him or her a Jew, Christian or a 
Magian, and in the absence of parents of a different religion, the child will grow up to be 
a Muslim. As mentioned previously, Ibn Ḥazm held that the fiṭra is identical with the 
religion of Islam. Based on Adang’s study of Ibn Ḥazm’s writings on this topic, he 
doesn’t seem to understand this particular ḥadīth in this manner, nor does he use it to 
justify his position. His views on the fiṭra come up when he discusses the fate of children 
who die before they are able to choose the religion of Islam in his Kitāb al-Fiṣal. 
Responding to the Azraqiyya, an early offshoot of the Kharijite sect, who held that only 
people who choose to be Muslims will enter paradise, Ibn Ḥazm maintains that such 
children will go to paradise. Based on the Qurʾān 2:136 and 2:138, Ibn Ḥazm states that 
“all souls are created by God, humans, jinn, and angels alike, are conscious, 
discriminating believers. This being so, all of them are entitled to go to paradise for their 
belief, except for those who change this covenant, this fiṭra, and this <<colour>> and 
leave it for another and die in this other state” (Adang 2000, 400). This understanding of 
fiṭra has been shared by some Muslim theologians. Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr (d. 463/1070) states, 
in his commentary on this ḥadīth that, “Others have held that fiṭra here [in this ḥadīth] is 
to be understood as the religion of Islam. They say, “This position is what known to the 
understanding of scholars and exegetes of the early [Muslim] community (salaf)” (Ibn 
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ʿAbd al-Barr 2001, 2:627). He then quotes the glosses of a number of early Qurʾānic 
exegetes on Qurʾān 30:30 all stating that fiṭra in the verse is the religion of Islam.  
 Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) and his main student, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzīyyah 
(d. 751/1350) were two other theologians who both held the fiṭra is to be understood as 
referring to the religion of Islam. (Ibn Taymiyya 1971, 8:359-502) Ibn Taymiyya 
understands the fiṭra as referring to “the fiṭra of Islam. It is the primordial disposition 
which God created human on the day when He said, He said, ‘Am I not your Lord?’ and 
they replied, ‘Yes!”24 [The fiṭra] consists of bring free from false doctrines and accepting 
true doctrine. This is so because the essence of “Islam” is to submission to God, no one 
other than Him” (Ibn Taymiyya 1980, 4:245). He then goes on to comment on the part of 
the ḥadīth that refers to offspring being born free of physical defects, and how this serves 
as an example of the human heart being free of any defect. Any defect that does occur 
only takes place due to external factors. Ibn Taymiyya then goes on to provide an analogy 
for understanding the fiṭra. He states, “The relationship of the fiṭra to the truth is like that 
of the eye to the sun. Every person possessing eyes will be able to see the sun if [the 
eyes] were left without any barrier. False doctrines that are accidental [to the fiṭra] that 
come about due to a person becoming a Jew, a Christian, or a Magian, are like barriers 
that impede between the eyes and seeing the sun” (Ibid., 4:247). Confirming that only 
due to external factors prevent the fiṭra from having its effect and becoming manifest in a 
person’s life.  
 There is still some ambiguity as to what is meant by Ibn Taymiyya’s equating the 
fiṭra with Islam. A natural understanding could be that a child is born as a Muslim, being 
                                                               
24 Referring to Qur’ān 7:172. 
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cognizant of the creedal doctrines and practices of Islam. So what does Ibn Taymiyya 
exactly understand by Islam when equating it with the fiṭra? Based on the Qurʾān 16:78, 
“It is God who brought you out of your mothers’ wombs knowing nothing, and gave you 
hearing and sight and minds, so that you might be thankful”, Ibn Taymiyya sees the fiṭra, 
not as providing knowledge of the creed and practices of Islam to a person when they are 
born. Rather, he sees it as a faculty that cognitively and practically necessitates a person 
to accept the religion of Islam, provided that no impediments exist that will prevent the 
fiṭra from being effective. A child is not effectively (bi-l-fi’l) a Muslim when they are 
born. What Ibn Taymiyya means by Islam when equating it with the fiṭra is, “a heart that 
is sound, its accepting and wanting the truth, which is Islam.” This natural disposition is 
not neutral regarding the truth. By its very nature, the fiṭra will necessitate a person 
accepting the truth, i.e. Islam, because it wants to seek it as opposed to merely accepting 
and finding the truth to be good when it is presented to a person. “This is similar,” Ibn 
Taymiyya states, “to a child being born loving foodstuffs and drinks that are compatible 
with its body, thus desiring milk which is compatible to it” (Ibn Taymiyya 1971, 8:384). 
The truth, Islam, being loved by the fiṭra. Perhaps what Ibn Taymiyya has in mind when 
he says the fiṭra is Islam is that the fiṭra is created by God in complete compatibility with 
Islam and the fiṭra has a strong impulse to seek out the truth. This impulse is so strong 
that it will necessarily lead to a person becoming a Muslim assuming there are no 
impediments. 
 As mentioned previously, Ibn Ḥazm holds that all children are born on the fiṭra 
which he equates with Islam. When a child reaches the age of moral responsibility 
(taklīf), the child must choose whether to remain on the fiṭra, i.e. continue to be a 
117 
Muslim, or adopt another religion. Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, who has the most extensive 
commentary on this ḥadīth, discusses other views of theologians on how fiṭra is to be 
understood in addition to the view mentioned previously. He states that a group of 
scholars stated that, “what is meant by fiṭra in this ḥadīth is the disposition (khilqa) a 
child is created with regarding knowledge of his lord. It is as if [the Prophet] said, “every 
child is born with a disposition by which he knows his lord when he reaches the age of 
discernment.” [The Prophet] intended by this a disposition that is contrary to the 
disposition of animals that cannot attain the knowledge of God” (Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 2001, 
2:626). The fiṭra is a particular disposition which God created human beings on. This 
disposition is not equated with Islam, rather this natural disposition provides humans with 
the capacity to know God. This interpretation of fiṭra is supported by the form of the 
noun in the Arabic language. The noun fiṭra is on the form of fiʿla which are known as 
nomina speciei, or nouns of kind and manner. This noun form indicates the manner or 
mode of what is expressed by the verb. As mentioned before, the meaning expressed in 
the verb fa – ṭa – ra is to create. Accordingly, the noun fiṭra denotes a particular way of 
being created, if understood in its passive sense, or a manner of creating, understood in its 
active sense. The fiṭra is the particular disposition on which God created human beings.  
 Fiṭra as disposition has been explained by commentators as the natural capacity 
of a person to be guided and accept the religion of Islam. al-Ṭībī (d. 743/1342) explains 
this capacity to accept the religion of Islam stating, “the goodness of this religion (Islam) 
is found in the soul. A person turns away from this religion only due to adverse 
circumstances in life and the uncritical acceptance of authority (taqlīd)” (al-Tị̄bī 1996, 
1:234). So it is not that the soul has the knowledge of God, or knows the religion of Islam 
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in general or its particular doctrines and practices. Rather, fiṭra is the constitution of the 
soul that provides it the capacity to acknowledge God’s existence and to recognize the 
goodness of the doctrines and practices of Islam. The soul is created and comes into the 
world with this particular constitution that is not in a state of unbelief or belief, nor in a 
state of acknowledgement or denial of God. (Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr 2001, 2:626) 
 This position is also based on Qurʾān 16:78, “It is God who brought you out of 
your mothers’ wombs knowing nothing, and gave you hearing and sight and minds, so 
that you might be thankful.” The key part of the verse is that human beings did not have 
any knowledge when born into this world. Although this state of being without 
knowledge is qualified as to refer to specific knowledge of God’s existence and the 
details of the practices of Islam as we will see later. Ibn Taymiyya objects to this position 
by stating that if this were the case, then it would be superfluous to for the Prophet to 
mention the altering of the fiṭra by the child’s parents. (Ibn Taymiyya 1971, 8:385) This 
is objection is weakened by the fact that the ḥadīth does not refer to an altering or 
changing of the person’s fiṭra. According to the Qurʾān 30:30, the fiṭra is not able to be 
changed nor is anyone able to alter the fiṭra. Nor does a person becoming a Jew or a 
Christian alter someone’s fiṭra. They may be acting against their fiṭra, but the fiṭra 
remains unaltered. Rather, even according to Ibn Taymiyya’s understanding, a person 
adopting another religion is a barrier for the fiṭra to be expressed, not an altering of the 
fiṭra. Additionally, to further support their position, theologians bring in other another 
ḥadīth related to the nature of human beings, the Prophet Muhammad said, “God has said 
that, “I created all of my servants as ḥunafā ͗.” Those theologians who hold this 
understanding of the fiṭra mention two observations with this ḥadīth: one is that God did 
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not say that He created all of His servants as Muslims. The other observation is that they 
glossed the term ḥunafā ͗, as we have seen before, created in with disposition that has the 
potential to accept the truth. (al-Tị̄bī 1996, 10:38) Other transmissions of the fiṭra ḥadīth 
contain the additional text, “and if his parents are both Muslim, then the child will be a 
Muslim” when mentioning that it is the parents who make a child a Jew, Christian, or a 
Magian. If the fiṭra were to be equated with the religion of Islam, a child would not need 
Muslim parents in order to be a Muslim.  
 Anwar Shāh Kāshmīrī (d. 1352/1933) argues, supporting the view that the fiṭra is 
not to be identified with the religion of Islam, that fiṭra is to be understood as one of the 
preliminary factors (muqaddimat) that lead a person to Islam. The fiṭra is “a natural 
disposition [that lends itself] to accept Islam. Stated in another manner, it is the child’s 
preparedness (istiʿdād) for it (i.e. Islam). [This disposition] is remote from unbelief but 
close to Islam. And yet stated in another manner, it is the build of the child being free 
from any factors that encourage it to unbelief” (Kāshmīrī 1980, 2:485). So the fiṭra is this 
preparedness (istiʿdād) of the soul to accept the religion of Islam, but is not to be 
identified with Islam. Its preparedness or compatibility, being close to Islam, is perhaps 
why scholars of the early Muslim community glossed the term fiṭra in Qurʾān 30:30 as 
religion or Islam. Not that the fiṭra is identical with the Islam, but, assuming that there are 
no external factors serving as impediments and the child has Muslim parents, the child 
will naturally see the goodness of Islam and become a Muslim.  
 
Epistemological and Psychological Dimensions of the Fiṭra 
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 Thus far, it has been argued that, in the Islamic tradition, the fiṭra is a God given 
natural disposition of the human soul and its preparedness (istiʿdād) to accept the truth. 
This natural disposition is what all human beings have been created with. External factors 
can either be compatible with the fiṭra, allowing it to manifest, or it can serve an 
impediment for the fiṭra to be manifested. To be sure, the fiṭra does have a propensity for 
belief. This propensity is not to be equated with knowledge of the creed and practices of 
Islam. This is supported by the Qurʾān 16:78, “It is God who brought you out of your 
mothers’ wombs knowing nothing, and gave you hearing and sight and minds, so that you 
might be thankful.”  
 The question arises as to what does “knowing nothing” in the verse mean exactly. 
It could be understood that the human soul has absolutely no a priori knowledge when 
created. This is similar to Locke’s understanding of the origins of innate ideas. Locke 
holds that ideas such as the whole is larger than its part, the impossibility for the same 
thing to be and not to be, or the idea that God is to be worshipped do not have their 
origins that are innate to human beings. Locke observes, “If we will attentively consider 
new born Children, we shall have little Reason, to think, that they bring many Ideas into 
the World with them” and he ultimately assigns the origins of these ideas in human 
experience whether that experience be sensation or reflection (Locke  1975, 85).  
 Muslim theologians, logicians, philosophers, and mystics of the Ashʿarite and 
Muʿtazilite schools have all affirmed some understanding that humans have knowledge 
that is a priori and knowledge that is a posteriori. The Ashʿarite theologian al-Bāqillānī 
(d. 403/1013) classifies knowledge (al-ʿilm) into God’s knowledge and human’s 
knowledge. Human knowledge can either be necessary knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ḍarurī) and 
121 
acquired knowledge (al-ʿilm al-naẓarī). God’s knowledge is not classified as either being 
necessary nor acquired. This classification applies solely to created beings. Necessary 
knowledge is knowledge that is not acquired as the result of reflection or reasoning. 
Rather, it is knowledge that cannot be repudiated, nor can it be doubted. Examples of 
necessary knowledge include knowledge gained through the five senses and knowledge a 
person finds naturally occurring in his soul. Such knowledge includes the knowledge a 
person has of his own existence, knowledge of his internal states of pleasure, pain, 
hunger, happiness. It also includes a priori knowledge of necessary truths such as the 
knowledge that two contrary propositions cannot be true and false at the same time and 
that two is greater than one. All other knowledge requires reflection on the part of the 
person and is classified as acquired knowledge. (al-Bāqillānī 2000, 14-15) 
 Muslim theologians have made observations and remarks that the fiṭra, even 
though it does not provide the soul with knowledge of the religion of Islam, nonetheless 
is such a constitution of the soul that does have certain types of knowledge. When 
discussing the four homonymous applications of the word intellect (al-ʿaql), al-Ghazālī 
describes the first as “the quality which differentiates humans from all other animals. It 
prepares humans with the ability receive theoretical knowledge.” al-Ghazālī takes this 
definition from al-Muḥasibī who defines the intellect in this sense as “an innate capacity 
(gharīzah) by virtue of which prepares [one] to obtain theoretical knowledge.” The 
second application of the term intellect refers to “to those sciences that come about in a 
child who has reached the stage of discrimination (mumayyiz) and consists of the 
knowledge of what is [rationally] possible and impossible, that two is greater than one, 
and that one person cannot be in two places. It was what some theologians have referred 
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to when defining the intellect as some of the knowledge that is necessarily known.” This 
knowledge is necessary and human beings do not differ from one another regarding 
possessing this knowledge. After clarifying the four applications of the term intellect, al-
Ghazālī describes this knowledge “as if they are constitutive of this innate capacity by 
virtue of the fiṭra. [This knowledge] appears when a cause makes it manifest.” 
 From al-Ghazālī’s description of necessary knowledge and its relationship to the 
fiṭra, there are certain types of necessary knowledge that constitute the fiṭra. What we 
observe of this knowledge depends on what external factors a person is exposed to. Ibn 
Taymiyya, agreeing with al-Ghazālī’s understanding of the types of knowledge that 
constitute the fiṭra provides further examples for us. In his discussion of Qurʾān 52:35-
36, “Were they created without any Creator or were they the creators of themselves?” Ibn 
Taymiyya sees this verse as an example of utilizing an a priori principle that is rationally 
impossible. This principle is “part of the natural disposition (fiṭriyyun), intuitively known 
(badihīyyun) established firmly in the souls [of humans] that no person can deny. A 
person with a sound natural disposition (fiṭra) cannot claim that a temporal entity can 
come into existence without an agent that brought it into existence. It is not possible for 
him to claim that this entity brought itself into existence” (Ibn Taymiyya 1971, 9:212). 
Ibn Taymiyya describes this knowledge as part of the natural disposition using the term 
fiṭriyyun for this. Another example that we can gather from the writings of Ibn Taymiyya 
is the rational principle that the existence of an entity whose is existence is rationally 
possible can only be determined over its non-existence by a willing agent (murajjiḥ). He 
states that this principle is “necessarily known by virtue of the fiṭra which is not possible 
to reject” (Ibid., 8:136). Necessary knowledge, such as the law of non-contradiction, the 
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law of the excluded middle in addition to the principles mentioned above, are seen as 
constituting the fiṭra. It is not knowledge of particulars that a person only comes to know 
through experience. These are rational principles and categories that a person knows a 
priori by virtue of the fiṭra.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
BADR AL-DĪN IBN JAMĀʿAH: ON ACQUIRING ADAB 
 
The Educational Career of Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamāʿah 
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 The goods of an act serve to influence the manner the act is carried out. The ‘act’ 
of education in Islam, I argue, has the cultivation of the self that possesses adab as its 
highest good. In this chapter, we will study a developed understanding of the educational 
act in the writings of many Muslim authors but focus on the writings of Badr al-Dīn Ibn 
Jamāʿah (d. 733/1333). He lived and worked under the Mamluk sultanate and due to the 
high level of intellectual activity that took place in the Muslim world during the Mamluk 
era and the Mamluk’s educational concerns, Ibn Jamāʿah’s educational thought reflects a 
mature and sophisticated of the ‘act’ of education in all of its dimensions, social, 
theological, and political. His writings on education are comprehensive in that regard 
unlike the writings of the early period. 
 This chapter will focus on the method of cultivating adab as understood by Ibn 
Jamāʿah and all other Muslim writers. We will focus on analyzing the title of Ibn 
Jamāʿah’s major work on education Tadhkirat al-sāmiʿ wa-l-mutakallim fī ādāb al-ʿālim 
wa-l-mutaʿallim and how it differs from other titles in the ādāb al-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿallim 
literature. It will be shown that the role of hearing, its relationship to reading, and the 
teacher are all essential components when it comes to cultivate the self possessing adab. 
The hearing of knowledge, whether from one’s own recitation, or the reading of the 
teacher, is linked to various modes of how knowledge is ‘read’. This reading of 
knowledge takes place in various contexts and each has a mode of reading specific to it. 
The role hearing plays in the acquisition of knowledge and the cultivation adab will be 
studied. Additionally, that the ‘act’ of education in Islam is focused on the personal 
relationship between the teacher and student rather than on an institution will be shown, 
and then the implications this has for cultivating adab within a student will be analyzed. 
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 To develop a full understanding of the self that possesses adab in the context of 
education, we will be studying the authors and works in the ādāb al-ʿālim wa-l-
mutaʿallim literature. Having already looked at the genre, we will be focusing our study 
mainly on Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamāʿah’s (d. 733/1333) Tadhkirat al-Sāmiʿ wa-l-Mutakallim 
fī Ādāb al-ʿĀlim wa-l-Mutaʿallim: A Monograph for the Auditor and the Lecturer on the 
Ādāb of the Teacher and the Student. Ibn Jamāʿah’s work is chosen because it is 
considered late in the genre. Being a late work, it is representative of this genre of writing 
at a mature stage and is composed in a setting where madrasas and other educational 
institutions developed into playing a more formal role in Muslim society. This is 
evidenced by Ibn Jamāʿah’s own career of serving as a teacher and rector in many of the 
major educational institutions of his time. Additionally, the work itself has received wide 
acceptance amongst scholars and students alike being used referenced in many works in 
the same genre composed after Ibn Jamāʿah. Franz Rosenthal notes, for example, that al-
ʿAlmawi’s (d. 1573) al-Durr al-Naḍīd, a text on adab, has sections that are almost 
identical to Ibn Jamāʿah’s Tadhkirat al-Sāmiʿ (Rosenthal 1947, 7). 
 Ibn Jamāʿah’s own education and the teaching and judiciary posts held throughout 
his career have stood out as being exemplary and has been the focus of discussion 
amongst his biographers.25 He has been described as the “judge of the two regions, Egypt 
and the Levant” (Subkī 1964, 9:139) for serving as the chief judge (qāḍī al-qudāh) for a 
span of forty years in Egypt and the Levant which was an important political position 
during the Turkish period of the Mamluk era. The Mamluk sultanate, displacing the 
                                                               
25 For studies on the background of the Banū Jamāʿa dynasty, see Salibi, Kamal S. "The Banū Jamāʿa: A 
Dynasty of Shāfi'ite Jurists in the Mamluk Period." Studia Islamica, no. 9 (1958): 97-109 and Sirriyeh, 
Elizabeth. "Whatever Happened to the Banū Jamā'a? The Tail of a Scholarly Family in Ottoman 
Syria." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 28, no. 1 (2001): 55-65. 
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Ayyubids dynasty, reigned from 648-923/1250-1517 over the regions of Egypt and the 
Levant. The term Mamluk means ‘a thing possessed’ and refers to the fact that it was 
military slaves that made up the Mamluk forces. They were also referred to as the dawlat 
al-atrāk or the dynasty of ‘the Turks’ due to the ethnic makeup of the ruling slave forces. 
Historians of the Mamluk era commonly divide up their rule into the Turkish or Bahri 
period, which runs from 648-784/1250-1382, and the Circassian or Burji period, which 
extends from 784-923/1382-1517. Their origins lie in al-Ṣāliḥ Naj̲m al-Dīn Ayyūb’s 
(637-47/1240-9) recruiting of Turkish slaves from the Ḳipčāḳ steppe who were uprooted 
from their lands by the Mongol invasion. They were called al-Baḥriyya because he 
stationed them on al-Rawḍa on the Nile river (Baḥr al-Nīl). Ayalon states, “The 
importance of the Baḥriyya regiment lies in the fact that its formation had ultimately led 
to the creation of the Mamlūk sultanate. It is wrong, however, to call the early part of 
Mamlūk rule (648/1250-784/1382), in which the Ḳipčāḳī element was predominant, by 
the name of “the Baḥrī period”. The common name in Mamlūk sources for that period is 
Dawlat al-Turk, to distinguish it from the Circassian period (784-922/1382-1517) which 
they call Dawlat al-D̲j̲arkas” (Ayalon  2014) due to the dominance of rulers who were 
ethnically from Circassia. 
 Ibn Jamāʿah’s career as a chief judge was part of a long family tradition of 
serving as judges from 1291 to 1382. Ibn Jamāʿah belonged to the Shafi’ī school of law 
and served as a judge giving verdicts according to the school. His judgeship was in an era 
that witnessed significant shifts in the judiciary in the Muslim world introduced by 
Mamluk sultans. In most Muslim lands, there was the practice of the judiciary basing its 
decisions on one of the four schools of Sunni Law. “In 663/1265, the Mamluk sultan al-
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Ẓāhir Baybars decided to appoint four Chief Qāḍīs in Cairo, one from each of the Sunni 
schools of law, thereby adding Ḥanafī, Mālikī and Ḥanbalī judges. The incumbent Shāfiʿī 
retained exclusive jurisdiction in matters pertaining to the public treasury and the 
property of orphans. The judiciary of Damascus was similarly reformed the following 
year. Over the next century non- Shāfiʿī Chief Qāḍīs were appointed in other Mamluk 
towns and cities. By the latter half of the eighth/fourteenth century, Aleppo, Tripoli, 
Hama, Safed, Jerusalem and Gaza each had its own quadruple judicial system” (Rapoport  
2013, 2:210). Each judge was expected to give rulings according to the established 
doctrine of his own school, avoiding the weak legal opinions in their school, regardless of 
his own personal position. Judges would frequently transfer cases to other schools for the 
benefit of the public. And people would often refer their cases to judges who belonged to 
different schools of law. The aim of these initiatives on the part of the Sultanate was to 
provide legal uniformity and stability in Mamluk society while, at the same time, 
maintaining a balance of legal diversity for the sake of public welfare. (ibid., 2:213) Such 
is the environment Ibn Jamāʿah’s career as a judge and a teacher in the major educational 
institutions of his time. 
 One can observe the intimate involvement of the Mamluk Sultanate in setting up 
the judiciary system. This indicates the political importance of being a judge in Mamluk 
Cairo and the Levant to the extent that often it would be the sultan himself that would 
personally appoint a person as the chief judge (qāḍī al-quḍah). The chief judge would 
oversee the administration of the major colleges (madaris) and be responsible for 
delivering the Friday sermon (khitābah) in the main mosque of either Cairo or Damascus. 
Ibn Jamāʿah served as the chief judge for a period of thirty years from 687/1288 through 
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727/1327. He served in the cities of Jerusalem, Cairo, and Damascus. He first served as 
the chief judge in Jerusalem in 687/1288 along with holding the office of khitābah and 
served to lead the prayers at al-Aqṣā Mosque. On the 14th of Ramaḍān in 690/1291, he 
transferred to serve as chief judge for the first time in Cairo, until the 14th of Dhul-Hijja 
in 693/1294 where he served as the chief judge in Damascus for three year until 696/1297 
when he was discharged and then later in 699/1300 he was reassigned back to the office 
of chief judge in Damascus until the 17th of Safar 702/1302. In this year, the Shafiʿī jurist 
Ibn Daqīq al-ʿĪd, who was serving then as the chief judge in Cairo, had died. Upon his 
death, Ibn Jamāʿah was called back to Cairo to serve as the chief judge for a second time 
until he was requested to discharge his duties due to his old which he obliged to in the 
year 727/1327. (Khalaf 1990, 159-161)  
 The madrasa has been the most studied institution in the field of Islamic 
education. There have been various understandings by scholars on what place the 
madrasa held in Muslim society, its purpose, culture, curriculum, and other aspects of this 
institution. One view is that of George Makdisi who sees the madrasa as, “the institution 
of learning par excellence, in that it was devoted primarily to the study of Islamic law” 
(Makdisi 1981, 9). The madrasa, Makdisi notes, was the institution for higher education in 
the Muslim world from the 5th century onwards and concentrated on law to the exclusion 
of the other religious sciences such as theology, in particular the teaching of the Ashʿarī 
school of theology and other non-religious sciences. Sciences that were helpful to the 
study of law were also taught in the madrasa with a set curriculum, but only as ancillary 
sciences (Ibid., 9-10). The maktab was the site of elementary education which consisted 
primarily of the teaching of Arabic grammar, morphology, writing, and memorization of 
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the Qurʾan. The ‘foreign sciences’ such as theology according to the Mu’tazilite school 
and medicine were taught in libraries and hospitals (Ibid., 24-27). Contrasted to this is the 
view of the madrasa is that of writers such as A.L. Tibawi and Jonathan Berkey who both 
argue for a more informal structure of Islamic education. “Instruction in jurisprudence 
and its related subjects took place in a variety of institutions, many called madrasas, but 
others not,” and due to Islamic law not providing any corporate identity to an institution, 
“no formal degree system was ever established” (Berkey 1992, 16). Madrasas were 
places where all subject matters such as “Qur'anic science, traditions, grammar, adab 
literature, dogmatic theology, sermons” (Tibawi 1962, 25: 230-31) and even medicine 
were taught, not only law. That being said, Berkey and Tibawi both conclude that 
“Islamic education remained fundamentally and persistently an informal affair” (Berkey 
1992, 18) and as we shall see below, was focused more on who was teaching and what 
was being taught rather than on any institution. 
 Ibn Jamāʿah’s education, his expertise in various sciences, and his career as an 
educator all contribute to the significance of his insights and writings on education. 
Despite him being a chief judge in various areas and various times, he was consistently 
involved in the area of education teaching either privately or in madrasas. His 
biographers have highlighted, in addition to his mastery of various sciences, his 
exceptional skill as an educator. Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1448) describes Ibn 
Jamāʿah as being, “a leader, caring, easy-going, having good character. He delivered 
excellent lectures, and would instruct well, without severity or embarrassment [of 
students]” (Khalaf 1990, 181). In total, Ibn Jamāʿah held teaching positions or served as 
an administrator in thirteen madrasas. Similar to his positions as a judge, the madrasas 
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were in Cairo and Egypt, yet he did not serve as a teacher or as an administrator in 
Jerusalem. Ibn Jamāʿah served in five madrasas in Damascus and eight in Cairo. 
a) Madrasa al-Qaymarīyyah. (Damascus) Ibn Jamāʿah assumed a teaching post 
here in 681/1282 for seven years until he accepted the post of chief judge in 
Jerusalem in the  687/1288. He later returned to teaching at the madrasa in 
693/1293 until he left for Cairo  to assume the position of chief judge. 
b) Madrasa al-ʿĀdilīyyah al-Kubrā. (Damascus) This madarasa was established 
by Nūr al-Dīn Zangī in 568/1172. Ibn Jamāʿah taught at this madrasa in 670/1272. 
Although others held he taught there in 693/1294.  
c) Madrasa al-Shāmiyyah al-Baraniyyah. (Damascus) This madrasa was 
established by the Lady of the Levant daughter of Najm al-Dīn Ayyub, known as 
Umm Ṣaliḥ. The famous scholar of ḥadīth, Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ. Ibn Jamāʿah taught here 
in 693/1294. 
 d) Madrasa al-Nāṣirīyyah al-Juwānīyya. (Damascus) Ibn Jamāʿah taught here in 
 693/1294 until 696/1297 only to return in 701/1302. 
e) Madrasa al-Ghazālīyyah, (Damascus) This madrasa was located in one of the 
corners of the Grand Umayyad Mosque and named after al-Ghazālī who spent his 
spiritual retreat at this corner. Ibn Jamāʿah taught here in 685/1287 until 687/1289 
leaving to Jerusalem for the position of chief judge. He later returned to teacher 
here in 699/1300. 
f) Madrasa al-Ṣāliḥiyya. (Cairo) This school was built in 641/1244 and had a 
post for all four Sunni schools of law. Ibn Jamāʿah taught here on two occasions. 
The first was in 691/1291 to 693/1293 while serving as chief judge at the time. 
The second time was on 711/1311until 727/1327 being asked to leave due to an 
eye condition.  
g) Madrasa al- Nāṣirīyyah. (Cairo) A school dedicated to teaching the Shafiʿī 
school of law. Ibn Jamāʿah taught here from 693/1293 until 727/1326. 
h) Madrasa al-Kāmilīyyah. (Cairo) This school was dedicated to the teaching of 
ḥadīth  (dār al-ḥadīth) and was one of two such schools in Cairo. Ibn Jamāʿah 
taught here from 711/1311 until 727/1326.  
i) Jāmiʿ ibn Ṭūlūn. (Cairo) Built in 263/877. Ibn Jamāʿah taught here from 
711/1311 until 727/1326. There was a post for teaching all four Sunni schools of 
law. Additionally, ḥadīth, grammar, and Qur’an recitations were taught here.  
j) Zāwiyyah al-Shāfiʿī. (Cairo) Imam al-Shafiʿī taught here as well as many 
jurists of the Shafiʿī school. Ibn Jamāʿah taught here in 721/1320 whereas some 
sources mention he taught here until his death in 733/1333.  
k) al-Mashhad al-Ḥusaynī. (Cairo) Built by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-ʾAyyūbī in 
567/1172. Ibn Jamāʿah taught here in 693/1294. 
 l) Madrasa al-Khashābīyyah. (Cairo) (Ibid., 183-195). 
 
In each of these madrasas, Ibn Jamāʿah taught a variety of subjects. His biographers all 
state that he mastered numerous sciences. One of the sciences he taught in the madrasa 
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was Qurʾānic exegesis (tafsīr), a science which he composed his own work. He studied 
and taught Law, ḥadīth, legal theory (usūl al-fiqh), theology, logic, history, grammar, 
morphology, Qurʾanic recitations, and the sciences related to spherical astronomy 
(asṭurlāb). (Ibid., 54) His work on education represents the insights of a person of high 
scholarly credentials, and vast experience in the judiciary and the major educational 
institutions of his times.  
 
Ibn Jamāʿah’s Tadhkirat al-Sāmiʿ 
 Some observations and comments on the title of Ibn Jamāʿah’s work Tadhkirat al-
Sāmiʿ and my translation of the title are appropriate as they will provide us with some 
significant insights as to the philosophy of learning and knowledge transmission in the 
Islamic tradition.  Two words are the focus of our investigation here al-sāmiʿ and al-
mutakallim. I have chosen to translate al-sāmi’ as auditor and al-mutakallim as lecturer. 
The title captures Ibn Jamāʿah’s understanding of what the learning process must entail. 
Authors of adab manuals prior to Ibn Jamāʿah have used a variety of names for teacher 
and student. These range from al-ʿālam, al-shaykh, al-ustādh to al-faqīh, al-mudarris, al-
mufīd, al-mustamlī, and al-muʿīd. Some of the terms, such as al-ustādh, which is Persian 
in origin and means an expert, and al-ʿālam , which means a scholar, are general terms 
for teacher. Other terms clearly come from a particular craft but then get used in a context 
that is more general of learning. For example, al-mustamlī refers to the one who dictates 
a lecture, and al-faqīh refers to a jurist. Works of adab that use these titles may intend 
their work to be solely for the student in law for example, or it may reflect the occupation 
of the author.  
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 In Ibn Jamāʿah’s case, he uses al-sāmiʿ and al-mutakallim in the title of his work 
on adab. To fully understand the significance of the two terms, I will examine how the 
term has been used in amongst writers on education and its methodology. Specifically, 
the significance of the relationship al-sāmi’ has to act of reading and its various types 
will be examined. Additionally, there is a theological significance to faculty of hearing 
that provides us additional insight to Ibn Jamāʿah’s understanding of the cultivation of 
adab. To that end, we will examine certain texts of theology on the faculty of hearing to 
the end of establishing that for Ibn Jamāʿah, learning takes place by hearing knowledge. 
Knowledge is ‘heard’ from a teacher but is also acquired through various modes of 
reading where one ‘hears’ knowledge being read to one by oneself, by a teacher, or by 
another student. In his title of the work, Ibn Jamāʿah is stating that the work is on the 
cultivation of adab in the context of education. This cultivating of adab on the part of the 
student can only take place when the activity of teaching and learning requires a teacher 
who already has cultivated a self that possesses adab. The habitus of adab can only be 
cultivated in someone from a person, in this case the teacher, who already possesses adab 
and can take the student through the necessary steps to cultivate adab.  
 The term al-sāmiʿ is an Arabic noun in the form of a subject and is derived from 
the verb samiʿa which means ‘to hear’. Thus al-sāmiʿ refers to the one who is hearing 
and the term al-mutakallim is a noun meaning ‘the one who is speaking’. A 
representative statement on the learning process was made by al-Daḥḥāk ibn Muzāḥim 
(d. 106/723), a teacher who held positions in various schools dedicated to elementary 
education known as maktabs or kuttab.26 He said, “The first stage of [acquiring] 
                                                               
26 For more on maktabs see Makdisi, The rise of colleges: Institutions of learning in Islam and the west, 19. 
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knowledge is silence (al-ṣamt), the second stage is hearing it (istimāʿahu), the third stage 
is acting upon it, and the fourth stage is spreading and teaching [the knowledge 
acquired]” (al-Khatị̄b al-Baghdādī 1996, 1:293). Another summary statement on the 
learning process was mentioned by a certain Muḥammad ibn al-Naṣr who said, “It was 
said that the first [stage] of knowledge is to be silent (al-inṣāt) with it, then to listen to it 
(istimāʿahu lahu), then to memorize it, then to implement it, [and] then to spread it” 
(Ibid., 293) In both statements, the tenth form of the verb samiʿa is used. The difference 
between the two verb forms is that despite them sharing in the same basic meaning, to 
hear, the tenth form will signify additional dimensions that the first form will not. In the 
case with the verb istamaʿa, it refers only to listening that is intentional and focused. The 
first form samiʿa, signifies listening that could be both unintentional or intentional. 
Various other traditions also refer to a student perfecting the act of listening (ḥusn al- 
istimāʿa) as a quality a good student possesses.  
 The term al-sāmiʿ has been applied in the context of ḥadīth transmission to the 
student who is receiving the ḥadīth from the transmitter, al-rāwī. In the transmission of 
ḥadīth, the ḥadīth scholar would conduct sessions of ḥadīth audition known as a majlis 
al-samāʿah. These sessions would be conducted in a mosque or the private residence of a 
scholar and anywhere from tens to thousands of people would attend. In the sessions, a 
ḥadīth scholar would read the ḥadīth and the attendees would listen to the ḥadīth being 
recited. Some would copy down the ḥadīth and have it verified at the end of the session. 
Attendees would receive an ʾijāzah, a license and certificate to transmit the ḥadīth, at the 
end of the session. “The elements involved in this certificate were: the certifier, musmi’; 
the reader or recite, qari’; the auditors, sami’un (sing. sami’); and the writer of the 
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certificate, katib, katib al-sama’” (Makdisi 1981, 141). An example is the sessions of 
audition (samāʿah) of al-Sunan al-Kubrā of al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066), a text in ḥadīth 
and law. (Abū Ghuddah, 1992) The idea here is that the term for acquiring ḥadīth, 
samāʿah (audition), emphasizes the role listening plays in the learning process as the term 
refers to the session of knowledge transmission and the students are referred to as 
sami’un, auditors because they are hearing the knowledge being recited. A majlis al-
samāʿah would last anywhere from an hour or more and would occur depending on the 
length of the book being read. The al-Sunan al-Kubrā, a book of 4,000 pages, was read in 
its entirety over 757 sessions by Ibn Ṣalāḥ in the Dar al-Hadith al-Ashrafiyya in the city 
of Damascus. This was a very public reading of the text as indicated by samāʿah 
certificate of the sessions. Scholars, students, and non scholars were all in attendance for 
the sessions. Depending on the situation and the caliber of the scholar and students in 
attendance, either the teacher would read from the book or a student would be appointed 
as the reciter for the session and would read aloud. The text would be read from memory 
or from a book depending on the type of session being conducted. The certificate of the 
audition (al-samāʿ), which was typically written of all such readings, is a rich and 
detailed resource on what took place during the audition sessions. Scholars of ḥadīth, 
jurists, judges, students, and non scholars were all in attendance for the sessions. The 
certificate for this session includes information on the number of sessions and the date of 
each session, name of each auditor along with their nicknames, agnomens and other 
pertinent information about them, and information about what the students were doing 
during the session and what sessions they attended and did not attend (Ibid., 103-114). 
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 There are theological considerations to the faculty of hearing and the importance 
of hearing knowledge in the learning process that Muslim scholars have explored. In texts 
of theology, one frequently encounters a discussion on the five external senses of hearing, 
vision, smell, touch, and taste. Muslim theologians have differed over and discussed over 
whether the sense of hearing or the sense of sight is superior. Studying the reasons 
provided for the superiority of the sense of hearing grants us insight to the role of hearing 
in the learning process. In al-Nasafī’s well known theological treatise, al-ʿAqāʾid, he 
states, “The external senses are five: hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch. Each sense 
discloses aspects of an object [that is] specific to that sense.” The Ashʿarite theologian 
Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1390) elaborates on each of the senses stating regarding 
the sense of hearing that, “Hearing is a faculty in the nerve that is spread out in the canal 
of the inner hole of the ear.” Other commentators have glossed on this section focusing 
on the particular order of the senses mentioned, investigating whether or not there is a 
hierarchy of the senses represented by the order or is there some other understanding 
represented in the order. Mulla Aḥmad al-Jundī explains, “ He mentioned hearing before 
the other senses despite the most important sense for animals being the faculty of touch, 
because most religious knowledge has its basis in sound transmitted reports that impart 
knowledge by way of the faculty of hearing” (al-Jundī  2008, 1:47). It is the faculty of 
hearing that is ranked at the top of the hierarchy of all the senses due to its role in the 
acquisition of knowledge. What is not to be understood here is that the rest of the 
faculties do not impart knowledge and that they are not involved in the acquisition of 
knowledge. The faculties are all involved yet they are not all of equal rank. Another 
commentator on the same text, al-Farhārī (d. 1239/1823) highlights further the role 
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hearing has in the acquisition of knowledge. “It is said the he mentioned [the sense of] 
hearing before others due to it being more noble. This is because firstly, this sense can 
perceive from all sides. Secondly, it can perceive what is behind a wall. These two 
reasons are not the case regarding the sense of sight. Thirdly, acquiring religious virtues 
are contingent on the sense of hearing. Fourthly, most human perfections are contingent 
on it. This is why you will often find scholars who are blind whereas those who are deaf 
are considered amongst the animals that do not speak or understand” (al-Farhārī  2012, 
89-90). Hearing holds the highest rank of the senses due to its role in learning and 
cultivating the virtues. Additionally, religious knowledge is only acquired through 
hearing. Human perfection consists partly in acquiring knowledge which, of all the 
senses, hearing ranks the highest.  
 One significant work on the adab of a student and a teacher in the context of 
ḥadīth transmission is al-Jāmiʿ li-Akhlāq al-Rāwī wa Ādāb al-Sāmiʿ (The Compendium 
on the Character of the Transmitter and the Ādāb of the Student of Ḥadīth) by al-Khaṭīb 
al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1071). Here the term for student of ḥadīth, al-sāmiʿ, is being used 
that we also see with Ibn Jamāʿah. Yet Ibn Jamāʿah’s usage is not to be understood as 
being restricted only to the student of ḥadīth. Rather, I argue that Ibn Jamāʿah selects this 
term to emphasize the specific mode that embodies the essence of how the teaching and 
learning of any discipline of knowledge is to be practiced. This mode of acquiring 
knowledge consists of the necessary nature of a student ‘reading’ knowledge with a 
teacher. Ibn Jamāʿah’s advice to the student on the adab to observe during a lesson 
reflects the correct manner of sitting and listening. “[A student] should enter the presence 
of the teacher (shaykh) or sit in his presence with a heart that is free of concerns that will 
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distract him and a mind that is focused, not in a state of slumber, anger, extreme hunger 
and thirst or other similar states. This is so that a student will be receptive to what is said 
and comprehends what he hears” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 96). This is the adab that a student 
should embody all lessons in order to hear the lesson correctly. al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī  
quotes the grammarian Khalīl ibn Aḥmad speaking about his experience as a student 
emphasizing the role of listening and silence. He says, “When I wanted to begin to learn 
grammar, I started to attend the study circle (ḥalaqah). I sat in the study circle for one 
year not speaking [during the lessons] I only listened. During the second year, I began to 
study (naẓartu), and during the third year, I began to reflect. And during the fourth year, I 
began to inquire and speak” (al-Khatị̄b al-Baghdādī 2008, 593). The measures Ibn 
Jamāʿah recommends are all intended so that the activity of hearing the lesson is carried 
out in the most effective manner. The emphasis on hearing is further emphasized in 
another passage regarding the manner a student should sit when in the lesson. “The 
student should sit in front of the teacher in a manner embodying adab,” Ibn Jamāʿah 
writes. He continues explaining the manner of sitting stating, “Just as a young child sits 
in from of his Qur’an reciter (muqrī) or to sit cross-legged with humility, submission, 
tranquility, and constrained. [The student] should also listen attentively to the teacher 
while looking at him, wholly facing towards him in order to fully comprehend his words 
so that the student will not be in need of the teacher having to repeat what he said a 
second time. The student should not turn unless there is a necessity [to do so], nor should 
he look to the right or the left, nor above or in front him without need particular when the 
teacher is examining the student or speaking with him” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 97-98). Ibn 
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Jamāʿah’s choice of al-sāmiʿ for student expresses his understanding of the mode which 
teaching and learning should takes place, namely by ‘hearing’ knowledge. 
 The role listening plays in the learning process is inextricably linked with the role 
of reading. Makdisi argues that the term for reading, qarʾa, the term for listening, samīʿa, 
are nearly synonymous. He writes, “One ‘read’ a certain subject, the sense of studying 
and mastering it. The verb qarʾa was used with, and without, the preposition ʿalā. For 
instance, qarʾa ʾl-madhhab wa ʾl-khilāf ḥattā tamaiyaz (He ‘read’ the law of his school 
and that of others until he distinguished himself; and qaraʾa ʾl-fiqh ʾalā (fulān) (He ‘read’ 
law under the direction of So-and-So); both used in the sense of he ‘studied’. The verb 
qaraʾa meant also to read aloud or recite from memory, as did the verb samīʿa, used 
especially for the field of hadith, the other scriptural source of Islam” (Makdisi 1981, 
141). Additionally, readings were conducted for different goals and under different 
teachers. A text on the rare words in ḥadīth, Gharīb al-ḥadīth by al-Khattabi (d. 
386/996), was read for the purposes of memorization (qirāʾa al-samāʿ), read under 
another scholar for purposes of ensuring the text was correct (qirāʾa tasḥīḥ), and read 
under a third scholar for commentary in order to comprehend the text. Makdisi notes that 
reading a text, being synonymous with hearing a text, “applied to the professor himself, 
or to the student who actually did the reading, or to the student in attendance who was not 
reading, but who was following the reading or recitation in his own copy” (Makdisi 1981, 
144). Ibn Jamāʿah pays close attention of the ādāb to be observed when reading during a 
lesson. Paying attention to the voice he states, “the teacher should not raise his voice 
beyond what is needed nor should he lower his voice that results in not being able to 
completely understand [what is being read].” He comments further, “it is best that the 
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teacher’s voice does not extend beyond his assembly [of students] and reaches the ears of 
those present. If someone attending is difficult of hearing, then it is not objectionable for 
the teacher to raise his voice to so that he may hear [what is being recited]. There has 
been a prophetic tradition (ḥadīth) transmitted regarding this. Additionally, the teacher 
should not read continuously without pausing. Rather, he should recite correctly, 
distinctly, and slowly in order to contemplate on it, listening to the recitation” (Ibn 
Jamāʿa 1974, 39). One observes here that there is no mention of looking at text when 
speaking about the act of reading. This indicates that it is conceived as an aural act not 
necessarily a visual act. To be sure, visual reading was not absent from the Islamic 
tradition, but aural reading was predominant.  
 There are other modes of reading Ibn Jamāʿah mentions that the students should 
adopt. “A student should divide up the time of his day and night and utilize what is left of 
his life, for the end of his life is of little worth [to acquiring knowledge]. The optimal 
time for memorization (ḥifẓ) is the early mornings before dawn, for investigation (baḥth) 
is after dawn, for writing is midday, and for private reading (muṭālaʿah) and reading for 
review (mudhākara) is night” (Ibn Jamāʿa 1974, 72-3). Here we have four types of 
reading identified by Ibn Jamāʿah, reading for memorization (ḥifẓ), investigative reading 
(baḥth), private reading (muṭālaʿah) and review reading (mudhākara). These readings are 
all conducted by the student that take place outside of the lesson. The act of memorizing 
was a reading conducted by the student for the purposes of preserving to memory what 
was read publicly in the lesson. It was not conducted during the lesson and generally 
away from any forms of distraction such as other students. This type of reading is not to 
be understood as a silent reading. Rather the student would read aloud for the sake of 
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putting to memory what was learnt in the lesson. Investigative reading, on the other hand, 
was a reading conducted in order to look up an issue. This was conducted privately as 
well and may well have been a silent reading. Private reading (muṭālaʿah) would be 
considered visual reading since it is the reading of an actual book done by the student 
privately. The goal behind muṭālaʿah would be for the student to enrich his studies by 
reading alone other works in the field or by reading works in another field that would not 
normally be read with a teacher. Although, Ibn Jamāʿah advises, “the student should be 
cautious in the beginning of his studies about readings (muṭālaʿāt) in different books for 
this will waste his time and will scatter his thoughts. Rather, the student should give the 
book he is currently reading or the science he is studying his full attention until he 
perfects it” (ibid., 119). Muṭālaʿah is a reading that is for the adept student who has 
grounding in the sciences, not for the novice who still has not received sufficient training 
in the foundations of the sciences.  
 The review reading (mudhākara) is conducted for the purposes not of memorizing 
but of correctly understanding and discussing the contents of the lesson. The term 
mudhākara is a verbal noun from the third form of the verb dhakara which means to 
remember or to recall. Third form verbs have the meaning that the act is conducted with 
another person, thus mudhākara usually implies that one is reading and reviewing the 
lesson with another person. Both mudhākara and muṭālaʿah are readings that are best 
conducted at night, and would often last throughout the night. Despite mudhākara taking 
place between two people, Ibn Jamāʿah states, “If a student cannot another person to 
review with, the student may review by himself.” He then continues to describe the way 
one would read in a mudhākara session, “The student should repeat the contents of what 
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he heard in the lesson and the words of the lesson by heart so that it would be affixed to 
his mind. Repeating the contents by heart is exactly like repeating the words by the 
tongue. It is rare for someone to succeed who limits himself to reflecting on and 
attempting to comprehend [the lesson] only in the presence of the teacher. Who 
discontinues and leaves the lesson and then does not return the contents of the lesson.” 
(Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 145). Two ways of reading have been identified here: reading by the 
tongue and reading by the heart. Both methods of reading require repetition of the content 
and the text which also entails vocalizing of the text on part of the student. al-Khaṭīb al-
Baghdādī  provides a description of how the student of law should study that brings all 
the various forms of reading together. He states, 
The student should continuously attend the session and attentively listen (istimāʿ) 
to the lesson. Once he attends for a while and he is intimate with what he has 
listened to [from the teacher], he should ask the teacher (faqih) to dictate a portion 
from the beginning of the book to him. He should then write down what is 
dictated to him then separate himself from the session and study what he has 
written. If he understands the text, then he should depart from the session and read 
the text privately (ṭālaʿahu) and repeat his reading until he puts it to memory. He 
should then repeat reading the text to himself until he perfects it [to memory]. 
When he attends the session afterwards, he should request the teacher to listen to 
him recite and then recite to him from memory. Then the student should ask the 
teacher to dictate to him what follows and take the same steps as the steps 
previously mentioned (al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 2008, 594-594). 
 
This passage illustrates the hearing of a text and its reading in the various modes 
mentioned. Additionally, the role the teacher plays is essential in this process. The 
teacher reads the text that the student hears. The dictation of the text, along with 
commentary by the teacher, and having the student read the text from memory for the 
teacher to hear are all constitutive of the learning process.  
 In light of study of the role of the teacher and the student in the learning process 
as conceived by Ibn Jamāʿah, and the types of reading and listening each undertake, I 
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have translated al-sāmi’ as auditor and al-mutakallim as lecturer. To complete the study, 
we will now look at the term ‘lecture’ in the English language and explore the various 
modes of reading that took place in the Middle Ages and the early modern period. The 
noun ‘lecture’ in English means the action of reading, the action of reading aloud and is 
etymologically derived from the Latin lectūra and legĕre, meaning to read.27 The term 
legĕre referred to the act of teaching and to the act reading as well. A passage in The 
Metalogicon of John of Salisbury provides us with an understanding of the activity of 
learning and reading in the Middle Ages. He writes, “The word “reading” is equivocal. It 
may refer either to the activity of teaching and being taught, or to the occupation of 
studying written things by oneself. Consequently, the former, the intercommunication 
between the teacher and learner, may be termed (to use Quintilian’s word) the “lecture”; 
the latter, or the scrutiny by the student, the “reading,” simply so called” (Salisbury 2009, 
65-66). To do away with the ambiguity in the term for reading, prelegendi, John of 
Salisbury referred to the activity of teaching or reading aloud as prelectio and referred to 
the silent reading of text, although the physical text is not necessary, by the term lectio. 
Jacqueline Hamesse notes that the term legere (to read) can be used to refer to different 
activities. “Thus legere librum illi indicates explaining a book to someone; legere librum 
ab illo, a learning from a book with the aid of someone; legere librum, reading a book” 
(Hamesse 1999, 106). This pre-modern understanding of reading is important to pay 
attention due to the fact that our current understanding of reading is usually known as 
visual reading which is reading from a text. Texts and reading in our modern minds are 
inextricably linked. The activity of reading involves our eyes looking at a text. This 
                                                               
27 "lecture, n.". OED Online. December 2014. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/106869?rskey=jeuWs8&result=1 (accessed December 20, 2014). 
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visual reading is what is understood by the term reading in our current understanding of 
reading. A person would not be reading something if there was no text to read from. 
 In early modern times reading was an act that was not linked to a physical text in 
the way we conceive of the term. To better understand the activity of reading, Heidi 
Hackel has looked at two early modern reading practices that come under the term aural 
reading. Aural reading, which was the norm at the times, covers the practices of 
vocalized reading and communal reading aloud. Aural reading is to be contrasted with 
visual reading which is linked to the text. Learning is accomplished through the eyes, 
where as in aural reading, learning is accomplished primarily through the ears. The term 
lectio refers to the activity of reading that is carried out in public and privately as well. 
“Classrooms, churches, courts, great halls, and even closets were also spaces for aural 
reading” (Hackel 2005, 47). A central feature of reading, then, is the hearing of a text 
being read. As Hackel notes that early modern readers “often used their voices even when 
reading alone in a closet or study” (ibid., 45). Expanding further on the activity of reading 
Mary Carruthers identifies two distinct methods of reading. She states, “It seems to me, 
however, that silent reading, legere tacite or legere sibi, as Benedict and others call it, 
and reading aloud, clare legere in voce magna or viva voce, were two distinct methods of 
readings taught for different purposes in ancient schools and both practiced by ancient 
readers, and they correspond roughly to those stages in the study process called meditatio 
and lectio” (Carruthers 2008, 212). In this understanding, lectio refers to a public or 
communal reading of a text that is heard by the student and other attendees and is reading 
done in a loud voice. A student will also reading silently, meditatio, yet still vocalize the 
reading. This is carried out in a manner where only the reader is reading alone studying. 
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What is important to point out here is the term reading is referring to the act of reading 
that does not require a physical text to be present. It is the hearing of the text being read, 
either by oneself in private, meditatio, or being read by oneself or from someone else in 
public, lectio, which captures the activity of reading in pre-modern and early modern 
times.  
 An essential understanding of the Ibn Jamāʿah’s theory of learning is that the 
cultivation of adab can only occur from a teacher who possesses adab. In this section, we 
will examine this aspect of adab cultivation which is the necessity of a teacher. There are 
many statements by Muslim scholars to the effect that autodidactic learning, especially in 
the beginning of a student’s learning career, is not viewed favorably in the Islamic 
tradition. al-Nawawī quotes a famous saying about learning from books without recourse 
to teachers, “Do not acquire knowledge from a person who learnt from the depths of 
books (buṭūn al-kutub) without having read to scholars or an expert scholar. For a person 
who learns only from books will commit errors in vowelizing the text (tasḥīf) and will 
make many mistakes and errors in word forms (taḥrīf)” (al-Nawawī n.d., 1:66). The 
purpose highlighted here is the avoidance of mistakes and ensuring the text is accurate. 
This purpose and more is also in the mind of Ibn Jamāʿah, 
 And the student should exert his utmost to have a teacher (shaykh) who has  
 acquired a complete mastery of the religious sciences (ʿulūm al-sharʿiyyah) and 
 is considered to be reliable amongst contemporary scholars. The teacher should  
have conducted much research and have spent a long time in the company of 
other scholars, not someone who studied only from the depths of books and who 
has not known to have kept the company of proficient scholars. Al-Shafiʿī, God 
be pleased with him, said, ‘Whoever has studied Law from the depths of books 
has missed all legal rulings.’ And some used to say, ‘Of the greatest misfortunes 
is the taking of books as [replacement for] teachers,’ namely those who learn only 
from books (Ibn Jamāʿah  1974, 87).  
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From these passages, one can say that the purpose of a teacher is for correctly 
understanding the discipline the student is being initiated into. Expertise on the part of the 
teacher is required in addition to being known amongst one’s colleagues as reliable. This 
is to ensure accuracy of the content that is being taught by the teacher and the proper 
transmission and composition of the texts being studied. It is in this sense that al-Shāṭibī 
(d. 790) discusses on the possibility of acquiring knowledge without a teacher. After 
stating that, despite it being possible to acquire knowledge without a teacher, he rejoins 
“but what is customarily known is that it is necessary for there to be a teacher [to acquire 
knowledge], which is agreed upon in general, despite [them] differing on some of the 
details.” al-Shāṭibī (d. 790) provides further support to the purpose of accuracy stating, 
“It has been said, ‘Knowledge was in the breasts of people, then it transferred to books, 
and the keys to the books are people’” (al-Shātịbī 2013, 1:140). Indicating that early on, 
learning took place primarily by oral means, and with print materials becoming more 
common, teachers were still needed to explain the science and ensure the accuracy of the 
content. 
 However, when we look further into the role of a teacher and why it is an 
essential component of the learning process, we find that accuracy of knowledge and 
content expertise is not the only good to be acquired from a teacher in the learning 
process. Rather, the more primary role of the teacher is the cultivating of adab in the 
students he or she teaches. When it comes to selecting a teacher, the first task Ibn 
Jamāʿah advises the student to do is to, “first consider and seek God’s guidance whom 
one should study with and whom to acquire virtuous character traits and ādāb from” 
(Ibid., 1:85). Here the role of the teacher is not merely for the accuracy of content, rather 
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the student is to embody the virtues and adab of the teacher. For this, there are qualities 
the teacher needs to possess and the student should look for when adopting someone as 
their teacher. al-Shāṭibī has an important passage that explores this other dimension of the 
role of a teacher. There are three indications of a teacher who is realized in his knowledge 
(al-ʿālam al-mutaḥaqqiq),  
The first of them is that he implements what he knows so that his words are in 
accordance with his actions. For if his words were contrary to his actions, then he 
is not someone qualified to study with and should be taken as an authority in the 
science. This idea has been clarified completely in the Book of Legal Reasoning. 
All praise be  to God. The second indicator is that the teacher is someone whom 
elder scholars have trained in the relevant science because he studied with them 
and kept their company. Such a person is more fitting to be characterized with 
what the elder scholars have been characterized with. This was how the early 
Muslims were…this method became the principle for everyone after them. The 
Successors kept the same manner of learning of the Companions had with the 
Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace) until they acquired a deep 
understanding of the religion and attained the heights of perfection in the religious 
sciences. It suffices you to know the soundness of this principle that you will not 
find a scholar whom people studying with is well known except that he had a 
mentor who was well known [for people studying with] in his own generation. 
And rarely a  heretical sect will be found or someone who holds positions 
contrary to orthodoxy (al-sunnah) except that they have not learnt in this manner. 
And for this very reason Ibn  Ḥazm al-Ẓahirī28 was censured for he did not 
continuously study with scholars nor cultivated their adab…The third indicator is 
that the teacher emulate the scholars he has studied under and cultivate their adab 
in himself (al-Shātịbī 2013, 1:141-144). 
 
                                                               
28 ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad ibn Saʿīd Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) was an Andalusian scholar belonging to the Ẓahirī 
school of law. He was an author of numerous works in the law, theology, legal theory, ḥadīth as well as in 
other disciplines. He wrote al-Fiṣal fi ’l-milal wa ’l-aḥwāʾ wa ’l-niḥal on heresiography which he studied 
the sects that exist within Islam as well as other faiths that existed in his time, and al-Muḥalla in law. His 
works had a mixed reception from his contemporaries and later scholars. What al-Shātịbī has in mind here 
regarding his statement on Ibn Ḥazm is the lack of adab displayed in the tone and language used by Ibn 
Ḥazm when referring to scholars who held divergent viewpoints. The historian al-Dhahabī, despite praising 
him highly, says, “he did not use proper comportment when addressing other scholars. Rather he used 
extremely arrogant language, and he hurled insults (sabba) and derided people. He was thus treated the way 
he treated others. A group of scholars did not pay attention to his works, abandoned him and discouraged 
others from reading his works, while other scholars read his works critically while benefitting from them” 
(al-Dhahabī 1981, 18:184). According to al-Shātịbī, this was a result of Ibn Ḥazm not having spent time 
with scholars and thereby not cultivating adab. 
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The role of the teacher is not merely to convey correct content and ensure its accurate 
comprehension on part of the student. Additionally, and more importantly, the teacher is 
fundamental for the cultivation of adab in the student. In the educational context, the 
context of Ibn Jamāʿah’s work, the ādāb he describes are to be applied in all situations of 
where education is taking place. These ādāb are to be acquired by teacher ensuring the 
student practice the ādāb in relation to each object, such as books other tools of learning, 
and each situation, such as a lesson. Then through the repeated practice of the ādāb in 
relation to all objects and contexts, it will become a habitus and the student will then 
possess ādāb. Once it is a habitus, the student will not necessarily be in need of a teacher 
in the same manner as he needed a teacher prior to ādāb being a habitus. The cultivation 
of adab additionally ensures the correct practice of a craft or an act. Similarly to the case 
of Ibn Ḥazm, in medicine we find a certain an Egyptian physician,   ʿAlī ibn Riḍwān, 
whom his biographer, Ibn Abī Usạibiʿa  (d. 668/1269), described as someone who, 
“would often be involved in refutations of his contemporary physicians and in refuting 
the physicians of the past. Additionally, his investigations were shallow (safāhah fī 
baḥthihi) and he exhibited disgraceful qualities with those he held discussions with” (Ibn 
Abī Usạibiʿa  1965, 563).  What is important to pay attention to here is that Ibn Abī 
Usạybiʻa mentions almost right after this that ʿAlī ibn Riḍwān did not have a acquire the 
craft of medicine from a teacher and that he composed a book arguing that learning the 
craft medicine from books is superior than learning the craft from teachers. We see the 
improper practice of the craft of medicine due to the practitioner not possessing adab. In 
the case of Ibn Ḥazm al-Ẓahirī and ʿAlī ibn Riḍwān their practice of the crafts of law and 
medicine was not aligned with the goods of the craft. In the end, it made them unreliable 
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and they were not taken as authorities due to not practicing these crafts with adab, having 
acquired the crafts without a teacher. 
 Berkey, I believe, has accurately observed based on studying biographical 
dictionaries on scholars and their academic careers, that education in Islam was “tied to 
persons rather than institutions” and “the personal connection – the educational model 
relying not simply on close study of a text, but on intensive, personal interaction with a 
shaykh – has always been central to Islamic education, not simply in Mamluk Egypt” 
(Berkey 1992, 18-21). Berkey identifies that in addition to the knowledge that was being 
imparted to the student, teachers “also imparted authority, an authority over texts and 
over a body of learning” (ibid., 23-24). Our study of Ibn Jamāʿah’s conception of the 
necessity of a teacher in the learning process supports Berkey’s conclusion, yet it also 
shows that his analysis falls short when trying to understand why Islamic education has 
been focused on the person rather than the institution. The fact that Islamic education was 
personal and not focused on institutions was due to the cultivation of adab which I argue 
is the highest good of education in Islam. Content accuracy, craft expertise, and authority 
are also goods that are internal to the practice of education. Yet above all, the highest 
good is that of adab which can only be cultivated in the eyes of Ibn Jamāʿah by a teacher 
who has successfully cultivated a self that possesses adab. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE ADAB POSSESSING SOUL: THE RELATIONAL SELF 
The self that has cultivated adab is a relational self. Most conceptions of the 
relational self are concerned with social aspects of humans. While the self that has 
inculcated adab does concern itself with social aspects, it has relational dimensions that 
extend to God and to one’s own self. This self is embedded in the cosmos, with a 
particular order of creation that results in a hierarchy and is constituted in terms of its 
relations with all beings in creation. In this chapter, we will build the adab possessing 
self that serves as the highest good of education in the Islamic tradition. Ibn Jamāʿah’s 
Tadhkirat al-Sāmiʿ wa-l-Mutakallim fī Ādāb al-ʿĀlim wa l-Mutaʿallim, a manual of adab 
for the teacher and the student, will serve to provide us with the different relational 
aspects of the adab possessing self. The manual serves a dual purpose: it provides us a 
picture of what constitutes a soul that possesses adab and it also serves on how to 
cultivate such a soul in light of adab being a habitus. Ibn Jamāʿah composed this manual 
of adab for the student and the teacher in order to provide what constitutes correct action 
in the context of adab. Correct action is an act that is carried out in recognition of another 
being’s rank in the order of creation and the rights of the being by virtue of the rank it 
holds in the hierarchy of creation. Adab manuals serve as a guide for the student as to 
what correct action would entail. The correct action is determined based on the student’s 
relationship to the rights of other beings by virtue of the place in the order of creation. 
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The student would undertake the correct actions with the aim of cultivating a habitus of 
adab after which correct action would ensue forth from the student and teacher without 
difficulty and effort.  
 The anatomy of Tadhkirat al-Sāmiʿ provides us with an understanding of what 
constitutes the self that possesses adab. At the same time the work serves as a manual of 
practices for the student and the lecturer to employ in order to cultivate adab. For Ibn 
Jamāʿah the work is intended to be a “reminder for the teacher of what has been made 
incumbent on him and as a counsel to alert the student as to what is specifically binding 
upon him” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 3). What can be understood from this statement is that the 
ādāb the teacher and the student are required to cultivate are the similar if not identical. 
This is consistent with the understanding of adab being a habitus (malakah); as the 
student will undertake these practices that will engender a state (ḥāl) of adab in the soul 
that does not possess the quality of permanency. Upon the repetition of these practices 
and the passage of time, the state of adab will turn into a disposition or habitus. The 
difference is not in any essential property of adab, rather adab as a habitus is identical to 
adab as a state. The difference between the two is the quality of fixedness and 
permanency (rusūkh). When adab is a habitus, it is a quality that is firmly rooted in the 
soul and acts of adab ensue from the soul without any prior effort or deliberation. Thus 
the ādāb of the teacher and the student will be the same while the only difference lies in 
the degree of fixedness and the effort and deliberation required for acts of adab to ensue. 
Additionally, the student, once a teacher, will now be relating to various beings in 
creation as a teacher. Holding a different rank, the rights that come from that rank will 
also reflect the rights of a teacher not of a student.  
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 Based on the above understanding of adab, Ibn Jamāʿah’s conception of the 
practices the teacher and the student must employ exhibit much overlap. The question of 
how does Ibn Jamāʿah determine which practices constitute adab and which do not arises 
here. “Good adab,” Ibn Jamāʿah’s writes in the introduction of Tadhkirat al-sāmiʿ, “is 
whose merits the Sacred Law (al-sharʿ) and reason have countenanced as well as 
considered opinion and statements [of people] are in agreement that those who possess it 
should be praised.” This passage provides us with an answer to this question. For Ibn 
Jamāʿah, good adab is that which the Sharīʿah has countenanced as good. Often equated 
with Islamic Law, in the Islamic tradition Sharīʿah refers to the doctrinal, legal, ethical 
and spiritual ordinances of God. It is in this sense that Khaled Abou El Fadl describes the 
broad meaning of the Sharīʿah as, “the way or path to well-being or goodness, the life 
source for well-being and thriving existence, the fountain or source of nourishment, and 
the natural and innate ways and order created by God” (Abou El Fadl 2014, xxxii). Good 
adab is not contrary to human reason. However by identifying the Sharīʿah as the 
foundation for knowing what entails good adab, Ibn Jamāʿah, in line with Asharite 
theological school to which he belonged, sees human reason unaided by revelation as 
being unable to determine which practices the student and teacher must employ to 
cultivate adab. Hence, revelation is required in order to indicate which practices qualify 
as adab and which do not. To be sure, adab is not only constituted by what is divinely 
determined but is also inclusive of what is customarily considered good adab by societal 
customs. Yet custom-based adab does differ depending on the time and location a person 
finds themselves in.   
 Ibn Jamāʿah outlines the overall anatomy of the Tadhkira stating,  
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I have collected, by the grace of God, the Exalted, the various ādāb pertaining to 
each  chapter in a single composition; something I have not seen before. 
[Additionally], I have  prefaced them with a short chapter on the merits of 
knowledge and scholars seeking its [spiritual] blessings and following the 
example [of writers before me]. I have arranged the [book] in five chapters that 
encompass the objectives of the book.  
 Chapter One:  On the merits of sacred knowledge, scholars, and the honorable  
   rank and nobility of the scholar. 
Chapter Two:  On the ādāb of scholar in relation to himself, with his students and 
his instruction. 
Chapter Three: On the ādāb of the student in relation to himself, with his teacher,    
           his fellow students and his lesson. 
 Chapter Four: On having books and the ādāb associated with it. 
 Chapter Five:  On the ādāb relating to the school living quarters and valuable  
counsels associated with it (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 4). 
 
In treating each adab, Ibn Jamāʿah typically will explain the nature of the adab to be 
cultivated and explore how the adab serves to achieve the internal goods of learning. 
After which he will provide examples of the early Muslim community (al-salaf), the 
community which is taken to have upheld and maintained the ideal embodiment of Islam, 
and statements of Prophet Muḥammad to support his identifying why this should serve as 
an adab to be cultivated. What is significant to note here is that adab is always to be 
cultivated in relation to some object. The teacher cultivates and exhibits adab in relation 
to his students and his instruction. The student cultivates adab in relation so his or her 
teacher, fellow students and the lesson. Adab is additionally cultivated in relation to the 
tools of learning such as books, writing instruments, and when in the living quarters. 
From this we see that there are ādāb to be cultivated that are specific to individuals, 
places, situations, and objects. Furthermore, it may be concluded that adab is only to be 
demonstrated to objects that are other than the person; that are external to one. However, 
as Ibn Jamāʿah argues, there are in fact ādāb a person is to cultivate in relation to one’s 
own self whether a teacher or a student. It is in this sense the self that possesses adab is a 
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relational self. In this chapter, I will focus on the ādāb Ibn Jamāʿah identifies that are to 
be cultivated in relation to the self of the teacher and of the student and the ādāb the 
teacher and student cultivate in relation to each other.  
 
Knowledge and Scholars in the Islamic Vision of the Created Order 
 Ibn Jamāʿah, as do other writers on the adab of the teacher and the student, begins 
with a chapter on the merits of knowledge, scholars, teaching, and learning. The intent of 
this chapter is to establish the position of scholars and scholarship in hierarchy of the 
cosmos. One of the main ideas Ibn Jamāʿah stresses is that religious scholars are to be 
seen as inheritors of prophets. After quoting numerous verses of the Qurʾān that praise 
scholars and sacred knowledge, Ibn Jamāʿah focuses on the metaphysical implications of 
being a scholar and concludes that scholars possess the highest rank hierarchically of 
God’s creation after the rank of God’s prophets. His reasoning is based on the ḥadīth of 
the Prophet Muḥammad, “Scholars are the inheritors of prophets. Prophets bequeath 
neither dīnār nor dirham,29 rather they bequeath knowledge.” Ibn Jamāʿah commenting 
on this ḥadīth says, “Just as there is no rank higher that the rank of prophethood, there is 
no nobility greater than the nobility of the inheritor of the rank of prophethood” (Ibn 
Jamāʿah 1974, 6). In the Islamic tradition, the position scholars and scholarship possess 
in the hierarchy of the cosmos is understood in relationship to the prophets of God and in 
relation to other human beings specifically and to the rest of creation generally, the 
prophets possess the highest rank and scholars possess a rank just below that rank of 
prophets.  
                                                               
29 The dīnār and dirham were forms of currency in use during those times and are still used in certain 
nations in the Middle East. 
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 Ibn Jamāʿah also cites the social and religious goods related to scholarship in 
addition to the metaphysical ones He states that “occupying oneself with acquiring 
knowledge for the sake of God is more meritorious than physical acts of worship such as 
prayer, fasting, exalting [God], supplication, and the like. This is due to the benefit of 
knowledge extending to the scholar and to others whereas [the benefit] of supererogatory 
physical acts of worship extend only to the person performing them. Knowledge also 
validates other acts of worship as they depend on knowledge and are contingent upon it; 
scholars are the inheritors of prophets and such is not the case for mere devotees; obeying 
scholars is an obligation upon others in religious matters; the positive effects of 
knowledge remain after the scholar has passed away whereas the effects of acts of 
worship [come to] end with the passing away of the devotee; and the continuance of 
knowledge entails the revival of the Sharīʿah and the preserving of the emblems of the 
religion”( Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 13). What this chapter tells us is that these ādāb that Ibn 
Jamāʿah will detail are linked with the metaphysical and social place scholarship and 
knowledge hold in that the adab a teacher and a student cultivate reflect their rank in the 
order of creation and at the level of human existence.  
 
The Ādāb in Relation to One’s Self 
 In exploring Ibn Jamāʿah conception of the self that possesses adab I will be 
looking at the adab as it relates to both the teacher and the student together. This is 
because I argue that the student is simply the starting point of the path in cultivating the 
self that possesses adab and the teacher represents the terminus of the path and although 
there are differences in terms of what ādāb Ibn Jamāʿah emphasizes, there is much 
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overlap as well. Taking this approach, in addition to be an easier way to organize our 
study, also highlights the underlying conception of adab as a habitus in that these ādāb 
are at the same time the starting and the end point. Being a habitus, the difference 
between the novice and the adab possessing soul lies not the adab qua adab but in the 
state of the soul as discussed previously. 
 Ibn Jamāʿah identifies twelve ādāb a teacher is required to cultivate in regards to 
his own self where as he identifies ten for the student. The first adab the student is to 
direct him towards is, “to purify his heart from all types of pretense (ghish), foulness 
(danas), animosity (ghill), envy (ḥasad), heretical doctrines, and vice. This will prepare 
the student to receive sacred knowledge, preserve it to memory, come to know its subtle 
meanings, and the true nature of its ambiguities” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 67). All of these 
ādāb relate to the student’s heart and are therefore spiritual in nature. Once see the 
influence of al-Ghazālī here as he also identifies the first duty (waẓīfah) of the student is 
the “purifying the soul of vicious character traits and blameworthy qualities.” 
Furthermore, Ibn Jamāʿah provides the same reasoning as al-Ghazālī as to why this is the 
first adab of the student saying, “For [acquiring] knowledge, as some have said, is the 
prayer of [a person’s] innermost being (al-sirr), the worship of the heart and an inner act 
of drawing near to God. Just as the prayer, which is an act of worship involving the 
outward limbs, is not valid without outward ritual purity from states of impurity and filth, 
likewise acquiring knowledge, which is the worship of the heart, is valid only by the 
purification [of the heart] from the filth of blameworthy attributes and the impurity of 
vicious and base character traits.” What is understood from this is that the learning 
process is at its essence an activity of the soul. And in order for the soul to be able to 
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receive knowledge, it must cultivate adab and an important aspect of adab entails 
divesting the soul of vicious character traits and the soul acquiring virtuous character 
traits. Although Ibn Jamāʿah identifies this as the first adab for the student, for the 
teacher this is constitutes the eighth and ninth adab. It is difficult to determine whether 
Ibn Jamāʿah’s ordering of the ādāb is intentional or not. Nevertheless, one can infer that 
this being the first adab for the student is intentional as it prepares the student for the 
reception of knowledge, which implies that it serves as a condition for knowledge 
acquisition. Explaining this idea Ibn Jamāʿah states, “When the heart is rendered pure for 
[receiving] knowledge, the heart’s blessing (barakah) manifests and it begins to grow 
like the earth when it is rendered pure for cultivation, the earth’s crops grow and yields 
abundantly” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 637). The heart, a spiritual substance, is the vessel of 
knowledge and needs to be prepared to receive knowledge. This preparation is the 
purification of the heart from vicious character traits and the acquiring of virtuous 
character traits.  
 Writers on adab in other genres have identified a person holding correct doctrines 
related to creed as constituting adab relating to oneself. For example, in discussing the 
ādāb of a physician, al-Ruhāwī holds that a person, in addition to being an apprentice to a 
physician should also study and know books related to drugs and the practice of 
medicine. However, before even initiating this course of study, the physician must hold 
correct theological doctrines regarding God and prophets. For example, the physician 
must hold “that every entity that has been brought into existence has a creator who 
brought it into existence who is one, powerful, wise, carries out all things willfully, grants 
life and death, illness and health. [This creator] has blessed creation since the moment He 
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created them by making known to them what will benefit them in order that they use 
it…This is the first duty and belief that a physician should believe in firmly” (al-Ruhāwī 
1992, 41). al-Ruhāwī then goes on to explain second duty which is for the physician to 
possess full love of God and the high spiritual station the love of God holds. He ends with 
the third duty of the physician which is to uphold the doctrine that God has sent prophets 
to mankind because the human intellect unaided by revelation is unable to discern all that 
benefits them. He ends advising the student that, “these principle duties a physician must 
hold between him and his creator and must hold these beliefs correctly,” and “you should 
not keep the company of him who deviates from these principles” (Ibid.) 
 Similarly, in his book on the ādāb required for one delivering the sermon of the 
Friday prayer, Ibn al-ʿAṭṭār (d. 724/1324) states the following as the first adab in relation 
to his self, “He should hold correct doctrine (ṣaḥīḥ al-ʿaqīdah), that of orthodoxy (ahl al-
sunnah wa-l jamāʿah), not the doctrine of the anthropomorphist nor the doctrine of those 
who divest God of His attributes” (Ibn al-ʻAtṭạ̄r  1996, 87). The very same idea is 
presented by Ibn Jamāʿah when speaking of the adab of the student thus placing him in 
the same line as adab writers of other crafts. An essential element of what constitutes the 
purifying of the heart is to ensure that a person holds correct doctrines regarding God, 
prophets, and other tenets of faith. The student or teacher must not hold any heretical 
doctrines as doing so renders the heart corrupt and will jeopardize the deliverables of the 
act of learning and teaching.  
 Regarding what virtuous and vicious character traits entail when dealing with the 
adab of the student Ibn Jamāʿah does not go into detail. This is due perhaps to the fact 
that he did so when dealing with the adab of the teacher. Ibn Jamāʿah places the 
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acquiring of the virtues and the divesting of vices as the third, eighth and ninth ādāb of 
the teacher, whereas it was the first adab of the student. The eighth and the ninth ādāb 
take up the most attention of Ibn Jamāʿah of all the twelve ādāb of the teacher in relation 
to his own self. In the Tadhkirat, Ibn Jamāʿah sees the virtues and vices as those virtues 
that are to be applied when one engages with other people in society, i.e. they are the 
social virtues. They are social in the sense that they are manifested towards an object 
other than oneself. The next set of virtues are those they relate to the person them self; 
not requiring another object in order to be manifested. This set of virtues and vice pertain 
either to the inner dimensions (al-bāṭin) of the self or its outer dimensions (al-ẓāhir). 
 The eighth adab is dedicated to detailing the social virtues. Ibn Jamāʿah states, 
The Eighth Adab: To engage people with noble character traits (makārim al-
ʾakhlāq) such as: having a cheerful countenance, spreading the greeting of peace, 
feeding others, suppression of rage, preventing harm from people and bearing 
harm that issues forth  from them, preferring others and to leave appropriating 
things for oneself, dealing with [others] in fairness and not to ask to be treated 
with fairness, showing thankfulness  to acts of generosity, facilitating things, 
striving to take care of [peoples’] needs, using ones social standing to intercede 
for others, showing kindness to the poor and love to[one’s] neighbors and close 
kin, [dealing] in gentleness (al-rifq) with students, supporting them and being 
truly devoted (wa birrihim) to them – as will be discussed later God willing (Ibn 
Jamāʿah 1974, 23). 
 
Being self-explanatory, Ibn Jamāʿah simply lists the social virtues with the understanding 
that most of these are known to the average Muslim and are expected in any Muslim 
society. From the list it can be seen that all of the virtues Ibn Jamāʿah lists involve the 
exhibition of that virtue to some member of society other than the teacher. Additionally, 
Ibn Jamāʿah does not discuss nor list social vices as they too are self explanatory. And 
finally, for Ibn Jamāʿah, even these social virtues are known and determined by the 
example of the Prophet Muḥammad. With this understanding, he ends this adab with the 
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following anecdote from the Prophet’s life, “In the case when [the teacher] observes 
someone note performing his prayer or his ablution or an obligatory act correctly, [the 
teacher] should gently and with kindness guide him [to the correct manner] just as the 
Messenger of God (God bless him and grant him peace) did with the bedouin when he 
urinated in the mosque and with Muʿāwiyah ibn al-Ḥakam when he spoke during prayer,” 
(Ibid.) implying that these virtues are taking from the Sharīʿah, specifically in the 
example of the Prophet.  
The ninth adab relates to the virtues and vices that relate to the person of the 
teacher.  
 
The ninth adab is that [the teacher] purifies his outer form and inner form from 
base character traits and cultivates his self with the praiseworthy character traits. 
Among the base character traits are: enmity (al-ghill), envy (al-ḥasad), 
transgression (al-baghy), anger for other than the sake of God, the Exalted, 
deception  (al-ghish), pride, ostentation, vanity, acting for the sake of reputation 
(al-sumʿah), avarice (al-bukhl), wickedness (al-khubth), insolence (al-baṭar), 
covetousness, boastfulness (al-fakhr), vainglory, competing and vying  for the 
world, sycophancy (al-mudāhana), pretentiousness, loving to be praised for acts 
one did not do, blind to the faults of the self and being distracted from them by 
[focusing on] the faults of other people, showing partisanship and solidarity for 
other than God, having hope and fear in other than God, backbiting, tale-bearing, 
calumniation, lying, vulgar speech, looking at people with disdain even if they are 
lower than one. So be warned against these filthy attributes and based character 
traits for they are the gateway to all types of evil. In fact, they are all evil (Ibn 
Jamāʿah 1974, 23-24).  
 
All of the vices mentioned relate to the person of the teacher and the removal of which is 
considered necessary. The outer/inner form dichotomy introduced here by Ibn Jamāʿah is 
not to be confused with the social virtues and the outer form being equated here. Rather 
the distinction implies that outward vices are perceptible by the external senses, whereas 
the inward vices are not perceptible to them.  
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 There are four vices Ibn Jamāʿah singles out for special attention due to, “some 
amongst the jurists of our time who possess wicked souls have been afflicted with these 
attributes, except for those who God, the Exalted, has protected. In particular [they have 
been afflicted with] envy, vanity, ostentation, and looking at others with disdain.” This 
passage demonstrates the practical dimensions and social role adab manuals held in 
circles of education in classical Muslim societies as ensuring the correct practice of each 
craft is a means for the goods of each craft to be realized in society thus allowing the 
community to continue to flourish and grow. All of these vices result in the craft of 
teaching and learning to be undertaken without adab and the ends of the craft will not be 
realized. Additionally from Ibn Jamāʿah’s observations one can infer that some 
practitioners are afflicted with traits, as in the case of law, which practitioners of other 
crafts may not. The purpose of practicing a craft with adab is to ensure that the external 
and internal goods of craft are realized. Ibn Jamāʿah’s closing of this paragraph provides 
us with insights as to the relationship between adab manuals and the sciences. Ibn 
Jamāʿah closes this paragraph saying, “The cure for each of these afflictions is to be 
found in the books related to sciences of the heart (al-raqāʾiq). Whoever desires to purify 
his soul from these afflictions should see well to these books. The most beneficial of 
them is the al-Riʿāya of al-Muḥāsibī (God have mercy on him).” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 24). 
What we can understand from this important passage is that adab manuals do not 
represent a science in the sense that they serve to inform the readers of the details of the 
particulars outlined in the adab manuals. Here Ibn Jamāʿah does not discuss how a 
person would acquire the virtues and divest himself of all the vices. Rather he redirects 
the reader to the science whose subject matter this would be which is the science of 
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Sufism. Yet, due to the importance of this observation, and due to the fact that most 
likely a student and teacher of law will be reading the Tadhkira, Ibn Jamāʿah does spend 
some time defining these vices and providing the means to rid oneself of them. What this 
demonstrates is that in order to cultivate the self that possesses adab one would have to 
take from various sciences and adab manuals serve to provide the reader with what 
constitutes the self that possesses adab. For example, in the case of a person riding their 
hearts from heretical doctrines, they would be referred to the science of theology.  
 Ibn Jamāʿah next moves on to discuss the virtuous character traits thus completing 
the ninth adab of the teacher. He lists them stating,  
Of the praiseworthy character traits are continual repentance, sincerity, certainty, 
God-fearingness, patience, contentment, being satisfied [with God’s 
apportionments], asceticism, absolute trust in God, entrustment to God, being free 
of malice, having a good opinion of others, relinquishing any claims, good 
character, acknowledging acts of goodness, being grateful for blessings, having 
tenderness towards God’s creation, and having modesty towards Gods and 
towards people. The love of God is the character trait encompassing all good 
qualities and attributes. The love of God can only be achieved by emulating the 
Messenger of God (God bless him and grant him peace). ‘Say: ‘If you love God, 
follow me, and God will love you.’’[Qurʾān 3:31]. 
 
This passage and the others allow us to make some important observations regarding the 
conception of the virtues in Ibn Jamāʿah’s thought. What differentiates the list of virtues 
above from the social virtues mentioned in the eighth adab is the object which the virtues 
are directed towards. The object of a social virtue is primarily transitive, meaning they 
are external to the person possessing the virtue. One shows thanks to others, facilitates 
things for them, and shows kindness towards others. The ninth adab encompasses those 
virtues who primary object is God. One is to repent to God, be sincere towards God, have 
certainty of God, be content with God, and ultimately to have love of God. These virtues 
could be classified as theological virtues in the sense that God is the object of these 
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virtues.30 However, when keeping in mind the greater conceptual understanding of the 
virtues in the Islamic tradition, an additional dimension of the virtues comes to light – 
their role regarding the salvation of a believer. al-Ghazālī sums up this dimension stating, 
“Salvation is in [acquiring] virtuous character” (al-Ghazālī 2006, 213). al-Ghazālī 
expands on the salvific dimension of these virtues by first clarifying that the perfect 
embodiment of the virtues has only been achieved by the Prophet Muhammad and other 
rare individuals. Who they are al-Ghazālī does not identify. Individual salvation does not 
depend on acquiring each virtue in its perfect form. Rather, what is expected is that there 
be a stronger inclination towards the good or the beautiful in an individual than towards 
the ugly for there are various degrees between absolute beauty and absolute ugliness. And 
in accordance with the degree of closeness a person is to beauty in this world, they will 
be felicitous in the life hereafter. (ibid., 217) The virtues that constitute the adab on the 
part of the student and the teacher have dimensions that extend beyond the educational 
sphere.  
 In closing the first adab of the student, Ibn Jamāʿah restates the purpose behind 
this adab stating, “Thus when the heart is rendered pure for [receiving] knowledge, its 
blessings manifest and increases just as land when it is ready for sowing, its seed grows 
and bears harvest” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 67). The student, being at the beginning of the 
path of self cultivation, needs to set the foundations for the cultivation of the self that 
                                                               
30 The category of theological virtues is particular to the conception of virtue in the Christian tradition. For 
example, Augustine of Hippo (d. 430) acknowledges the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, 
temperance, and fortitude that originate in writing of Plato. However, in addition to the cardinal virtues, 
Christian theologians affirm virtues that are uniquely Christian and are seen as being superior to the 
cardinal virtues. These have been identified as the virtues of faith, hope and love based on Corinthians I 
13:13, “And now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love.” See Brynjulv 
Norheim Jr (2004) The theological virtues. Aquinas did, but did Kant?, Studia Theologica - Nordic Journal 
of Theology, 58:2, 108-122. Scholastic writers such as Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) provide more clarity 
regarding the different types of virtues.  
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possesses adab. Ibn Jamāʿah supports this being the first adab for the student by citing 
the ḥadīth of the Prophet Muhammad: “In the body, there is a morsel of flesh, if it is 
sound, the entire body is sound and if it is corrupt, the entire body will be corrupt. Indeed 
it is the heart.” He provides additional support by citing a statement of one of the early 
Muslims, Sahl stating, “Light is not allowed to enter a heart that contains anything God 
Mighty and Majestic abhors.” Light here refers to sacred knowledge. It is understandable 
now why Ibn Jamāʿah stresses this as the first adab of the student and not for the teacher 
as the teacher, having cultivated the self possessing adab, needs only a reminder of this 
adab.  
 The second adab of the student according to Ibn Jamāʿah is concerned with the 
motive behind the act of learning. A student should intend God’s countenance in his act 
of learning. The intention of an agent when carrying out an act has received significant 
focus by Muslim jurists, mystics, and moralists. Based on the statement of the Prophet 
Muhammad, “Actions are only according to intentions,” Ibn Jamāʿah is writing and 
thoughts can be seen as a continuation and accurately reflective of the discourse 
generated around what makes up the essence of the act of a moral agent. Furthermore, the 
correct intentions behind the act of learning and align it with the ends of the act, thereby 
ensuring that internal and external goods are acquired. Ibn Jamāʿah clarifies this point 
stating, “Learning is considered to be amongst the acts of worship and those acts that 
draw one near [to God]. If the intention of learning is sincerely for God, the Exalted, the 
act will be accepted [by God], grow, and its blessings will increase. However, if other 
than God is intended, [then the act of learning] will fail, not achieve its ends, and not 
yield any results. It is likely that the goods sought will not be realized or obtained, 
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thereby rendering his hopes unfulfilled and his effort futile.” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 69-70). 
The intention serves to ensure that the external and internal goods of an act, an act’s final 
cause (al-ʿillah al-ghāʾīyyah) for which it is aimed at, will be acquired.  
 Ibn Jamāʿah lists the goods of the act of learning and thereby clarifying for the 
student that he should “intend the countenance of God, the Exalted, to act in accordance 
with [the knowledge acquired], revive the Sacred Law (sharīʿah), enlighten one’s heart, 
beautify one’s inward dimensions, proximity to God on the day of meeting with Him, and 
to become recipients of what has been arranged for his family of God’s good pleasure 
and His great bounty.”  These goods have to do with the act of learning, and not with the 
specific craft that the student is being initiated into. The craft has internal and external 
goods, in addition to the goods in the act of learning, which are specific to the craft. 
Additionally, Ibn Jamāʿah identifies objectives that, if intended on the part of the agent, 
are harmful to the craft of acquiring knowledge and will jeopardize the attainment of the 
goods identified. “Worldly objectives should not be intended,” says Ibn Jamāʿah, “such 
as [intending to] obtain positions of leadership, social status, wealth, competing with 
one’s peers, being held great in people’s hearts, being the head of gatherings, and the 
like. [Consequently, he would be] exchanging what is good for what is lowly” (Ibn 
Jamāʿah 1974, 68). 
 This second adab of the student relates to the first and second adab to be 
cultivated on part of the teacher. However, as it relates to the student, the adab is 
intended to prepare the student to acquire knowledge. In the case of the teacher the adab 
is on maintaining the knowledge acquired and living up to the trust placed on the scholar 
and teacher. Thus the teacher should be constantly be vigilant (murāqaba) of God the 
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Exalted in private and public, and being in fear of God in all of the teachers movements, 
rest, words, and deeds. Ibn Jamāʿah stresses this because the teacher is, “entrusted with 
the knowledge that has been consigned to him and the subtle perceptions and deep 
understandings that have been conferred to him. God the Exalted says, ‘Do not betray 
God and the Messenger, or knowingly betray the trusts that you have with each other’” 
(Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 15-16). Additionally, the scholar is required to cultivate a constant 
state of tranquility (sakīna), inspiring dignity, humility, scrupulousness, and humbleness 
before God. Here we see that the main focus of the adab of the student is on being 
sincere towards God in the acquiring of knowledge. In the case of the teacher, the adab of 
sincerity is now focused on fulfilling the trust that is placed on scholars and teachers. 
 The second adab of the teacher builds on the sincere fulfillment of the trust. The 
teacher must ‘protect’ knowledge. This protection entails preserving the honor and 
nobility of knowledge and the teacher given by God by the conduct of a scholar socially 
and in whom to teach and in what manner. So the scholar “should not dishonor 
knowledge by him going to or walking to those not worthy [of it] such as the worldly 
classes (lit. the sons of the world) unnecessarily and without need or those of them who 
desire to learn from him however great his stature or distinguished his standing maybe. 
al-Zuhrī said, ‘It is an ignominy for knowledge that a teacher should take it to the house 
of the student.’” Preserving the honor and dignity of knowledge impacts the conduct of a 
teacher socially and in what manner the act of teaching must take carried out. Scholars 
and teachers have taught those with political positions and kings, the sons of the world. 
Ibn Jamāʿah explains that this is acceptable “when there is a religious interest that 
outweighs the detriment of dishonoring knowledge and his intention is good and sound, 
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then there is no harm God the Exalted willing.” When the scholars of the early 
community did keep the company of the sons of the world, they did not do so for any 
worldly motives. Similarly, Ibn Jamāʿah notes “if the person who the scholar goes to is a 
person of knowledge and asceticism” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 17) then there is nothing wrong 
with keeping their company to teach them.  
 Stressing the external social goods of a teacher that are harmful to the craft of 
teaching, Ibn Jamāʿah places asceticism or renunciation (zuhd) as the third adab the 
teacher must cultivate. This will allow the teacher to avoid external goods that come with 
the social role of a scholar and a teacher that end up harming the craft of teaching such as 
wealth, political influence, and relationships with politicians. The teacher must cultivate 
zuhd to ensure the internal goods of the craft of teaching are preserved. Thus, Ibn 
Jamāʿah requires that the teacher “should be acquire the character trait of renunciation 
(zuhd) regarding worldly goods and to be scant with them to the extent possible not 
harming himself or his family. For the worldly goods he reasonably requires for himself 
and his family keeping them content is not deemed to be worldly. The least degree a 
scholar [should be at] is to disdain any attachment to worldly goods. This is because, of 
all people, he knows well the baseness and the alluring nature of the world, its ephemeral 
nature along with the great toil and fatigue [it brings]. He is, therefore, more duty bound 
not to pay attention to the world and be preoccupied with its worries” Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 
18). Continuing on the same concern of not being tempted by worldly motives 
encroaching in the act of learning, the fourth adab is for the teacher to “watch over his 
knowledge from being made a means to obtain worldly aims such as social status, wealth, 
reputation, notoriety, attendants, or winning advancement ahead of his associates.” The 
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teacher is to remove these motives from his heart when carrying out the craft of teaching 
as these would render the internal goods of the act unattained as these do not constitute 
the internal goods of the act. Ibn Jamāʿah stresses this point by citing a statement of a 
well revered scholar of the early Muslim community, Sufyan ibn ʿUyaynah (d. 198/814), 
reflecting on this adab saying, “I was granted a profound understanding of the Qur’ān. 
When I accepted a parcel from Abū Jaʿfar, it was stripped away from me. I ask God to 
pardon me.” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 19). The internal good of knowledge of the Qur’ān was 
not acquired due to a teacher employing knowledge as a means to worldly goods.  
 The fifth adab of the teacher focuses on the social role of the teacher in light of 
the rank a teacher holds in the order of creation. What we witness here is the impact of 
the cosmic position on the public conduct of a teacher. Ibn Jamāʿah starts of this adab by 
observing that the means of living a teacher adopts must be not bring down the nobility of 
the rank of teacher. He states, “The Fifth Adab: [The teacher] should distance himself 
from low means of earning a living, those that are by nature disdainful, and [those means 
of earning that are] offensive according to custom and the Sacred Law such as cupping, 
tanning, money exchange, and goldsmithery (ṣiyāgha).” The Sacred Law determines the 
ranking of each means of earning a living, yet custom also plays an important role. The 
rank of a teacher also determines the social conduct of a teacher. The teacher is held to a 
different set of standards than a non-teacher. Along these lines, Ibn Jamāʿah advises that, 
“the teacher should avoid circumstances that draw suspicion no matter how far-fetched. 
Neither should he perform any act that entails an impairing of [one’s social] 
respectability or outwardly be deemed objectionable – even if permissible in itself. For by 
doing such acts he exposes himself to suspicion and his reputation to being the talk of 
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people causing people to have blameworthy opinions earning the sin of gossip.” Thus 
even if the act is permissible for one to perform in the Sacred Law, the teacher must bear 
in mind how the act is perceived customarily as when. If the act raises doubt regarding 
one’s character, the teacher should avoid performing the act in public. All of this is to 
protect the honor and rank of the teacher. This is an example of an external good serving 
to facilitate the acquiring of an internal good. This adab is to be cultivated to achieve the 
external goods of honor and social rank which are there to serve the internal goods of 
being a teacher and a student. Ibn Jamāʿah further advises the teacher stating, “However, 
if such acts do occur due to a need or the like, [the teacher] should inform anyone who 
witnesses the act of its ruling [in the Sacred Law], his reason for performing such an act, 
and his objective [in doing the act]. [This is] so that the person witnessing [the teacher] 
not fall into sin by virtue of him witnessing such an act and avoid the teacher [due to 
disdain] thereby not benefitting from the teacher’s knowledge…This is the reason the 
Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace) said to the two men when they noticed him 
speaking with Ṣafiyyah and then turned away, “At ease! She is Ṣafiyyah.” Then he said, 
“Indeed Satan flows in human beings like blood flows [in them]. I feared that something 
would enter your hearts.” He then said, “By which you would be ruined.” The student’s 
opinion of the teacher is a significant factor that determines whether or not the goods of 
teaching and learning will be acquired by the teacher and the student. The teacher must 
act in a manner that takes into consideration the student’s opinion of the teacher.  
 Continuing with the theme of a teacher’s social role, the sixth adab focuses on the 
responsibilities of a teacher when in public. The teacher is to “maintain the performance 
of the public acts of Islam and outward acts of worship such as the performance of prayer 
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in the congregational mosques, spreading the greeting of peace to all classes of people, 
commanding the good and forbidding the evil and patiently bear the harm that comes 
about from it, openly speaking the truth to rulers, exerting oneself for God’s sake not 
fearing the blame of anyone. [All of this] recalling God’s words, “[and] bear anything 
that happens to you steadfastly: these are things to be aspired to.” [31:17].” These 
responsibilities come about due to the knowledge a teacher possesses and constitute an 
internal good of teaching and learning that, in particularly commanding the good and 
forbidding the evil, require knowledge and proper understanding. Ibn Jamāʿah continues 
to list the responsibilities including items such as rendering all innovative religious 
practices obscure, advocating what is in the interests of the Muslims in a recognized 
manner that has been adopted by the early Muslim community. Additionally, “[the 
teacher] should not be content, when it comes to his public and private spiritual works, 
with merely performing what is [legally] permissible. Rather, he should hold himself to 
the most beautiful and perfect manner of performing spiritual works.” All of this, Ibn 
Jamāʿah states, “is because scholars are the ones who taken as exemplars, recourse is 
made to them on legal questions, they are the Proof of God, the Exalted, over the laity. A 
person may be observing them to learn from them who they do not know, and a person 
may be adopting their ways whom they are unaware of.” The social responsibilities of a 
teacher or scholar are directly linked to their rank hierarchically in the created order. 
Being an inheritor of the prophets and, in the absence of a prophet, the proof of God over 
the laity, a teacher’s actions take on a different valence. From this vantage point, the 
teacher must embody the ideals of the faith because of their role as being the sound 
understanding and practice of the faith for everyone. “For this reason,” Ibn Jamāʿah 
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explains, “the misstep of a scholar is considered an enormity in light of the detriments 
that result from it, because people take him as an exemplar to follow.” 
 The tenth adab of the student focuses social conduct that is determined by rank of 
the teacher in the created order as the student is the teacher at an early stage of training. 
Ibn Jamāʿah states, “The student should abandon all general social relationships as 
abandoning them is amongst the most important concerns for a student of the religious 
sciences. In particular, [the student should cut off relationships with] those who are not 
also students of the religious sciences, and with those who go to excess in recreational 
activities and have little time for reflection for natural dispositions are stolen [from 
others].” At first, this adab may seem to be merely practical; aimed to help focus a 
student on their studying. Yet the last statement is key to understanding the point of this 
adab. The dispositions a student is to cultivate are susceptible to being affected by the 
dispositions of others. The adab of others members of society who have not been 
cultivated are likely not the adab a student is to seeking to cultivate and keeping their 
company will expose a student to their adab that will not serve to achieve the goods he is 
seeking. Therefore, the student is to avoid the company of those who are not on the same 
path as he is. Instead, Ibn Jamāʿah explains that, “What is recommended for the student 
of religious sciences is that they should only keep the company of one who benefits him 
or whom he benefits as has been transmitted from the Prophet (Allah bless him and grant 
him peace), “Be a scholar or a student but not the third type [of person] and then you 
would be ruined.” Seeing that a student will be eventually in need of the company of 
people, he, “should keep the company of someone who is upright, practicing, and God 
fearing, scrupulous, intelligent, abundantly good with little evil, well in dealing with 
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others, not arguing with others much, reminding him if he forgets, when he remembers he 
comes to his aid, when he needs he consoles him and when he is worried, he reminds him 
to be patient.” 
 The tenth adab of the teacher and the third adab of the student focus on the use 
of time in the pursuit of learning and teaching. The student should, “hasten to spend his 
early years and the moments of his life acquiring [knowledge] and not be deluded by 
trickery of procrastination and false hopes.” Similarly, the teacher is to be, “continuously 
be avid in increasing in knowledge by earnestness and effort; continuously maintaining 
ones litanies of acts of worship, occupying ones time and the time of others in [public] 
recitations, listening to the recitation [of students], private readings, reflecting, 
commenting [on passages], putting to memory, composing works, and research. The 
teacher should only spend the moments of his life in what he has dedicated himself to in 
terms of acquiring knowledge and acting upon it, and only spend his time on other 
matters to the extent required such as eating, drinking, sleeping, taking rest due to 
tiredness, fulfilling the rights of his wife, a visitor, obtaining foodstuff and other items he 
is in need of, attending to any physical pain or other needs that make it difficult to pursue 
his craft. For there is no worth in trying to preserve the life of a believer, and he whose 
state is the same for two consecutive days is cheated.” Invoking the rank of teachers and 
students as inheritors of prophets, Ibn Jamāʿah states that this manner of spending one’s 
time is because, “the rank of knowledge is the rank of the inheritors of prophets. 
[Additionally,] lofty matters are only obtained by exerting oneself. In Saḥiḥ Muslim, 
Yaḥya ibn Abī Kathīr said, ‘Sacred knowledge is not acquired by the relaxation of the 
body’ and [the Prophet’s] ḥadīth, ‘Paradise is surrounded by loathsome things.’” 
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 On the same theme of giving oneself entirely to teaching and learning, when it 
comes to the student, Ibn Jamāʿah quotes al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī as transmitting a well 
known statement of the early Muslim community, “This knowledge is only acquired by 
one who closes up his shop, destroys his garden, abandons his companions, and if his 
close relatives dies, he does not attend his funeral prayer.” Ibn Jamāʿah does note the 
hyperbole in this statement, yet observes that, “the point here is that it is necessary in 
order to acquire knowledge that the student bring together his heart and focus his 
thought.” The student and the teacher must cultivate the adab of a strong sense of 
purpose and focus; a single-mindedness. In order to achieve this single-mindedness, the 
student is required to cut off all relations and attachments that will not aid him in his goal 
of learning. Ibn Jamāʿah likens these unnecessary attachments to high-way robbers 
(qawāṭiʻ al-ṭarīq) and explains that, “this is the reason why the early community 
recommended estranging one relatives and moving far away from [one’s] homeland. For 
if thought (fikrah) is dispersed, it will fall short of perceiving the true nature of things and 
obscure subtleties. God has not placed in a person to hearts in their body and it has 
likewise been said, ‘knowledge will not give you part of itself until you give your all to 
it.’”  
 The fourth adab to be cultivated on the part of the student continues along the 
line of dedication to learning and the attainment of knowledge. In this adab, however, the 
student’s wealth and lifestyle as possibly serving as impediments is analyzed. The student 
is to cultivate the adab of being, “content with an amount of food that is readily available 
even it is of a small amount. Likewise, [the student should be content] with clothing that 
is readily available even if [the garment] is worn-out.” The student is to cultivate the 
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virtue of patience to deal with these rough circumstances while studying. The students is 
required to create these circumstances if they happen to be affluent because usually 
affluence results in a person not able to develop the single-mindedness required to obtain 
knowledge. Ibn Jamāʿah explains that it is by, “being patient with the constrictions of 
poverty (ḍayq al-ʿaysh) [the student] will attain the vastness of knowledge (sāʿat ul-ʿilm), 
bring together the discomposure of his heart over various hopes. Thereby the well-springs 
of wisdom will overflow in [his heart].”  
The relationship between affluence and learning has been commented on by many 
Muslim scholars. Ibn Jamāʿah’s position in Tadhkirat al-sāmiʿ is well supported by major 
figures in Islamic education. In this adab, Ibn Jamāʿah next provides the statement of 
scholars on this issue for the student to know that the major scholars of the early 
community made their achievements by adopting a lifestyle of near poverty. Starting with 
the eponym founder of his own legal school, Ibn Jamāʿah states, “al-Shāfiʻī (God be 
pleased with him) said, ‘No one who sets out to acquire this knowledge while having [a 
large amount of] possessions and self-pride has succeeded [in achieving his goal]. Rather, 
one who sets out to acquire it with humility, straitened circumstances, and being of 
service to scholars will succeed.’ He also said, ‘Learning Sacred knowledge is suitable 
only for one who is bankrupt. He was asked, ‘Not for the one with wealth that only meets 
his needs?’ He said, ‘Not for the one with wealth that only meets his needs.’ Mālik said, 
‘No one will attain what he desires of Sacred knowledge until he his harmed by poverty 
and prefers it over all other things.’ Abū Ḥanīfah said, ‘One should make their entire 
concern singular in order to help them in the study of Law. One should seek help by also 
cut off social relations by restricting themselves to only what they need, not exceeding 
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that.’” The fourth adab of the student Ibn Jamāʿah tackles this adab of single-
mindedness on part of the student in order to assist him or her in learning as the, 
“student’s capital assets are focusing his thoughts, resting his heart, and employing his 
reflection.”   
Humility and the continuous zeal for acquiring knowledge constitute the eleventh 
adab the teacher is required to cultivate. Humility and continuous learning are related in 
two ways: the teacher should not feel that there is nothing left to learn and the teacher 
should learn from anyone who possesses knowledge regardless of their age, gender, or 
social rank. Ibn Jamāʿah explains, “[The teacher] should not refuse to learn what he does 
not know from someone lesser than him in social status, lineage, or age. Rather, the 
teacher should be avid to learn no matter who the person is. Wisdom is the believer’s 
stray camel (ḍāllah), he will take possession of it wherever he finds it. Saʻīd ibn Jubayr 
said ‘A man will continue to be a scholar as long as he is learning. When he abandons 
learning and assumes he is not in need of learning and suffices with what he knows then 
he is the most ignorant of all.’ One of the bedouins recited [the following verses]: 
 Blindness is not [in] the length of the question, 
[Rather] complete blindness is the lengthy silence  
while [in the state of] ignorance.” 
 
Typical of Ibn Jamāʿah, he next provides statements and examples of this practice from 
the early Muslim community. He states, “Groups of scholars of the early community (al-
salaf) would learn from their own students what they did not have knowledge of. al-
Ḥumaydī – who was a student of al-Shāfiʿī – said ‘I accompanied al-Shāfiʿī from Mecca 
to Egypt. [Along the way], I would learn from him issues [related to Law] and he would 
learn from me ḥadīth.’ Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal said ‘al-Shāfiʿī said to us ‘You are more 
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knowledgeable in ḥadīth than I. Therefore, if a ḥadīth is authentic according to you, then 
tell it to me so I may implement it.’’” Ending the adab, Ibn Jamāʿah cites the practice of 
Prophet Muḥammad who exemplifies in its most complete form the adab possessing 
soul.  
 Ibn Jamāʿah dedicates the eleventh and final adab of the teacher relating to 
himself to the collecting and composing of books. Composing works is an essential adab 
of the teacher for two reasons: the knowledge the teacher has acquired during his career 
and as a means of solidifying the knowledge. For Ibn Jamāʿah, the teacher should only 
begin to compose his own works “with total excellence and complete mastery. For the 
teacher has studied the depths of various disciplines and the subtleties of the sciences [all 
of] which requires a significant amount of investigation, reading, research (tanqīb), and 
review.” As a way of ensuring all of the knowledge acquired over the teacher’s career, 
the teacher is required to record their findings in compositions. This will ensure the 
continual growth in knowledge that is accumulated in the community of scholars in 
particular and for the general community of believers. Thus Ibn Jamāʿah recommends 
that it is preferred for the teacher, “to devote his attention to [composing works] whose 
benefit extends [to as many people possible] and that whose need exists for the most.” 
The scholar must write in a manner that ensures these two benefits are achieved. For this, 
Ibn Jamāʿah recommends that the scholar should concentrate his efforts, “to compose a 
work that is original, intending to utilize clear language in his compositions, avoiding 
lengthy passages that will bore the reader and succinctness that does not achieve the 
[author’s] purpose.” 
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 Regarding the second reason for composing works, solidifying the scholar’s 
knowledge, Ibn Jamāʿah quotes al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī listing the benefits of authoring 
works stating that, “[composing works] strengthens the memory, sharpens the mind (al-
qalb), develops the disposition (al-ṭabʻ), and perfects expression.” These serve as internal 
goods to the practice of teaching. Completing the list with what would be considered as 
external goods al-Khaṭīb states that composing works, “brings about a good reputation, 
abundant reward, and eternalizes [his name] until the end of time.” 
 The remaining ādāb of the student concentrate on what Ibn Jamāʿah considers 
being the greatest supports for the student. The sixth adab describes the greatest supports 
to studying, correct understanding, and avoiding the dullness of studying to be eating a 
sufficient amount of food from that is made from sources considered permissible in the 
Sacred Law. The student must cultivate and develop the ability to determine which 
foodstuff will contribute to studying. This includes the ability to discern the spiritual and 
physical effects of food and drink. Ibn Jamāʿah highlights the spiritual aspect to the adab 
a student should cultivate towards eating. “A sound mind is too honorable to be wasted 
and neglected with even a paltry amount of food that ends up in what is known.” Ibn 
Jamāʿah clarifies ‘what is known’ when one consumes food stating that it results in, 
“sleep, obtuseness, indolence of the mind, dullness of the senses, and laziness of the 
body.” The rank the mind has in the order of creation dictates that it should be employed 
in ways that honor and are reflective of its rank in the created order. Consuming food 
should be done in a manner that upholds the mind’s rank in the created order. The eighth 
adab of the student extends the theme of the sixth adab to avoid specific food, such as 
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sour apples, beans, and drinking vinegar. The student must consume foods that sharpen 
the mind that are known empirically. 
 For the seventh adab, Ibn Jamāʿah tackles the adab of scrupulousness (waraʻ) in 
all matters of a student’s life. This adab impacts the student by “illuminating his heart 
and preparing it to accept knowledge, its light, and to benefit from it.” Being scrupulous 
entails adopting the more precautionary approach in matters of eating, drinking, dressing, 
and one’s residence. For Ibn Jamāʿah scrupulousness entails a certain disposition to 
applying the Sacred Law which entails that one should adopt positions of the Sacred Law 
that are stricter when legal differences of opinion exist. The student, Ibn Jamāʿah advises, 
“should not be content for himself by adopting what is plainly permissible according to 
the sharīʻah whenever it is possible for him to avoid it or there is no need pressing him 
to…Rather he should seek out the highest level [of practice] and adopt the example of the 
righteous scholars of the early community avoiding much of what they would judge to be 
legally permissible.”  
 
The Ādāb the Student is to Cultivate Towards the Teacher 
 The ādāb a student is to cultivate towards his or her teacher embody the position 
of a student and a teacher in the order of creation mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter. Additionally the rank knowledge holds in general and Sacred Knowledge in 
particular in the order of creation is embodied in these ādāb. In light of this, the student is 
to cultivate the adab to deeply consider and seek God’s assistance regarding with whom 
he or she should study. This is so because it is the teacher from whom the student will be 
acquiring ethical character and various ādāb. Thus the student should select a teacher, 
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“whose qualifications are complete, care [of the student] is realized, moral integrity is 
apparent, continence (ʿiffah) is known, good reputation is well-known, excellent in 
teaching, and thoroughly imparts understanding.” Additionally, the student should not 
restrict himself to teachers who are popular and ignore less known teachers even though 
they are more qualified. Doing so constitutes an act of pride and ostentation.  
 The ethical dimensions of a teacher are not the only items a student is to take into 
consideration when selecting who to study with. The academic dimensions are equally 
important. The teacher should have complete mastery of the religious sciences. 
Additionally, the teacher should have spent much time with other contemporary scholars 
in research and lengthy sessions of scholarly inquiry. The teacher should not, “be one 
who has studied from the depth of books, whose companionship with expert scholars is 
not known. al-Shāfiʻī said ‘One who acquired learning in Law [solely] from the depth of 
books brings legal rulings to ruin.’ Some of the [early community] would say ‘Amongst 
the most severe tribulations is the taking up of the pages of books for a teacher.’” 
Participation in a community of scholars and scholarship is an essential component to 
cultivating adab and to ensure correct understanding of the knowledge taught. 
 Once the proper teacher has been identified, the student must now cultivate the 
adab of not criticizing his teacher nor abandoning the teacher’s scholarly positions and 
advice all of which requires humility on the part of the student. “The student should be 
with his teacher like a patient with an expert physician. He should consult with him 
regarding his endeavor, seek out his pleasure in what he seeks, exaggerate in respecting 
him, and draw close to God by serving his teacher. [The student] should know that in 
abasing himself to his teacher is [true] glory, in submitting to him is [true] pride, and 
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humbling himself to him is a raising of rank.” This is brought about by the student, 
“viewing his teacher with the eye of veneration and hold that he possesses a degree of 
perfection. This is more conducive to the student benefiting from his teacher. One of the 
early community, when going to visit his teacher (shaykh), would give something as 
charity and say, ‘O God! Cover the faults of my teacher from me and do not take the 
blessings of his knowledge from me.’” Additionally, the student adab should not refer to 
the teacher in the second person singular. Rather the student should address the teacher 
using the expressions “My master!” or “My teacher!” Reflecting the relationship the 
student has in light of the rank the teacher possesses.  
 The relationship the student has with the teacher continues even after the teacher 
passes away. Consequently the adab a student is to cultivate extends to the teacher even 
after he or she has passed away. Ibn Jamāʿah, as the fourth adab, recommends the 
student to, “pray for the teacher during his life, and to look after his children, close-
relatives, and those beloved to him after his death. The student should regularly visit his 
grave, seek forgiveness for him, give in charity on his behalf. [Additionally, the student 
should] adopt the manner of religious practice and character of his teacher. [The student 
should] observe his teacher’s habits in imparting knowledge and religious teachings, 
pattern his motions and rests on his teachers in his daily habits and acts of worship. He 
should cultivate his (the teacher’s) adab in his soul and not abandon taking his teacher as 
a model [in this affair].” Ibn Jamāʿah sets out the view of the teacher being the archetype 
of adab the student must cultivate his self and embody. This relationship does not end 
with the life of the teacher and the student, after the death of the teacher, is a continuation 
of the teacher’s way of being.  
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 For the remaining ādāb, I will provide them in list-form as the preceding 
discussion suffices us from having to explore each of them in detail.  
5. The student should be patient with any coarse behavior that ensues from 
the teacher or bad character. This should now impede him from keeping 
his close company and having a good opinion of him. The student should 
interpret the teacher’s actions that appear incorrect in the best of ways.  
6. The student should thank the teacher for developing any virtue he has and 
for censuring any deficiency he has. 
7. The student should not enter upon the teacher without his permission, 
except if it is a public gathering. 
8. The student should sit in front of the teacher embodying adab, in the 
manner a child sits in front of a reciter to learn or sit cross-legged with 
humility and submission, tranquility and calmness. He should pay 
attention to the teacher focusing his gaze on him. He should face him with 
his total being, attempting to understand the teacher’s words such that he 
will not be in need of repeating his words a second time. 
9. The student should address his teacher in an excellent manner to the extent 
possible. 
10. If the student heard the teacher mention a ruling on a particular issue, or 
an unfamiliar useful point, or related an incident, or recited some poetry 
that he already knows, the student should give his attention to the teacher 
as if he is learning it at that moment, desiring it, and happy about it as if he 
has not heard it before. 
11. The student should not precede the teacher in explaining an issue or 
answering a question from him or someone else. He should not express his 
knowledge of it nor his knowing about it before his teacher [having 
mentioned it]. 
12. If the teacher hands him something, he should receive it with his right 
hand.  
13. If the student is walking with his teacher, he should be in front of him (the 
teacher) in the night, and behind him during the daytime. 
 
The Ādāb of the teacher in relation to his lessons. 
1. If the teacher sets out to a lesson, he should purify himself from ritual 
impurity, and filth. He should clean himself and wear scented oils, adorn the 
best attire that is appropriate for him and his contemporaries. 
2. When the teacher exits his house, he should supplicate with the authentic 
prayer of the Prophet (God bless him and grant him peace), “O God! I seek 
Your protection for leading astray or being led astray, from committing a 
misstep or being made to commit a misstep, oppressing or being oppressed, 
from treating one ignorantly or being treated ignorantly.” 
3. The teacher should sit being seen to all in attendance. 
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4. The teacher should recite a portion of the God’s, the Exalted, book before 
beginning research and teaching. 
5. If there are a number of lessons, the teacher should start with the most noble 
[sciences] and so forth, and the most important [of the sciences] and so forth. 
6. The teacher should not raise his voice more than what is needed nor lower his 
voice to the extent that the objective is not achieved. 
7. The teacher should protect his gathering from vain speech. 
8. The teacher should rebuke anyone who is excessive in his inquiry, displays 
recalcitrance during his debates, or [displays] bad adab or unfairness after the 
truth is manifest. 
9. The teacher should hold to fairness in his study and speech, listen to the issue 
from its questioner correctly – even if he is young of age. If asked about an 
issue that he does not know, he should say, ‘I do not know about the issue’ or 
‘I don’t know’ for saying ‘I don’t know’ is knowledge itself. 
10. The teacher should show love and affection to an unknown student attending 
his [lesson]. 
11. It is customary for the teacher to say at the end of each lesson ‘and God knows 
best.’ 
12. The teacher should not hold a position of teaching if he is not qualified for it, 
and should not mention anything in the lesson he of which has no knowledge.  
 
The Ādāb the Teacher is to Cultivate in Relation to His Students 
 The intention of the act is the central focus of the first few ādāb of the teacher in 
relation to his students. Although Ibn Jamāʿah has addressed the adab of cultivating the 
correct intention on part of the teacher and the student before, in this context, the Ibn 
Jamāʿah’s focus is now the intention of the act of teaching in relation to the student. The 
teacher is to cultivate multiple intentions in himself, and at the same time is to cultivate 
these intentions in his student as well. As the first adab, the teacher to cultivate in 
teaching is intend to do so solely for, “the pleasure of God, spreading Sacred knowledge, 
reviving the [practice of the] Sacred Law, the continuous manifestation of the truth and 
the obscurity of falsehood, the continuous good state of the community by the abundance 
of scholars, availing oneself of the reward, and acquiring the rewards of whom the 
knowledge benefits of future generations, the blessings of their prayers for him and them 
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invoking mercy on him, being included in the transmitters of Sacred knowledge between 
them and the Messenger of God (God bless him and grant him peace), and him being part 
of the group who convey the revelation of God and His commandments” (Ibn Jamāʿah 
1974, 47). The second adab is for the teacher to focus attention to the intention of the 
student and intially, “not to let the insincere intention of the student be a reason for him 
not teaching the student. For a good intention of the student is hoped for by virtue of the 
blessings of Sacred knowledge.” The teacher is to cultivate correct intentions in the 
student after developing an intimate relationship with student. Ibn Jamāʿah explains that 
the teacher is to make known to the student that, “by virtue f a good intention will attain 
the lofty rank of knowledge, works, the emanation of spiritual knowledge, various types 
of wisdom, illumination of the heart, expansion of the chest, successful decisions, 
obtaining the truth, good states, correctness in speech, and high, lofty stations on the Day 
of Resurrection.” By this, the teacher will correct the student’s intention in the act of 
learning.  
 The relationship the teacher is to cultivate with the student is to draw him close 
and to personally take interest in his learning. The teacher is to encourage the student to 
spend most of his time learning, and is to want for his student what he wants for himself, 
and abhor for his student what he abhors for himself. Thus as the fourth adab  Ibn 
Jamāʿah states the teacher is to be, “concerned with the interests of the student, to deal 
with him the way he would deal with his most cherished child with tenderness, care, 
being good to him. The teacher is to be patient with any coarse behavior of the student 
that might occur” (Ibn Jamāʿah 1974, 49). 
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During the lesson, the teacher is to, “deal gently with the student by delivering the 
lesson in a simple manner, and being gentle in helping the student understand [the 
lesson].” Regarding the manner of delivering the lesson, Ibn Jamāʿah explains that the 
teacher should, begin by providing the proper conception of the topics [of inquiry], then 
explain them further with examples and providing its proofs. The teacher should restrict 
himself to only providing the proper conception of the topics [of inquiry], then explain 
them further with examples for a student who is not able to comprehend its proofs,” 
taking into consideration the intellectual capacity of the student when delivering the 
lesson. “The teacher should clarify for the student subtle ideas and the bases of the topics 
of inquiry. [Additionally, the teacher should mention] the foundations and derivatives of 
the topic of inquiry, and mistaken understandings regarding the topic’s ruling, reference, 
transmission in good way far from disparaging any of the scholars.” 
After the lesson has ended, the teacher should pose various questions to the 
students and test their understanding and retaining of what was taught. The teacher 
should praise the students for their correct answers and re-teach students who did not 
understand the lesson. Ibn Jamāʿah explains that rationale behind the adab of posing 
questions by the teacher stating, “the student might feel shy of saying ‘I do not 
understand’ either due to burdening the teacher to repeat [the lesson] or a lack of time or 
being shy of the other attendees or not resulting in delaying the other students’ 
recitation.”  
In terms of a teacher showing their love for students during a lesson, Ibn Jamāʿah 
advises the teacher, “not to display in the presence of students his preference in love or 
care of some students over others.” However, if some students do possess qualities such 
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as being more hardworking or possessing higher adab, then “the teacher should display 
his preferential treatment and preference of them. He should make clear that his 
preferential treatment is for these reasons.” It is expected that this will drive other 
students to possess the same qualities.”  
The final group of ādāb Ibn Jamāʿah has for the teacher focus on the teacher 
caring for the students’ ādāb and their inward and outward character traits. This covers 
any act of the student that is considered offensive or unlawful in the Sacred Law in 
addition to any act that constitutes bad adab. The teacher is to take into consideration the 
personal qualities of the student when redirecting them. Thus, the teacher should restrict 
himself to merely gesturing if that is enough for the student to desist from the act. If not, 
then the teacher can verbally redirect the student and use harsh words if required. Ibn 
Jamāʿah states, “In general, just as the teacher instructs students regarding the religious 
interests when dealing with God, the Exalted, he also instructs them regarding their 
worldly interests when dealing with people in order to completely [achieve] the merits of 
both states.” The teacher is expected, “to strive to achieve what is in the best interest for 
[his] students, bringing their hearts together, and aiding them using what is ready 
available to him such as his social status, his wealth when he is able to.” Finally, the 
teacher is to be humble when engaging his students and all who seek his guidance. This 
entails referring to his students, especially those who excel, with their agnomen or with 
what they most loved to be called. The teacher should meet them with, “a cheerful 
countenance, displaying happiness, love, informing them of his love.” 
 This section is comprised of the remaining ādāb in relation to different objects as 
described by Ibn Jamāʿah in list form. 
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The ādāb of the student in relation to his lessons, recitation in study circles, and 
what he should adopt in regards to his teacher and fellow students.  
 
1. The student should set out first with the Book of God Almighty. He should 
memorize it and strive to perfect its exegesis and all of its sciences. 
2. The student should, in the early stages of his studies, avoid being occupied 
with [studying] the differences of opinions of scholars, or of people, in creedal 
and scriptural matters.  
3. The student should precisely authenticate what he has recited before putting it 
to memory. 
4. The student should set out to [attend] sessions of ḥadīth audition (samāʿ) early 
on and not delay it and the study of the its sciences, analyzing its chain of 
transmitters, its transmitters, its meaning, the rulings [it contains], points of 
benefit, various dialectical readings, and its biographical aspects. 
5. The student should master primers before attending to lengthier works. 
6. To continuously attend the gatherings of his teacher – sessions of teaching and 
recitation – rather all of his gatherings that the student is able to attend. 
7. When the students attends the gathering of the teacher, he should greet those 
present with a voice that all can hear and single out the teacher with an 
enhanced greeting and welcome. 
8. The student should display adab with those attending the gathering of the 
teacher. 
9. The student should not shy away from questions regarding what is not clear to 
him, and seek to understand what he has not comprehended.  
10. Keep in mind his turn [in the lesson]. The student should not step ahead 
without the consent of whose turn it is. 
11. The student should sit in front of this teacher in a particular manner. 
12. When the student’s turn comes, he should first request the teacher’s 
permission to begin his lesson. 
13. The student should encourage other students towards study and guide them to 
ways that likely lead to it. 
 
The Ādāb in Relation to Books: The Tools of Knowledge. 
1. The student should acquire books he needs. 
2. The student should lend books to those who will not ruin them. 
3. The student should not place a book on the ground spread out. 
4. The student should examine the book he is borrowing when he takes 
possession of it and when he returns it. 
5. The student should be in a state of ritual purity when copying any book of the 
religious sciences, facing the direction of prayer, with purity of body and 
clothes, and use pure ink. 
6. The student should avoid thin script when copying a text. Script is a 
signification, and the best script is the one that is clearest to read. 
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7. When a student is correcting a book and comparing it to an authenticated 
manuscript or [reading it] to a teacher, the student should include all of the 
vowels, place dots on each letter, clarify obscure words, and examine words 
that have been altered. 
8. If the student wants to write a note in the margins, he should place a line in the 
location slightly in the direction of the note.  
9. It is acceptable for the student to write footnotes, useful comments, and 
important points in the margins of a book that he possesses.  
10. It is acceptable to write chapter headings, biographical notes, and sections 
headings with red ink.  
11. Placing a line above a word (al-ḍarb) is preferable to erasing a word, 
particularly in books of ḥadīth. 
 
The Ādāb Relating to the School Living Quarters for Advanced Students. 
1. To the extent possible, the student should select a school for himself whose 
endower is more scrupulous and most free of blameworthy [religious] 
innovations. 
2. The teacher in the endowed school should be: a leading scholar and of high 
moral excellence and religious practice, intelligence, awe and majestic, 
modest, upright,  of good repute with scholars, tender towards the weak, keeps 
close company with the advanced [students], encourages beginning students, 
keeps students who are not serious away, supporting those in research, avid to 
bring about benefit, continuously teaching. 
3. The student should know the conditions of the endowed school and give what 
it is due. 
4. If the endower stipulates that only those teaching in the school can reside in 
the school’s living quarters, then no one else should reside in the living 
quarters.  
5. The student should not be engaged in socializing or fraternizing when in the 
quarters. 
6. The student should honor those who reside in the school living quarters 
greeting [others] with peace, expressing love and respect, and observe 
neighborly rights and the duties of companionship and brotherhood in religion 
and craft for they are [all] scholars, teachers, and students of Sacred 
Knowledge. 
7. The student should select as a neighbor one who possesses the most righteous 
spiritual state, most dedicated towards learning, most excellent nature, 
unblemished reputation in order to support him in what he is engaged him.  
8. If the student’s residence is in the masjid area of the school, or in a location 
where people gather, and his coming and going is on his mat and bedding, 
then he should be careful when rising up to it of anything falling from his 
sandals. 
9. The student should not take the gates of the masjid as a place of sitting. 
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10. The student should not look at the resting place of anyone through the 
openings of the door or the like. 
11. The student should arrive to the place of the lesson early and demonstrate the 
appropriate adab when attending the lesson: attending in the most excellent of 
manners and in the optimal forms of purity. 
 
 Ontologically, the soul possessing adab is a relational self. Adab is always shown 
and demonstrated to a particular being and is reflecting the recognition of the proper 
place and rank that being holds in the order of creation. It is these relationships and the 
correct action that follows from the rights of the rank each being holds in relation to other 
beings that constitute the adab possessing soul. Ibn Jamāʿah’s Tadhkirat al-Sāmiʿ, 
representing a mature stage of the practice’s manuals of adab, reflects the relational 
aspect of adab in the anatomy and content of the text. The anatomy of the text reveals 
that adab is to be cultivated on part of the teacher and the student. For both there are 
objects in regards to which they are to cultivate adab. This is accomplished by 
comprehending the rank teachers and students hold in the order of creation, knowledge 
which only revelation can provide. Thus, a student and a teacher are to cultivate adab 
towards God, their own selves, their teachers and students, lessons, the tools of learning, 
fellow students, their time, and other beings in creation. Relationality is a fundamental 
component of the adab possessing soul.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I have attempted, in the preceding chapters, to put forward a solution to the 
current situation in Islamic educational institutions in the Western world. Describing this 
situation as an antinomy, Merry has identified the crisis facing Islamic educational 
institutions in the West along the lines of a gap between the philosophy of education, if 
there is any, and the practice on the ground, and the struggle of Islamic schools “to define 
what an Islamic education entails that is uniquely distinctive to Islamic schools” (Merry 
2006, 43). The lack of a distinct Islamic philosophy of education that incorporates the 
distinctive elements of an Islamic education has generated multiple attempts amongst 
Muslim educators that generally fall into the universalist and particularist camps as 
discussed in chapter 1. Facing the multiplicity of voices and the long history of 
educational thought in Islam, both approaches have been unable to provide Muslim 
educators with an approach to retrieve the distinctive characteristics of Islamic education 
that accounts for the history and multiplicity of voices. I see both of these points being 
related; the latter being a cause of the former for without a clear understanding of the 
distinctive features of Islamic education, essentially a vacuum is created whereby 
dominant philosophies and practices of education will inform Islamic educational 
institutions in the West, thus rendering them in many cases as virtually identical to 
secular institutions. The two pressures of the nation-state, with its imperative for schools 
to produce citizens with political virtues, and the demands on the Muslim community in 
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the West to integrate liberal values have also resulted in this lack of a distinctive 
institutional identity. The trend of mission statements of Islamic educational institutions, 
and other religious institutions, being developed more in terms of social roles and skills 
that are often identical to secular educational institutions in democratic societies, rather 
than theological and salvific virtues grounded in the Islamic tradition bears this out.  
 In this dissertation, I have employed MacIntyre’s rich conception of a tradition to 
identify the distinctive elements of Islamic education. The MacIntyrean tradition has 
provided us with important tools and frameworks in this inquiry. Importantly, it also 
accounts for the multiplicity of voices and the historical dimensions one encounters when 
endeavoring on this inquiry. By conceiving of education as a practice within the greater 
Islamic tradition, where a practice is “any coherent and complex form of socially 
established human activity” (MacIntyre 1984, 187), we are able to identify its internal 
and external goods along with standards of excellence for that practice. These goods and 
standards have been argued and identified the practice’s authoritative community since 
the practice’s inception thus connecting a practitioner to the history of the practice.  
 The goods of a practice are precisely what has been missing from educational 
discourse amongst Muslim educators in the West. Understanding the historical 
situatedness of the practice of education provides Muslim educators with an 
understanding of the goods over which debates in the community of practitioners have 
been taking place. The authoritative discourse embedded in each practice allows Muslim 
educators to identify which voices represent Islamic educational discourse and which 
voices are not part of that community of practitioners. We have seen that this is achieved 
by an understanding of the internal goods of the practice of education. For if the internal 
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goods of a practice are not achieved, then the practice is not in good order and is a sign 
that the standards of the practice are not being met by the practitioners.  
 When exploring the authoritative discourse of the practice of education in the 
Islamic tradition, it was demonstrated that the adab al-ʿālim wa-l-mutaʿallim genre of 
literature was a major constituent of the authoritative discourse of the practice of 
education in the Islamic tradition. From this genre, Ibn Jamāʿah’s seminal work 
Tadhkirat al-Sāmiʿ wa-l-Mutakallim fī Ādāb al-ʿĀlim wa-l-Mutaʿallim was identified to 
be the text studied for this inquiry. This selection was based on Ibn Jamāʿah’s own career 
as an educationist and the reception of his work amongst practitioners of education in the 
Islamic tradition. Additionally, he was writing at a time when the field of education was 
in a mature, developed form. Thus, his work is representative of a highly developed 
period of Muslim educational thought. It was argued in this dissertation that according to 
Ibn Jamāʿah, the highest internal good of the practice of education as conceived of in the 
Islamic tradition is the cultivation of the soul that possesses adab. Importantly, adab is to 
be understood as a habitus, thus placing it as a quality of the soul. In this, education is 
conceived of as the cultivation of adab in the soul. Education according to Ibn Jamāʿah is 
the cultivation of the self.  
  
Goods, Ends, and the Relational Self 
 One of the central claims of Charles Taylor in his work Sources of the Self, is that 
modern senses of the self are not comfortable with the notion of the good. Every human 
being has goods or ends that they deem to be desirable to attain and work toward. The 
modern self is a project to develop an identity without a framework or sense of the good. 
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For Taylor, there are goods and ends that are ordinary, which all of us seek out on a daily 
basis. Yet there are also goods and ends “which are worthy or desirable in a way that 
cannot be measured on the same scale as our ordinary ends, goods, desirabilia. They are 
not just more desirable, in the same sense though to a greater degree, than some of these 
ordinary goods are. Because of their special status they command our awe, respect, or 
admiration” (Taylor 1989, 20).  
How one makes sense and arrange these goods is a central concern of the modern 
project of the self. It is here where Taylor introduces the notion of hypergoods, which are 
“goods which not only are incomparably more important than others but provide the 
standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about” (Taylor 1989, 63). 
All of us, whether we adhere to a comprehensive framework we hold to be true or not, 
recognize that some of our good are hypergoods, Taylor claims. Two observations are 
important to make here: (1) not all goods have the same valency, and (2) some goods 
constitute the basis which other goods are assessed. For Taylor, it is these hypergoods 
that constitute form our very identity and serve as a horizon which all other goods are 
arranged and assessed. 
When assessing the identity of the self that the practice of education in Islam aims 
at cultivating, I have retrieved the understanding of the education as the cultivation of the 
self as argued by Plato in his work Alcibiades. By examining the highest good, or the 
hypergood in Taylor’s terminology, I argue that we can identify the distinctive features of 
Islamic education. It has been argued that Ibn Jamāʿah’s conception of the highest good 
of the practice of education in the Islamic tradition is soul that possesses adab. 
Importantly, it has been observed that the soul that possesses adab is relational in that 
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adab is always cultivated in relation to some being. This being can be in animate or 
inanimate and it is the rank this being holds that determines the adab a person is to 
demonstrate towards it. It is this dimension of the self – its relational dimension – where 
the most distinctive features of Islamic education can be identified.  Currently in the 
West, the liberal-democratic conception of the self is assumed in educational discourse. 
However, there have been challenges to the autonomous self from different philosophical 
schools. The relational self has been discussed by Confucianists philosophers of 
education31 and by feminist philosophers as well. More recently, feminist philosopher of 
education, Nel Noddings, has developed her ethics of care, rejecting ethics of principles, 
grounding it, instead, in the ideal conception of ourselves as the one-caring. The ethics of 
caring involves the one-caring and the cared-for. Noddings elaborates the act of caring 
stating that “for (A,B) to be a caring relation, both A (the one-caring) and B (the cared-
for) must contribute appropriately. Something from A must be received, completed, in B. 
Generally, we characterize this something as an attitude. B looks for something which 
tells him that A has regard for him, that he is not being treated perfunctorily” (Noddings, 
2013, 19). Such is the relation that serves as the fundamental constituent caring self. This 
relation involves two entities as the ideal self is incomplete if only the one-caring is 
involved. Yet at the same time, each person is the one-caring and the cared-for. In 
emphasizing the fundamental nature of this relatedness, Noddings states that this 
relatedness, “which connects me naturally to the other, reconnects me through the other 
to myself. As I care for others and am cared for by them, I become able to care for 
myself” (Ibid., 49).  
                                                               
31 See for example Jiang, Xinyan. "The Concept of the Relational Self and its Implications for 
Education." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33, no. 4 (2006): 543-55. 
193 
 Noddings takes the relation between beings to “ontologically basic” in her 
conception of the caring self. What this entails is that the self is constituted primarily 
through its relations to other beings. A relation for Noddings “may be thought of as a set 
of ordered pairs generated by some rule that describes the affect – or subjective 
experience – of the members” (Noddings 2013, 3-4). In the context of the caring self, the 
members of the ordered pairs are the one-caring and the cared-for. It is the experience of 
each member that is generated when the relation between the two members are caring and 
cared-for that Noddings takes to be ontologically basic to all human experience. How one 
acts as one-caring is determined by the social roles one holds. The way a mother 
embodies the one-caring will be unique to her role as a mother. Similarly, the way a 
teacher embodies the one-caring will be specific to the person’s role as a teacher and their 
relationship to a student.  
 The relational dimension of the self is constituted by the possession of adab. 
Noddings’ notion of relationality is contingent upon the social roles a person holds. Thus 
if a person is a mother, father, teacher, or employee the relation each member has is what 
serves as the basis of care demonstrated. The relationality of the adab possessing soul, 
although determined by the social role, yet that social role itself is grounded in a 
hierarchical order of creation. This order of creation generates a rank for each being in 
the created order which in turn generates rights by virtue of the rank a particular being 
holds. These rights differ in relation of one being to another.  
 Ibn Jamāʿah demonstrates this sense of relationality by first establishing the rank 
of religious knowledge and scholars in the order of creation before entering into any of 
the ādāb on the part of the teacher or the student. He starts this section with the Qurʾānic 
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verse “God will raise those of you who believe and those who have been given 
knowledge in vast degrees,” [58:11] indicating the high rank knowledge and scholars 
hold in the order of creation. Equally important Ibn Jamāʿah’s conception is idea that 
religious scholars are inheritors (al-waratha) of the prophets of God. The prophets 
holding the highest rank of all created beings in the order of creation, and consequently 
scholars of the religious sciences being inheritors of this prophetic knowledge occupy a 
similar high rank and position; although not considered as prophets. Understanding the 
rank religious sciences hold in regards to the other sciences and the rank the scholars of 
these sciences hold in relation to scholars of the other sciences allows one to comprehend 
the rights owed to them both, thus allowing correct action to ensue on the part of the 
person possessing adab. Ibn Jamāʿah establishes the same in this first section of his adab 
manual for teaching and learning of the religious sciences.  
 After establishing the rank and position knowledge, scholars, the acts of teaching 
and learning hold in the order of creation, Ibn Jamāʿah organizes his manual on adab in 
terms of the relation between two beings and the requisite adab required by that relation 
on the part of each being. Consequently, we see him organizing the ādāb along the 
various constituents of the practice of education: the teacher, the student, instruction, the 
lesson, the various sciences, course of study, fellow students, books, instruments of 
learning, composing books, and residential quarters. The teacher and the student have 
ādāb that relate to themselves and the role the play in the social order as a teacher or a 
student of the religious sciences. The relations govern the ādāb required in relation to 
their own soul from specific intentions they are to cultivate to the virtues they are to 
acquire and the vices they are rid themselves of. The ādāb each is required to cultivate in 
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relation to their lessons, books, and all of the other constituents of the act of learning are 
all determined based on the rank of scholars and knowledge elaborated in the first section 
of the manual. The rank of scholars and knowledge entails certain rights and the ādāb Ibn 
Jamāʿah outlines in his manual serve as the correct action a person is to undertake that 
reflects the cosmic rank of scholars and knowledge. Here we see that the relationality is 
determined by the theological and metaphysical commitments in the Islamic tradition, 
and these commitments serve as the constellation of various goods which further inform 
the internal and external goods of the practice of education in the Islamic tradition all of 
which determine the nature of the relational dimension of the soul that possesses adab. 
The soul that possesses adab is embedded in this constellation of goods and the 
hierarchical order of reality. It is in this constellation of goods and hierarchy that provide 
us with the distinctive features of the practice of Islamic education.  
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Kubrā. 2 vols. Riyadh: Adẉā ͗ al-Salaf, 1999. 
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Salibi, Kamal S. "The Banū Jamāʿa: A Dynasty of Shāfi'ite Jurists in the Mamluk  
Period." Studia Islamica, no. 9 (1958): 97-109. 
 
Salisbury, John. The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth-Century Defense of the  
Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium. Translated by Daniel D. McGarry.  
Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2009.  
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